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In 1976, amid the vastly greater celebrations of the bicentennial anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, there was the greatest orgy of historical nostalgia in the history of economics, occasioned by the bi‐centenary of the Wealth of Nations. In addition to a veritable deluge of scholarly books, articles, pamphlets, conferences, and symposia, and also innumerable popular and ephemeral effusions, all the mass media were enlisted. There were countless magazine and newspaper articles, some radio and T.V. programs, at least one especially commissioned technicolor film and, for all I know, there may also have been bicentennial poems, paintings, sculptures, and choral symphones!

This paper aims to present the salient features of Smith's argument of the falling rate of profit. This theory has usually been interpreted as a result of the intensification of competition in the markets of goods and services of the factors of production. This aspect of Adam Smith had been initially posed by Ricardo and subsequently was widely adopted by the major economists of the past as well as from the majority of the modern historians of economic thought.

This paper reviews the major interpretation of the argument from Ricardo and Marx as well as from major historians of economic thought, and then attempts to reconstruct Smith's argument, which is scattered throughout the Wealth of Nations. The authors present some indirect empirical evidence based on the evolution of interest rates on annuities lending support to Smith's insights of the falling rate of profit.

In the author's view, Smith's analysis of the falling tendency in the rate of profit is by far more complex than usually presented and that the intensification of competition is the result of the falling rate of profit rather than its cause which is the capitalization of the production process.

This paper presents a review of existing literature and an interpretation of Adam Smith's original model of the falling rate of profit.

At the 2009 Devos economic forum on the global financial crisis, David Cameron, then leader of the British Conservative Party and now Britain's Prime Minister, called for embracing a “moral capitalism.” The purpose of this paper is to consider the insights into a moral framework for the modern economic order that might be drawn from natural religions perceived by Adam Smith and Thorstein Veblen.

A review of the two perceptions of natural religions provide the basis for assessing their compatibilities with the type of competitive market economy that Smith observed in the eighteenth century, and with a modern market economy of large corporate enterprises and global financial markets. Particular attention is given to reforms that curb the practices that led to the global financial crisis.

Smith's “pure and rational” natural religion has been interpreted as being compatible with the type of competitive market economy that he analyzed in Wealth of Nations. Veblen's natural religion of “Christian morals” had a natural rights analogue in the ethics of a competitive market economy in which market relationships were heavily influenced by production resting heavily on personal skills of craftsmen and trade relying on the honesty of small merchants.

The primary focus is on reforms in those aspects of the financial sector of the modern market system that have been associated with the current global financial crisis. What the two natural religions might suggest in the nature of broader socio‐economic reforms, e.g. corporate governance issues, would require a much larger study.

While debates over a “moral capitalism” will be influenced doctrinal stances of institutional religions, sectarian differences may be bridged by considering natural religions that are rational and rest on the principle of fair play and mutual service.

Because of the attention that has been given to Smith's and Veblen's critical commentaries on institutional religions, the paper shows that their perceptions of natural religions and how those religions might relate to the economic order are easily overlooked.

The purpose of this paper is to present the methods of teaching about the global financial crisis (GFC) from a social economic perspective. Using primary texts from the history of economic thought, the moral underpinnings for collective social action are examined in times of economic depression. The deregulation of financial markets raises two questions: to what extent is deregulation the result of a misunderstanding about human nature and the behavioral lessons of social economics; and to what extend does deregulation ignore the moral lessons of Adam Smith’s invisible hand?

By reading sources including Mandeville, Smith, Keynes, Hayek and others, students form conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of government interventions, both to fix, and to prevent, major recessions and depressions.

Two fallacies relating to financial market deregulation are that “greed is good” and that rational actors in the market will self-regulate leading to widespread prosperity. These moral beliefs supported financial liberalization, and ultimately contributed to financial institutions taking on enormous risks and losses that are ultimately socialized.

This paper innovatively uses readings from the history of economic thought to spark pedagogical discussions and debates about human nature and policymaking relevant to the GFC.

Altruism seens to have a bad name among economists. Adam Smith pointed out that self‐interest, under the benign guidance of the invisible hand, was the engine that made the economic world go round. Altruism was worse than irrelevant; it was pernicious.

There has been controversy about whether Adam Smith is an economic egalitarian because he expresses at least four distinct views on equality, in two of which, he approves of inequality, and in the other two, he claims otherwise. The purpose of this paper is to isolate and consider these four views carefully to understand Smith’s complete position on equality.

