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To educate the audience about a significant change in SEC enforcement policy

Research was performed of SEC officials' recent public statements about the change in enforcement policy.

The SEC has increased enforcement activity in recent years, and the commission will begin insisting on admissions of wrongdoing in future settlement negotiations.

Private litigants will seize on any admissions exacted by the SEC from corporate defendants. This could result in huge damage awards in private civil litigation.

Explanation of the SEC's recent change in enforcement policy, specifically, how the SEC will demand certain corporate defendants admit to wrongdoing as part of any settlement with the commission.

To contrast SEC Chair Mary Jo White's enforcement rhetoric with the results of recent SEC enforcement actions.

Discusses a speech in which White explained the benefits she believes result from taking cases to trial. Proceeds to review three recent cases in which the Commission has lost after a jury trial or summary judgment motion.

Based on three recent SEC losses, White may be correct in her prediction that trials promote “public accountability for both defendants and the government.”

Some defendants in SEC enforcement actions may ultimately prevail if they refuse to settle with the Commission.

This article analyzes the early results of the SEC's newly-announced enforcement policies.

This paper aims to present the findings of a study examining fraud in the workplace setting, principally in the Australasian context. Although prior research into occupational fraud is conceptually rich, there is a lack of empirical evidence of this important but elusive problem.

Based on investigative data from 14 participating firms, the paper provides insights into the gender breakdowns and stated motivations of offenders. The paper also provides evidence of the number of investigations, interviews and reports to law enforcement in these firms.

The study finds that genders are evenly balanced for most firms, with females significantly outnumbering males in banking firms. Self-imposed financial hardship was the most popular motivator. Of the number of admissions to wrongdoing, only half were subsequently reported to law enforcement.

Particularly complex or advanced types of occupational fraud may go unreported or undetected: as a result, the figures presented in this study may be incomplete. Reported figures are based largely on historical data provided by respondents, and the authors are unable to report accurate details of the respondent firms. This makes it difficult to determine the frequency of offending against the background population.

Investigators should continue to look for changes in the life circumstances of their staff. Such changes will give an indication of instances of staff living beyond their means and the sudden financial pressures that can compel occupational fraud. Instead of trying to supervise staff to an impractical degree, managers and proprietors would be well advised to be alert to the kind of pressures that their staff might experience.

Social control and detection measures are likely to be easier to implement and less invasive than technical controls. The study provides additional pressure to update traditional conceptualisations of the male white collar offender. While male offenders were responsible for larger losses per case, females were more numerous in the summary offence data.

Gaining insights into the problem of employee fraud and white collar crime is difficult. The authors’ contribution in this paper is to provide empirical insights into the makeup of white collar offenders, including insights on gender.

To explain the impact of a recent decision by the USA Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the SEC’s “neither admit nor deny” practice on SEC enforcement matters after the practice was called into question by a federal district court judge.

Explains the background on the practice of no-admission, the challenge by Judge Rakoff to the practice, and the ruling of the Second Circuit and its practical approach on enforcement matters.

The ruling should resolve much of the uncertainty that has surrounded court approval of SEC settlements since Judge Rakoff’s decision to question the practice of no-admit or deny settlements. However, recent comments from SEC Chair Mary Jo White and Senior Enforcement Staff suggest that the SEC may continue to seek admissions in certain cases.

Practical guidance from experienced securities and financial services lawyers.

Deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) are the tool of choice for federal prosecutors when adjudicating corporate misconduct. A DPA is a negotiation that permits the allegedly guilty party from undergoing a criminal trial if they avoid committing further wrongdoing for a specified period. This paper aims to examine whether DPAs are a beneficial mechanism for the criminal justice system to use while adjudicating corporate misconduct. By conducting in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews with 24 practitioners in the legal field and white-collar crime experts, this study identifies the shortcomings and advantages of DPAs and highlights what policy enactments might enhance their application. The study contributes to the existing literature by expanding the narratives used by judicial officials, legal practitioners and white-collar crime scholars on the role of DPAs.

