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Whistleblowers have been credited for uncovering financial scandals in companies globally, including Enron, Olympus Corporation, and WorldCom. Despite increasing support and incentives for whistleblowing, there generally remains reluctance to blow the whistle. Thus, the purpose of this study is to review: (1) the determinants of internal and external whistleblowing on accounting-related misconduct, (2) U.S. whistleblowing legislation on accounting-related misconduct and related research, and (3) the effects of whistleblowing on firms and whistleblowers. Within each area, suggestions for future research are offered.

This paper aims to generate new research directions at the intersection of accounting, whistleblowing and publicness: defined as the attainment of public goals, interests and values.

A problematising review is used to challenge and rethink the existing accounting and whistleblowing literature by incorporating readings from the public interest and public value literature. The paper draws on the work of Dewey (1927), Bozeman (2007) and Benington (2009) to open up new ways of theorising relations between accounting, whistleblowing and publicness.

Firstly, the paper develops a public interest theoretical framework which shows whistleblowing is a public value activity that moves organisational wrongdoing into the public sphere where it is subject to democratic debate and dialogue required to reconcile the public's interests with what the public values. Secondly, this framework provides one answer to continuing questions in the literature of how to define accountings relationship to the public interest. Finally, the paper suggests this conceptual framework be used to stimulate debate on whether and how one should expand existing accounting and accountability knowledge boundaries to incorporate the broader social, political and moral concerns highlighted by whistleblowers acting in the public interest.

Accounting and whistleblowing research has ignored the theoretical implications of whistleblowing in the public interest. The paper shows how accounting and accountability can respond to the challenges of a shifting and intangible public interest by providing a conceptual framework to guide current and future theoretical questions of how accounting is connected to the public interest.

The purpose of this study was to determine the professional competency levels acquired by internal auditors in detecting unethical behaviour, to evaluate the position of internal auditors on objectivity and integrity in dealing with unethical behaviour and to examine the extent of their awareness on ethical issues in government-linked companies (GLCs).

Data were collected via questionnaires that were randomly distributed to the internal auditors of the selected GLS in Malaysia. These questionnaires were constructed from the Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) Examination Paper and The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Competency Framework.

This study found that internal auditors of the GLCs had a high level of competency in performing audit engagements and were able to detect unethical practices in the companies. The majority of the internal auditors also had a high level of objectivity and integrity when faced with unethical behaviour during audit engagements.

This study provided strong evidence that the internal auditors of Malaysian GLCs strongly complied with IIA Code of Ethics. Besides, they were also aware of the unethical behaviour which occurred within their organizations. However, this study is limited to the internal auditors in GLCs, while the questions of the survey instrument are restricted to the elements of integrity, objectivity and professional competencies of internal auditors.

This study highlights the level of internal-auditor competency and adherence to the IIA’s International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (ISPPIA) and IIA’s Practice Guide to identify unethical behaviour within the Malaysian GLCs.

This study is original as it focusses on GLCs which did not get much attention from previous researchers, particularly the GLCs that operate in a developing country such as Malaysia.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the factors affecting the whistleblowing intentions (WBI) by Iranian accountants by integrating the fraud pentagon and the extended theory of planned behavior.

The population was made up of accountants from all of the 400 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange and the authors used a quantitative survey-based method. Out of a total of 300 questionnaires administered, 171 valid responses were used for analysis. This research used the partial least squares structural equation modeling analysis using SmartPLS 3.3.3 to examine the proposed hypotheses and to analyze the research model.

The results indicated that the extended theory of planned behavior components (perceived behavioral control, perceived subjective norms (PSN), perceived moral obligation and attitudes toward whistleblowing) have positive effects on accountants’ internal WBI. The results of investigating the moderating effect of perceived moral intensity (PMI) on the relationship between components of the extended theory of planned behavior and WBI show that PMI moderates the effect of PSN on WBI.

This study develops the whistleblowing literature by bringing together the components of the fraud pentagon and the extended theory of planned behavior and providing an integrated model. This model, which incorporates many variables from previous research, seeks to provide a comprehensive model for whistleblowing with the expansion of the Brown et al. (2016) model.

This study aims to combine two fraud-related streams of the literature on guanxi and overconfidence into an integrated framework, which is the fraud triangle, to interpret the mechanism of fraud commission and detection.

A bivariate probit model with Partial Observability (POBi Probit) is applied. Moreover, the POBi Probit model is adjusted to the Chinese context. The China-specific POBi Probit model is constructed using data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2014, with a total of 15,109 firm-year observations.