The paper examines Smith’s apparently contradictory views on equality as his evolving response to Hume and Rousseau’s critiques of inequality.

Hume and Rousseau criticize any income inequality that is disproportionate to industry between the rich and poor. Smith’s response to their critiques evolves over time. In his initial response in early writings, he defends inequality in a civilized society by comparing it with a poor primitive society. However, in his later response in The Wealth of Nations, he eventually accepts Hume and Rousseau’s critiques of inequality. According to Smith, an equal and opulent society will evolve. A primitive society is equal but poor. In contrast, an existing civilized society is opulent but unequal. In each society, equality and opulence are incompatible. However, Smith believes that a future civilized society will fully achieve both equality and opulence.

The paper analyses both historically and theoretically the comprehensive structure of Smith’s egalitarian views.

A tax based on land value is in many ways ideal, but many economists dismiss it by assuming it could not raise enough revenue. Standard sources of data omit much of the potential tax base, and undervalue what they do measure. The purpose of this paper is to present more comprehensive and accurate measures of land rents and values, and several modes of raising revenues from them besides the conventional property tax.

The paper identifies 16 elements of land's taxable capacity that received authorities either trivialize or omit. These 16 elements come in four groups.

In Group A, Elements 1‐4 correct for the downward bias in standard sources. In Group B, Elements 5‐10 broaden the concepts of land and rent beyond the conventional narrow perception, while Elements 11‐12 estimate rents to be gained by abating other kinds of taxes. In Group C, Elements 13‐14 explain how using the land tax, since it has no excess burden, uncaps feasible tax rates. In Group D, Elements 15‐16 define some moot possibilities that may warrant further exploration.

This paper shows how previous estimates of rent and land values have been narrowly limited to a fraction of the whole, thus giving a false impression that the tax capacity is low. The paper adds 14 elements to the traditional narrow “single tax” base, plus two moot elements advanced for future consideration. Any one of these 16 elements indicates a much higher land tax base than economists commonly recognize today. Taken together they are overwhelming, and cast an entirely new light on this subject.

The purpose of this paper is to test a theoretical model examining the potential impact of abstract thinking on entrepreneurial intentions (EI). The impact of perceived desirability of entrepreneurship on the relationship between abstraction and intentions was also examined.

A total of 155 participants completed measures of abstraction, self-efficacy, desirability and EI. Hierarchical regression was used. A bootstrapping approach was utilized to test for mediation.

High levels of abstraction were positively related to EI, while also interacting with self-efficacy. High levels of abstraction counteracted otherwise low levels of self-efficacy, resulting in subsequently higher intentions. The perceived desirability of entrepreneurship mediated the relationship between abstraction and EI.

The scope of analysis and student population sample may limit generalizability.

The results identify a cognitive process that may help individuals overcome feasibility concerns. Entrepreneurial training programs might choose to instruct individuals that, when encountering a roadblock, they should focus on their ideals and the bigger picture rather than being discouraged by the challenges of the process.

The results provide insight into the psychological processes that lead individuals to become entrepreneurs. The study helps in explaining the mechanism by which a tendency toward abstract thinking leads to stronger EI and identifies an additional antecedent to individuals’ perceptions of desirability toward entrepreneurship.

Formerly socialist economies of Eastern Europe have been advised by the West to adopt the property rights of classical capitalism. Yet the Western economies from which this advice emanates are all struggling to overcome productivity stagnation, resulting from the tensions between the interests of capital and labour. Experiments range from quality circles to far fuller worker participation in decision making and ownership. However, these experiments are coming forth slowly and timidly. Once in place, property rights are exceedingly difficult to alter. Thus those property rights chosen within East European economies over the next several years may be those which define these economies for the foreseeable future. Consequently, it would be an ironic and tragic twist of fact if East European economies were to turn now towards classical capitalism only to find that the future belongs to post‐capitalist forms of productive organization.

It was typical in nineteenth century economic thought to view the tensions between the interests of capital and labour as critical to industrial society. Yet later economic thought has generally reduced these tensions to those captured in contract theory. Explores how this narrowing of focus has cast an important source of contemporary social dynamics into the shadows. A broad survey is made of the various ways in which capital‐labour tensions are manifested in today′s advanced industrial economies, with special attention given to the case of the USA. Concludes with a discussion of how intensified international competitiveness, combined with our increasing distance from the threat of material privation, may force societies to restructure their economies so as to eliminate the source of capital‐labour tensions. The task facing liberal economic thought is to expand its scope to better provide guidance for meeting this challenge.