The current study is an in-depth qualitative analysis that explores judicial actors’ and white-collar crime scholars’ opinions on the adoption of DPAs to adjudicate corporate misconduct. The literature on DPAs is currently derived primarily from law and literature reviews published by legal scholars. Clandestine negotiations are not accessible to the public and are frequently kept in sealed files unless a breach of contract occurs, resulting in the case proceeding to trial. Hence, a qualitative analysis is the best approach to evaluate the effectiveness of DPAs. Further, little evidence is available that focuses on the opinions of professionals who have participated in these agreements. The interviews were conducted over Zoom and lasted an average of 43 min, with the longest interview spanning 1 h and 45 min and the shortest interview being 14 minutes. A non-probability sampling method – specifically, snowball sampling – was used to generate a total sample of 24 legal professionals and white-collar crime scholars. Initial participants were found by contacting law offices specializing in white-collar crime litigation and using current networks to attain access to a broader range of participants. Then, 19 participants provided referrals throughout the study. The final sample consisted of nine government officials, eight legal practitioners and seven white-collar crime academics experts. One of the government official interviews was excluded from the final research project due to a lack of expertise in the field of white-collar crime. The interview questions were designed to promote in-depth conversation and insight into personal opinions on the adoption of DPAs. Several inquiries highlighted whether DPAs are an appropriate response to corporate misconduct and whether they reduced recidivism through their intended deterrent effect. Furthermore, several descriptive questions sought to understand which criminal justice actors support the adoption of DPAs in white-collar crime cases and why. Coding of the data was first conducted individually by each author. The researchers then compared thematic findings that reflected consensus.

An immediate theme identifiable in the research is the intrinsic value that DPAs offer in adjudicating corporate wrongdoing. As indicated by a participant, corporate misconduct is not “black or white,” stressing the importance of prosecutors having a middle ground between criminal prosecution and the dismissal of charges. A judicial official indicated that “DPAs are another essential arrow in a prosecutor’s quiver – and something a defense attorney can bargain for” (Respondent 5). Seven government officials and legal practitioners noted that you are unable to send a corporation to jail, and you do not simply want to put them out of business; thus, a DPA is the only tool in which the government can mandate structural change in a company without dismantling the entire entity. Only three academics concurred with the government officials and legal practitioners that DPAs are beneficial and offer prosecutors a vital middle ground. One academic, for example, stated that “DPAs have given U.S Attorney offices that ability to be involved for a considerable amount of time in a company's business, while simultaneously promoting change within the entity” (Respondent 14). Additionally, DPAs ensure that corporations are held criminally liable without triggering an endless cycle of collateral consequences for innocent third parties. One legal practitioner, for example, stated: “Just look at the Enron case; they charged Arthur Andersen with obstruction of justice and dismantled the entire entity they made it where the business was never going to come back. A small subset of individuals, in this case, should have been held responsible but instead, hundreds and if not thousands of people were harmed. With this in mind, DPAs are extremely important, in that it limits collateral consequences because DPAs take a more holistic view that criminal prosecution does not consider” (Respondent 21). Another respondent highlighted that “DPAs are the only tool available that can be employed to change an entire organization structurally” (Respondent 20). Ultimately, the findings suggest that there is a consensus among respondents that DPAs are an appropriate response to corporate misconduct, particularly when the agreement stipulates that a company must hire an external compliance monitor and update their current compliance system. Overall, participants emphasized that these stipulations promote a sense of corporate accountability, provide for the dismissal of guilty employees and mandate structural change. The majority of the respondents (n = 20) insisted that DPAs are advantageous, yet a subset of participants were skeptical of their use in white-collar crime prosecutions. One legal practitioner, for example, noted that “DPAs are political creatures that are awarded as political favors to the largest of corporations that our economy relies upon” (Respondent 17). Another government official confirmed this statement, indicating that “DPAs are a mere slap on the wrist for large corporations – they simply see it as doing business” (Respondent 6). Four academic participants emphasized that DPAs are typically negotiated with multi-level corporations and are not extended to the small businesses that suffer the dire consequences of criminal prosecution. One academic, for instance, stressed that “the question becomes is it fairly applied and being implemented properly. Larger companies are more likely to receive and benefit from a DPA, thus, raising the question of fairness” (Respondent 12). Another academic who was previously a government official stated: “DPAs risk abuse – there have been several instances where prosecutors have forced companies to donate money to favored charities and overstepped their powers. Sometimes DPAs also come with monitors. For example, banks typically have to pay for the auditor, and it becomes extremely intrusive, and it it not clear that they are efficient.”

Several limitations exist in this research. First, it is not a comprehensive study that is representative of the larger population, which limits generalizability. Given the contention of research on DPAs, this qualitative research contributes to the literature, and its findings are likely transferable to multiple settings in which DPAs are used. Second, DPAs are processed and drafted differently across jurisdictions; thus, comparing DPAs across state levels and among departments in the federal government would be equivalent to comparing apples to oranges. This comparison is yet another limitation to the study because criminal justice practitioners operate in both the state and federal jurisdictions. Another challenge in the current study and something that likely will be a problem for future researchers is the difficulty of gaining access to experts in an exclusive field of criminal justice, such as federal prosecutors, Department of Justice officials, federal judges and elite corporate defense attorneys. Ultimately, several obstacles arose during the study, particularly when recruiting participants to gain a large enough sample size to conduct meaningful analysis. This resulted in smaller sample size but rich, in-depth data that achieved saturation among participants.