Overconfidence induces fraud commission and worsens fraud detection; overconfidence mediates the relationship between fraud and guanxi; the “white side” of guanxi comes from alumni networks, while the “dark side” is derived from relatives-based networks; overconfidence induces fraud commission in accounting and disclosure and benefits the detection of disclosure frauds. Guanxi suppresses fraud commission in management and disclosure, however, it worsens fraud detection given fraud in management and disclosure; overconfidence induces fraud commission in both state-owned enterprises (SOE) and non-SOEs, and benefits fraud detection in SOEs. Guanxi suppresses fraud commission and worsens fraud detection in SOEs and city-owned firms.

There are two drawbacks of the partial observable bivariate probit (POBi-Probit) method that must be mentioned here. On one hand, the ex ante variable selection is one of the most difficult parts of applying the POBi-Probit model and different variables are included in different studies. On the other hand, the POBi-Probit model might not converge if too many variables are included. Thus, many widely accepted factors can be included in the model. Thus, this study initially sets the POBi-Probit model based mainly on Khanna et al. (2015) and then adjusts the model for the Chinese context (e. g. considering government ownership) according to Yiu et al. (2018) and Zhang (2018) and the local study of Meng et al. (2019). Considering the observability of fraud, on one hand, the observability of fraud commission is a widely accepted limitation, especially when accounting opacity comes across with regulatory efficiency (Yiu et al. (2018). On the other hand, the observability of relationships is another obstacle to this study. Future studies can go further by revealing the presently unobservable relationships using Big Data technology.

This paper theoretically and practically contributes to the literature on both corporate fraud and corporate governance. Theoretically, by introducing integrated principal-agent resource-reliance theory (IPRT) and upper echelon theory (UET), this paper broadens the framework of fraud triangle theory (FTT) and testifies the availability of the broaden FTT in the transitional and emerging-market context of China. Practically, this paper provides evidence that guanxi and overconfidence are two of the factors affecting corporate fraud. Thus, this paper provides a governance approach opposing corporate fraud in China, which may help the other emerging economies in transition.

This study aims to address the following four research questions: first, whether auditors report critical audit matters (CAMs) to shield themselves against possible litigation; second, whether reporting quality affects auditors’ propensity to report CAMs; third, whether auditors’ tenure length – reflecting familiarity with clients’ financial reporting – affects their likelihood to report CAMs; and fourth, whether auditors’ conservatism increases the likelihood of CAMs reporting.

Data are manually collected from audit reports including CAMs in 10-K, then financial data are collected from the Capital IQ database, and market data are collected from the CRSP database. Using propensity score matching, the initial sample of companies with CAMs is matched with companies without reported CAMs. Performance adjusted discretionary accruals, real earnings management proxy, Khan and Watts’ (2009) C-score, propensity to issue a going concern opinion, Dechow et al.’s (2011) F-Score, Rogers and Stocken’s (2005) model and Houston et al.’s (2010) model are used to measure reporting quality, auditor conservatism, misstatement risk and litigation risk, respectively.

The results do not show that auditors report CAMs opportunistically to shield themselves from litigation risk. However, the results do suggest that auditors have a greater tendency to report CAMs when reporting quality is low and when they are more conservative. On the other hand, they have less tendency to report CAMs in their first year of engagement.

The findings of this study have important implications for the auditor behavior literature as it shows that, when it comes to reporting CAMs, auditors actually behave objectively and do not report in a trite way. This study also provides early archival evidence on a standard that relates to the first major change to the auditor’s report in decades. To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the first to provide evidence on the association between auditor conservatism and auditors tendency to report CAMs and the first to triangulate prior research on auditor litigation risk by providing the first archival evidence on the auditors “litigation-shielding” concern.

This study examines whether auditors attempt to meet the stated objective of reporting CAMs by signaling information about reporting quality. This study demonstrates that reporting CAMs is not a “boilerplate” communication. This study has implications for standards setters, as it shows that CAMs are reported in a way consistent with the objectives of the new standard, namely, via signaling information in the audit report on the quality of the financial statements.

In terms of originality, this paper uses a manually collected sample and, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is the first to focus on auditor’s behavior rather than on investors or clients reactions to CAMs. Also, this paper addresses a recently issued standard using US data and archival approach, rather than experimental. This paper also provides relevant evidence related to concerns raised earlier but were not empirically examined, such as reporting CAMS as “boilerplate” expectations. This paper provides new evidence on the auditors’ behavior with regard to litigation risk.

In current vista of corporate governance (CG), whistleblowing (WB) has become critical for practitioners, researchers and other stakeholders. This study aims to identify, prioritize and analyze the interrelationships of determinants of effective WB on the basis of opinion of a medium-sized panel of experts.

It is a cross-sectional descriptive study conducted in the field setting. A self-administered structured questionnaire was used to collect primary data from the respondents. This study follows an interpretive structural modeling (ISM) approach.

