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This study contributes to the limited literature dealing with ethical perceptions of earnings management in developing capital markets by investigating the perceptions of managers, accountants, and investment analysts in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Thailand, to ethical issues concerning the management of earnings. The results are compared to similar studies undertaken in the US and UK. The results show that East Asian managers, accountants, and analysts tended to be less willing to condemn situations as clearly unethical and use a narrower range of ethical responses than their US/U K counterparts. However, there was a remarkable overall consistency of perceptions between East Asian and US/UK managers, accountants, and analysts in relation to many issues.

The purpose of this study is to examine investors’ awareness in Amman Stock Exchange of the effects of earnings manipulation incentives on the earnings manipulation practices of managements through the usage of the available level of flexibility in the accounting standards, and to examine whether those investors are able to detect these practices. A self‐administered questionnaire of three sections was developed and used to achieve the purposes of this study. A sample of 144 respondents from four industries was selected using a stratified sampling method. The study found that investors in Amman Stock Exchange have enough awareness to the effects of earnings manipulation incentives on the practices of managements toward the manipulation of earnings. Moreover, this study concluded that investors in Amman Stock Exchange have the ability to detect those practices.

The study explores accountants' views of the likelihood of widespread accounting manipulation in the emerging economy, Vietnam. Applying the fraud triangle framework, we examine accountants' responses to management pressure, manipulation opportunities and perceptions of how they rationalize their decisions.

The study uses an experimental methodology involving 592 Vietnamese accountants as participants. Post-experiment field interviews were conducted with eight highly experienced accountants.

Our findings indicate that accounting manipulation is perceived to be common in Vietnam. The findings reveal that there is no differentiation between manipulation of accounting transactions with or without management pressure and no differentiation between collective gain or individual gain.

While the study focused on accountants' perceptions of accounting manipulation, these views may change over time. The impact of law reforms and the potential for prosecution under the force of law provisions could alter these perceptions.

The study findings alert regulators, government authorities and auditors of the perceptions and views in relation to accounting manipulation and the potential for fraud in Vietnam. Auditors could use help from forensic specialists to uncover unethical behaviors identified in this study.

The fraud triangle framework is used to shed light on fraud through the examination of accounting manipulation in Vietnam. We contribute to the relevant accounting literature with insights into accountants' motivations toward conducting questionable accounting transactions. The contributions we make draw attention to preconceptions of Asian societies; in particular, accounting actions to motivate collectivist gains. While we shed further light on fraudulent accounting, we conclude that the fraud triangle framework does not necessarily articulate fraud well in relation to accounting manipulation in emerging economies.

Accounts manipulation has been the subject of research, discussion and even controversy in several countries including the USA, Canada, the U.K., Australia, Finland and France. The objective of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature and propose a conceptual framework for accounts manipulation. This framework is based on the possibility of wealth transfer between the different stake‐holders, and in practice, the target of the manipulation appears generally to be the earnings per share and the debt/equity ratio. The paper also describes the different actors involved and their potential gains and losses. We review the literature on the various techniques of accounts manipulation: earnings management, income smoothing, big bath accounting, creative accounting, and window‐dressing. The various definitions of all these, the main motivations behind their application and the research methodologies used are all examined. This study reveals that all the above techniques have common elements, but there are also important differences between them.

This paper aims to examine the frequency and the nature of International Financial Reporting Standards/International Accounting Standards (IFRS/IAS) violations that resulted in modified audit opinions (MAOs); determinants of MAO decision; and underlying motives, targets and techniques of accounting manipulations.

Descriptive statistics and in-depth investigation on archival data collected from the published audit reports are used to analyse the frequency and the nature of IFRS violations that resulted in MAOs, while the logistic regression is applied to identify the possible determinants of MAO decisions. A survey instrument is used to identify the relative importance of different manipulation motives, targets and techniques from the perspective of an external auditor.

Results from the archival research show that MAOs are expressed in 29% of audit reports of listed companies in Croatia. A majority of the qualifications refer to noncompliance with provisions of IAS 39, IAS 16, IAS 1, IAS 2 and IAS 36. The survey results show that manipulations are principally oriented towards creditors, tax authorities and suppliers with the intention to hide bad performance, get better terms of crediting and minimize fiscal and political costs. Results from the field study complement and confirm the archival research results in respect to the accounting areas and techniques used for manipulation purposes.

