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This paper attempts to trace and describe the role played by the government sector – the state – in promoting economic growth in Western societies since the Renaissance. One important conclusion is that the antagonism between state and market, which has characterised the twentieth century, is a relatively new phenomenon. Since the Renaissance one very important task of the state has been to create well‐functioning markets by providing a legal framework, standards, credit, physical infrastructure and – if necessary – to function temporarily as an entrepreneur of last resort. Early economists were acutely aware that national markets did not occur spontaneously, and they used “modern” ideas like synergies, increasing returns, and innovation theory when arguing for the right kind of government policy. In fact, mercantilist economics saw it as a main task to extend the synergetic economic effects observed within cities to the territory of a nation‐state. The paper argues that the classical Anglo‐Saxon tradition in economics – fundamentally focused on barter and distribution, rather than on production and knowledge – systematically fails to grasp these wider issues in economic development, and it brings in and discusses the role played by the state in alternative traditions of non‐equilibrium economics.

A close reading of Adam Smith’s works, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations” and “The Theory of Moral Sentiments,” indicates that he would not support the advocacy of free markets wholeheartedly. His view on market systems, although “free,” implies strong institutions and regulations. Adam Smith would have been particularly concerned with the fact that the large multinationals are as much political actors as they are economic actors. He would have argued that there may be ‘moral‘ limits to globalization. In his view, the general rules of morality are (in modern parlance) ‘socially embedded.’ Thus, sympathy and fellow‐feeling mostly operate at ‘close quarters’ and, in particular, they may not be effective at a transnational level.

This paper gives an account of important aspects of Smith’s methods in An Inquiry Concerning the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN). I reinterpret Smith’s distinction between natural and market prices, by focusing on Smith’s account of the causes of the discrepancies of market prices from natural prices. I argue that Smith postulates a “natural course” of events in order to stimulate research into institutions that cause actual events to deviate from it. Smith’s employment of the fiction of a natural price should, thus, not be seen merely as an instance of general or partial equilibrium analysis, but, instead, as part of a theoretical framework that will enable observed deviations from expected regularities to improve his theory. For Smith theory is a research tool that allows for a potentially open-ended process of successive approximation. These are the Newtonian elements in Smith. I provide evidence from Smith’s posthumously published Essays on Philosophical Subjects (EPS, 1795), especially “The History of Astronomy” (“Astronomy”), that this accords with Smith’s views on methodology.¹ By way of illumination, Smith’s explanation of the introduction of commerce in Europe is contrasted with that of Hume as presented in “Of Commerce.” I argue that Smith’s treatment is methodologically superior.

Adam Smith’s theory of economic growth, as presented in the Wealth of Nations, is based upon the potential for increasing returns in manufacturing generated by increased specialization and division of labour and upon the accumulation of real capital, which is necessary to support the greater division of labour. The increasing returns part of Smith’s theory leaves open the possibility that bank credit, issued judiciously, might be used to extend the market and so increase an economy’s growth rate. However, Smith’s theory of bank credit and note extension is quite conservative. Henry Dunning Macleod, a century after Smith, made much of the potential of credit to extend the market. Notes Smith’s apparent inconsistency and considers reasons why he might have chosen not to promote the use of credit to enhance economic growth.

It is commonly held that Adam Smith is a prophet of capitalism. There is a good deal of evidence pointing towards his optimism about commercial society. This article claims to show the pessimistic side of Smith’s view of commercialism. While some of Smith’s pessimism is obvious, some emerges only after considering his six ends of human nature. We show that according to Smith’s own criteria, commercial society is not good. We also show that Smith considers commercial society to be neither inevitable nor permanent. In other words, Smith says that commercial society fails on three counts. Rather than a prophet of capitalism as the end of history, Smith emerges from this analysis as a major critic.