This study found that the factor “specific law for WB” has maximum driving power but minimum dependence and occupies bottom level (the most critical level) in the ISM model. The Matrice d’Impacts Croisés Multiplication Appliquée á un Classement analysis revealed that there is no autonomous and dependent factor in the model. There are eight linking factors and only one independent factor.

The study found that the factor “specific law for WB” has maximum driving power but minimum dependence and occupies bottom level (the most critical level) in the ISM model. The Matrice d'Impacts Croisés Multiplication Appliquée á un Classement analysis revealed that there is no autonomous and no clear-cut dependent factor in the model. There are eight linking factors out of which five have high dependence as well, and there is only one independent factor.

This study has ensued in identification of significant challenging issues in WB and in development of interrelationships to gain insights into priority of these issues. This study uses limited primary data in context of Pakistan; therefore, generalizability of the findings is limited.

This study presents a novel theoretical and conceptual model focused on effective WB. The value of the study on effective WB is highly relevant for today’s complex organizations but incipient in literature. The insights provided by the study have vital importance for corporations to embark on the regime of reforms in CG.

The literature on corruption and whistleblowing is increasing over the past years. However, the authors contend that individual reactions to a corrupt proposal could differ from the mentioned behaviours. On these grounds, the authors contend that a “grey zone” between accepting corruption and whistleblowing does exist. This paper aims to explore what are the behaviours defining this “grey zone” as nuanced behaviours adopted to react to a corrupt proposal.

The authors draw from Miceli and Near’s process of whistleblowing to open the scope for the comprehension of grey behaviours in the decision-making process following to a triggering event. The authors adopted a qualitative and explorative approach by interviewing 27 Italian public servants through open questions and storytelling to explore what kind of behaviours could define the grey zone.

The findings unveil nuanced behaviours in the grey zone configuring neither as corruption nor whistleblowing, ranging from ignoring the corrupt proposal to explicit contraposition. Also, they reveal different social and individual outcomes affecting future relationships in organizations. The findings allow to extend Miceli and Near’s process of whistleblowing to the wider spectrum of response behaviours to triggering events such as receiving or assisting to a corrupt proposal.

Limitations might be recognized in that the situations detected could be only a part of a possible wider “grey zone”. However, the authors believe that the findings could encourage future research to continue exploring the grey zone to enrich its comprehension. Also, the paper offers useful and interesting insights on an undebated issue that has a prominent value under the theoretical, practical, social and policymaking perspectives.

From the practical and policymaking perspective, the advancement of a debate contending the existence of a grey zone made of nuanced behaviours between corruption and whistleblowing could provide support both for organizations and policymakers to a better understanding of individual behaviours and improving actions and policies to prevent corruption and encourage whistleblowing.

As the authors are at least unaware of studies debating on the grey zone with specific reference to corruption and whistleblowing, the paper advances a discussion on the grey zone between corruption and whistleblowing as a continuum of nuanced behaviours that could provide a starting point for further fine-grained analyses.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the fraud triangle, Machiavellianism, academic misconduct and corporate social responsibility (CSR) proclivity of students.

The present study surveyed 471 university students. The study was cross-sectional and employed structural equation modelling in statistical modelling.

The study provides evidence that perceived opportunity to cheat in examinations is the single most important factor accounting for significant variations in rationalization and academic misconduct. Similarly, low Machiavellians significantly get inclined to CSR ideals. The fraud triangle alone accounts for 36 per cent of the variations in academic misconduct, hence the error variance is 64 per cent of academic misconduct itself. This error variance increases to 78 per cent when a combination of perceived opportunity, rationalization, Machiavellianism is considered. Moreover, both Machiavellianism and academic misconduct account for 17 per cent of variations in students’ proclivity to CSR ideals.

Results imply that creating a setting that significantly increases a student's anticipated negative affect from academic misconduct, or effectively impedes rationalization ex ante, might prevent some students from academic misconduct in the first place and then they will become good African corporate citizens. Nevertheless, although the unit of analysis was students, these were from a single university – something akin to a case study. The quantitative results should therefore be interpreted with this shortcoming in mind.

This paper contributes to the search for predictors of academic misconduct in the African setting and as a corollary, for a theory explaining academic misconduct. Those students perceiving opportunity to cheat in examinations are also able to rationalize and hence engage in academic misconduct. This rationalization is enhanced or reduced through Machiavellianism.

This chapter investigates the effect of the geographical distance between institutional investors and firms on managers' financial misconduct. The evidence shows that the likelihood of committing financial misconduct by management is positively associated with distance. The distance effect is more prominent for firms with higher information asymmetry and more dedicated institutional investors. In line with the balance between risk-taking and benefit extraction from misconduct, the severity of financial misconduct is higher for firms closer to their institutional investors. Results show that geographical proximity can significantly reduce the cost of information production and facilitate monitoring through access to soft information.