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Adam Smith sees religion both as having a useful and a dangerous role. People create gods to explain what they do not understand and appease their desire of justice when human justice is perceived to fail. These are socially useful functions of religion. But when religion is used as a political tool and is used for state capture purposes, then it becomes a dangerous and destructive force in society.

Religion and philosophy satisfy the basic human needs of understanding, belonging, and finding meaning. They provide tranquility of mind and satisfy the desire to be loved and lovable. However, they present their own failings and can counter each other in positive and negative ways, that threaten the communities of beliefs they form and their interactions. An appropriate institutional framework can control the fanaticism and sectarianism that can come with established religion and philosophy.

Is liberalism premised on an unrealistically individualist anthropology? In one regularly told story about modernity, the earliest liberals grounded their arguments for political liberty in a picture of human nature that centered on our moral autonomy, perhaps epitomized best in Kantian thought. However, a range of critics have now compellingly argued that such accounts of our agency are descriptively inaccurate, and that normative social projects beginning from such flawed foundations are thus unstable. While this paper accepts this criticism of individualist anthropologies, it proposes that this need not identify a problem with liberalism overall. To make this case, this paper turns to Adam Smith, who grounded his early advocacy of liberalism in an anthropology grounded in natural theology that depicts us as morally interconnected, rather than as autonomous, and as always morally impressionable. As it will explain, Smith presumed an account of character as integrally related to and influenced by the agent’s social context, for both better and worse. Furthermore, he wove his attentiveness to this complex interaction between the agent and their context into both his economic analyses and political proposals. Smith’s social vision thus illustrates how a strong regard for individual liberty is fully compatible with a sophisticated anthropology that recognizes our malleability as moral agents – and even with political proposals that capitalize upon this malleability. Smith’s thought thus offers useful resources for contemporary proponents of liberalism who wish to value the dignity of individuals without basing that valuation in unrealistic abstractions, or ignoring the responsibilities engendered by the fact of our ongoing moral formation by our social contexts.

This chapter focuses on critical thinking as a new, powerful, and specialized tool and technique for understanding and analyzing the subtle operations of the free enterprise capitalist market system and its ethics and morality. Everything in the world of consumers and market enterprise systems are determined by our supply–demand system that in turn are determined by our presumed limitless production–distribution and consumption (LDPC) systems. From a critical thinking viewpoint, we study the free enterprise capitalist system (FECS) as a dynamic, interconnected organic system and not as a discrete or compartmentalized body of disaggregate parts. Systems thinking with critical thinking calls for a shift of our mindset from seeing just parts to seeing the whole reality in its structured dynamic unity; both mandate that we see ourselves as active participators or partners of FECS and not as mere cogs in its wheels or as mere factors of its production processes. Critical thinking seeks to identify the “structures” that underlie complex situations in FECS with those that bring about high- versus low-leveraged changes in various versions of capitalism. Specifically, this chapter applies critical thinking to FECS as defined by its founder, Adam Smith, in 1776 to its fundamental and structural assumptions, and as supported or critiqued by serious scholars such as Karl Marx, Maynard Keynes, C. K. Prahalad and Allen Hammond (inclusive capitalism), John Mackey and Rajendra Sisodia (conscious capitalism), and others.

The authors address the role that income plays in allowing individuals to resist dominant institutional norms and engage in entrepreneurship.

This is a conceptual article that develops propositions about the relationship of institutional logics and income level with opportunity entrepreneurship.

The authors suggest that high-income individuals are less impacted than low-income individuals by institutional logics that do not support opportunity entrepreneurship. More specifically, the positive effects of a national business system that reflects and replicates market logics within a society have a greater impact on the proclivity to pursue opportunity entrepreneurship of low-income individuals than those with high incomes.

Policymakers addressing poverty need to understand that examining the overall societal impact of institutions is not enough. Weak institutions have a disproportionately negative impact on low-income individuals. In addition to critical resources, the accessibility of market logics is key.

This study is the first in the entrepreneurship domain to theorize how and why institutions matter more for low-income individuals. This occurs via two mechanisms: (1) market logic accessibility and (2) the degree to which institutionalized market logics decrease opportunity cost. In so doing, this study contributes to the literature on embedded agency within the institutional logic perspective.

The aim of this conceptual paper, predicated on a hermeneutic literature review, is to improve understanding of the nature of value continues to be extensively studied with its ability to create competitive advantage. Understanding what constitutes value improves corporate social responsibility (CSR) comprehension, including managerial CSR values. This paper aligns with studies into value and/or CSR, whether hermeneutic or otherwise.

This study provides a reflexively critical understanding of the value literature. It focuses on the “identifying” stage of a hermeneutic circle (identifying central terms, core journals and seminal authors). A hermeneutic helix is proposed to better reflect the need of constant re-interpretation of the relevant literature.

Themes include value location (value in exchange, value in use, value in meaning and value in context); architecture (pathways, constellations and networks); creation versus determination; and value types.

This paper neither seeks to define value nor delve into the overarching value discourses. It does, however, refer to the antecedents for these areas. As a hermeneutic literature review, it lacks empirical testing.

CSR practices are strongly influenced by personal values. Hence, CSR practitioners must identify the processes involved and differentiate between the sought value and value types.

The paper could engender better understanding gaps between stakeholder attitudes and practices, i.e. consumers self-identifying as “green” may not engage in ecologically sound practices. As discussed herein, the value sought by university students influences where (and what) to study.

Outdated notions such as value propositions are widely used; value may be proposed; however, only stakeholders can take value. What constitutes value is under-represented in the CSR literature. Hence, terms such as value and values (i.e. value types) are incorrectly used interchangeably.

I suggest that the search for Adam Smith’s theodicy is likely to be in vain. The paper begins with a brief history of approaches to evil, emphasizing the context in which they arose, and the questions authors were addressing. Approaches most relevant to Adam Smith include those of Augustine and Calvin, and the early modern theodicies of Leibniz, Samuel Clarke and William King, as well as the attacks on them by Bayle and Voltaire. Scottish Enlightenment writers were not terribly interested in theodicy, though Hutcheson and Kames did devote space to their versions of problems of evil. David Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Religion are often taken to be classic statement of the problem of theodicy and argument against religious belief, but his concern was to demolish rationalistic theodicies rather than religious belief or practice. The paper then turns to Smith’s writings, considering similarities and differences to these approaches to evil. Smith emphasizes the wisdom and beneficence of God, and that evils we observe are part of a larger providential plan. He makes no attempt to justify the God in the face of evil, and in this respect Smith shares more with Augustine and Calvin than he does with the early modern theodicists. Smith’s approach to evil is simple and ameliorative. Smith’s approach contrasts with early nineteenth century English political economists, from Malthus onwards, for whom theodicy was important. Whatever view we take of the theodicists project of justifying an all-powerful and good God in the face of evil may, we still struggle to make sense of economic suffering and evil.

Is there a secret recipe for economic growth?

No, there is no recipe, but we can extrapolate some pieces of advice from Adam Smith.

An economy can leave behind its “dull” stagnant state and grow when its markets expand, when the productivity of its workers increases thanks to high compensations, which are seen as incentives to work harder and when lobbying and cronyism are kept at bay. Luck plays a role too, but these three ingredients are necessary, even if not sufficient, for an economy to grow and thus be “cheerful.”

These three aspects – expansion of market, liberal compensation of workers and lobbying – especially combined, have often been underestimated in Smith’s understanding of the possible sources of economic growth.