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The accelerated pace of change in the global economy and capital markets along with the complexity of transactions and financial reporting that involve applying fair value measurements (FVM) is a major third-party user concern. The 2008 financial crisis highlighted risks that investors are exposed to when making FVM-related capital allocations. Accounting estimates often involve subjective assumptions and measurement uncertainty, increasing potential management bias (Choudhary, 2011; Ramanna & Watts, 2012). FVMs are of critical importance to the reliability of the financial statements. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to inform educators of the possible need to evaluate their curriculum as to coverage of FVM topics. The support for this evaluation is based on our attempt to: (1) evaluate the extent of reported FVM-related deficiencies with reference to regulatory bodies’ findings of significant deficiencies in FVM; (2) examine the use of FVM specialists; (3) determine if colleges and universities are keeping pace with FVM demands; (4) list the Uniform CPA Examination Blueprint FVM testing areas; and (5) provide curricular FVM topic recommendations.

Private company investors operate in unique environments. Seed equity investors, which generally include venture capitalists and angel investors, often have the particularly unusual role of becoming involved in the oversight of the investee company. This continuing involvement with the investee firm introduces conflicting interests: the desire to maximize the profit from the investment, but also the desire to maintain a positive relationship with the entrepreneur(s) (consistent with the theory of upper echelons/strategic management). We discuss in detail this unusual investment context and the role that accounting disclosures can have in this environment. We predict that accounting disclosures can influence the tradeoff between the profit motive and the relationship motive. Using 64 experienced angel investors as participants in a realistic experimental setting, we find that disclosures indicating conservatively biased accounting choice and lower account risk (variance) lead to angels increasing the valuation of the target firm and forgoing higher profits. Increasing the valuation serves to foster the relationship with the entrepreneur(s). Our findings have implications for entrepreneurs making choices about discretionary disclosures and for standard setters; we also inform theory related to overcoming anchoring.

This chapter examines the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to market-adjusted returns and changes in earnings for high-tech (HT) firms vis-à-vis firms (NHT) in other industries. Consistent with the hypotheses, this chapter uncovers the following evidence: First, the sensitivity of executive bonus compensation to market-adjusted returns is weaker and more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms (a control group), which implies that the problem of ex post settling up, documented in Leone et al. (2006), may be far less serious in HT firms than in NHT firms. Second, the sensitivity of executive incentive compensation to earnings changes is generally more symmetric for HT firms than for NHT firms, which is consistent with the view that HT firms engage in more conservative financial reporting than NHT firms. Third, the sensitivity of executive equity-based compensation to market-adjusted returns is significantly negative for HT firms compared to NHT firms when bad earnings news is announced. The results imply that HT firms, with a strong motive to attract and retain their highly talented executives, judiciously use both short-term and long-term incentive compensation schemes by compensating for a reduction of short-term incentive pay with an increase in long-term incentive pay. The issue of executive compensation has been a longstanding one in the United States and Canada, and the issue of executive compensation-performance sensitivity for HT firms is also relevant in this era of the information technology (IT) revolution, especially when prior research has shown that HT firms differ from NHT firms in their market-valuation process.

The purpose of the study is to investigate the impact of tax planning activities on the firm value of FTSE 100 firms. We employ static and dynamic panel regression analyses on a sample of 70 companies drawn from the UK FTSE 100 over a five-year period (2006–2010). Empirical evidence suggests that tax planning activity as measured by the proxies based on reported accounting information has a negative impact on firm value. Moreover, the results from the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) models suggest significant dynamics in firm value, i.e., the current firm value is positively affected by the past firm value. The findings imply the need for a full review of the adequacy and relevance of tax accounting disclosure and therefore have policy implications for accounting standard setters.