In his bestselling The Worldly Philosophers, Robert Heilbroner puts the focus on the visions and analyses of the great economic thinkers from Adam Smith to Joseph A. Schumpeter. Worldly philosophy is considered as a child of capitalism and worldly philosophers as system-builders addressing the long-run development of the economy and the society. This implies viewing the economy as historically and institutionally situated demanding a more interdisciplinary perspective and embedding economics in the social sciences. The article compares the work of Heilbroner and Adolph Lowe who was Heilbroner’s main mentor. The focus is on their reflections on Smith and Schumpeter. Heilbroner considered Smith as the first worldly philosopher of whose Wealth of Nations a German translation was published already in 1776 in Stuttgart, Lowe’s native city. Lowe’s early work on business cycles was strongly inspired by Marx and Schumpeter’s emphasis on the role of capital accumulation and technical progress as well as Schumpeter’s distinction between statics and dynamics. Lowe was forced to emigrate from Nazi Germany in spring 1933, only half a year after Schumpeter’s move to Harvard where Heilbroner studied in the late 1930s when Schumpeter enjoyed making provocative statements on the Great Depression which was still not yet overcome.

Egoism as a moral philosophy of market economy in Adam Smith’s system is rational not ultra. It benefits not only other people but also the society led by an invisible hand. The Chinese traditional culture dominated by Confucianism, which denied gain‐seeking actuated by human selfish motives, as a whole, may be incompatible with the development of a market economy. Without rational egoism, the market economy would not exist. Meanwhile, ultra‐egoism which benefits oneself at the expense of others has also deformed the market economy. If it runs wild, the market economy would take the road to its doom.

In the Western world the voices calling for a secular society have grown ever louder over the last three centuries. This paper seeks to return to one of the founders of modernity for guidance. Adam Smith advocated globalization on economic and moral grounds.Design/methodology/approach – A discussion focusing on those calling for a secular society and, in addition to these normative advocates, various social scientists have propounded the “secularization thesis”; after analysing history from a purportedly positive view, they have argued that “modernization” leads to a secular society. Recently globalization has been seen as another cause of secularization. At the same time, the revival of various religions has cast doubt on these claims.Findings – Smith did not see secularization as an inevitable consequence of globalization. Further, despite his awareness of the arguments of the advocates of secular society (and contrary to some commentators like Minowitz), he rejected their advice. For him, a secular community was neither a necessary nor a desirable consequence of globalization.Originality/value – Provides a viewpoint on some of Adam Smith's thoughts and ideas.

Mainstream economists now consider their discipline to be a technical one that is free from ethical concerns. I argue that this view only arose in the twentieth century. In this paper I set out a brief history of economics as a moral science. First, I sketch the evolution of economics before Adam Smith, showing that it was generally (with the exception of the mercantilists) conceived of as a part of moral philosophy. Second, I present elements of the new interpretation of Smith, which show him as a developer of economics as a moral science. Third, I show that even after Smith, up to the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of leading economic theorists envisioned economics as a moral science, either in theory or in practice. Fourth, I sketch the decline of economics as a moral science. The key factor was the emergence and influence of positivism. Overall, I show that the current view of the detachment of economics from morals is alien to much of the history of the discipline.

The purpose of this paper is to hypothesise that business theory and education suffer from having been systematically de-philosophised over the last 200 years. Viewed through this lens the economistic narrative can be understood and new and integrated solutions to theoretical and pedagogical problems can be debated.

This paper is a theoretical exploration based on a literature review and philosophical analysis.

Going back to a social science philosophy would fundamentally affect how management is conceptualised, done and taught. The paper focuses on outlining the impact a re-philosophisation would have on management education.

If one agrees that philosophy plays a too small role in management, it would change how scholarship is currently defined and how management education functions. Business schools would have to fundamentally change in every respect.

Current criticism of the management mainstream focuses on either the political/ethical or the epistemic level. The paper argues that the epistemic and the ethical are connected and by making an integrated argument the debate can be re-energised and solution strategies become obvious. I am not aware of any other contribution making this argument. Ghoshal (unwittingly) used the same reasoning but without using the clear frame of reference (philosophy) that this paper proposes.