Several policy implications are identifiable. First, it appears that DPAs are a mainstay of white-collar crime prosecution. No participants advocate for their complete removal from the prosecution process. Participants highlight that DPAs occupy an essential middle-ground between dismissal and criminal charges. Without this mechanism, prosecution would be impeded, and holding corporate criminal actors liable would increasingly become formidable. Although it appears that the system cannot function without DPAs, several respondents emphasize that we must begin to hold individuals accountable alongside corporations. Another policy implication that a minority of participants mentioned within the study involves ensuring that our compliance monitoring system operates appropriately. A majority of participants note that the overarching stipulation that promotes structural change within an organization is adopting a functioning compliance monitoring system, thus, emphasizing the importance of this process operating smoothly and ethically. The selection of an independent compliance monitor may be problematic. For example, a former government compliance monitor notes that not all monitors are experts in the field they are overseeing. A pharmaceutical expert, for example, may be attempting to regulate an automotive organization, which may present unique challenges. An agency of federal professionals dedicated to supervising specific industries such as automotive, pharmaceutical and financial would ensure that organizations are actually implementing the terms of the DPA.

Ultimately, the current research highlights the necessity of empirically studying the benefits and drawbacks of such agreements. Future research on the topic remains onerous due to the scarcity of a centralized database that contains extensive details of DPAs. The present study suggests that the verdict on DPAs is undecided, with more than half of the study's criminal justice professionals advocating for their continued and even increased use. However, about half of the participants, particularly academics, called attention to the agreements’ potential bias. The disagreement among participants is most contentious in the consideration of a DPA centralized database which would immensely aid future research and policy advancements.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the circumstances in which a crisis response strategy can compound a crisis, especially a corporate scandal, as evidenced by the case of AWB Limited, where the organisational damage of the “cover‐up” escalated the scandal further and caused additional damage to the company.

The AWB case study provides a unique insight into the application of theories and research on crisis and reputation management and the specific challenges and risks of corporate scandals.

As a specific form of crisis, corporate scandals can easily descend into a secondary or “double crisis” if incorrectly managed, or even mismanaged.

The paper shows that the information provided to the Australian Government's Royal Commission and other documents relating to the management of the scandal by the company further embarrassed AWB and exposed the inappropriateness of the original defensive apologia crisis response strategy pursued by the company.

The AWB case study provides an opportunity for alignment with the crisis response theories of Coombs and De Maria, based on the evaluation of the initial failed response strategy and the more appropriate response eventually undertaken by the company.

The paper offers the additional insights of the author (as a former member of the management team at the company) into the documents tendered to the Royal Commission, which have not been evaluated and studied for their contribution to crisis communication and crisis management.

The purpose of this paper is to trace how and why the market-designed Libor benchmark turned bad, thereby necessitating a regulatory response.

The study relies on primary and secondary data in the public domain and complemented by a single-case study.

The study demonstrates how and why Libor benchmark rigging led to reforms in the UK and elsewhere.

The study relying mainly on the secondary data analysis needs to be enhanced by further empirical-based studies.

Insights generated by the study suggest why it might not be worthwhile for market participants to game the system.

Libor benchmark affects the financial system widely with varying significance to the wider public. With better regulatory oversight, its negative impact is expected to be mitigated considerably.

The seriousness with which the enforcement agency and judiciary now treat financial crime weakens the earlier public perception that white-collar crime is enforced differently.

The purpose of this paper is to provide enhanced insights on corporate governance failures which contributed to various financial crimes in major banking institutions and whether those involved have been held sufficiently accountable in the USA and the UK.

This interdisciplinary doctrinal research relies on primary and secondary data and is complemented by the case study approach.

Case insights demonstrate that a few major banks and isolated numbers of bankers at the lower echelons were held accountable in the USA but to a lesser degree in the UK. This contrasts sharply with the earlier Enron-type corporate financial reporting scandals or the much earlier Savings and Loans Crisis; but recent criminal charge practices against mega banks suggest a policy shift.

The paper findings suggest the need for further research in this under-researched area, while the banking communities in the USA and the UK may be prompted to review their corporate governance practices.

This interdisciplinary research uses corporate law and criminological research to provide enhanced insights on financial crimes perpetuated in major banks in the USA and the UK.

We examine the role of past litigation in the selection of independent auditors. Using a sample of persons typically involved in auditor selection, we find that any litigation announcement alleging audit improprieties greatly reduces the auditor’s likelihood of hire regardless of the type of legal action announced or the degree of direct involvement by the auditor. Based on these findings, litigation imposes an indirect (and potentially substantial) cost by impeding the CPA’s ability to attract new clients.