The analysis provides a rather robust estimation of the extent of accounting manipulations, compared to commonly used earnings management metrics. Application of multi-method research that integrates archival research and field study offers significant contribution to the existing earnings management literature in methodological approach. The results directly address particular provisions of the IFRS that are frequently violated and provide better understanding of the features of accounting manipulations in a specific institutional setting.

Financial manipulation means the modification made knowingly and willfully by businesses in accounting records and transactions, in financial statements, through addition and subtraction, for the purpose of misleading financial information users. Financial manipulations are expected to have an effect on the decisions of financial information users. The present study was established on the basis of two main objectives. The first objective is to determine whether banks, which are Public Interest Entities (PIE), manipulate their financial statements. As for the second objective, it is to reveal whether the detected financial manipulations have an effect on investor decisions. The research conducted to achieve the first objective is based on the examination of independent audit reports for the periods between 2009 and 2017, pertaining to 45 banks registered to the Banks Association of Turkey, in terms of presented opinions. Data acquired from examined reports were subjected to content analysis via the Microsoft Excel program. In line with the second objective of the study, investor numbers for the periods between 2010 and 2017, of 13 banks, which are within the scope of BIST BANK, were included in the analysis, according to data acquired from the Central Registry Agency. Financial statements of banks, with audit reports in which a qualified opinion is expressed, were considered to have been manipulated. SPSS 22.0 statistics pack software was used to analyze whether investment demands toward these banks had an effect on decisions of domestic and foreign investors. In the analysis, frequency and One-Way ANOVA tests were used. In consequence of the analyses conducted, it was determined that, around one fifth of financial statements of PIE banks, pertaining to the periods between 2009 and 2017, were manipulated; it was mostly committed by private banks, and majority of the manipulations were committed due to free provisions made. It was also observed that manipulations did not have an effect on decisions of neither domestic nor foreign investors. The reason behind the latter is the fact that while the level of manipulations in financial statements is significant, it is not a widespread occurrence.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the institutionally driven changes impacting organizational accounting manipulation in Vietnam’s emerging transitional economy. Specifically, this study explore how Vietnamese accountants and regulators explain questionable accounting transactions and their rationalization for those practices, especially during the period of accounting system transition from Vietnamese accounting standards to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

The study uses interview-based methods involving 22 Vietnamese accountants, financial managers, audit partners and regulators.

This study have found dysfunctional approaches to revenue and expense recognition underpinned by institutional theory. At play is a combination of opportunities relating to weak accounting standards and organizational controls; management pressure; and a desire to avoid unwanted scrutiny from Vietnamese regulators.

This study does not include the views of non-financial managers or other accounting users. Future research could focus more on the perceptions of these other stakeholder groups.

Accounting manipulation can be collusive, therefore, regulators should have a stricter view and broader examination in the monitoring process.

This study examine accounting manipulation through the lens of New Institutional Sociology and also share the views of the accountants and regulators. This study argue that weak accounting standards are not the only factors contributing to accounting manipulation. When evaluating the existence of accounting manipulation, this paper find a combination of factors including: opportunities for manipulation, pressure from management and the rationale behind the conduct. These factors should be interpreted in context.

This paper attempts to investigate the effect of corruption on the real and accrual earnings management of target firms in the process of mergers and acquisitions.

The sample includes target firms from the European area that participate in mergers or acquisitions announced during 2010–2020. The preliminary empirical part estimates the level of earnings management during the period two years before the deal's announcement to identify whether the sample follows the manipulation behavior that the literature suggests for target firms. The primary empirical analysis focuses on the impact of corruption on real and accrual-based earnings management proxies, employing regression models and two alternative proxies for corruption. The existing literature points out that the combination of low levels of corruption and an integrated legal system reduces earnings manipulation.

The findings provide strong evidence for systematic downwards accounting manipulation practices, whereas the findings for real earnings management are not significant. The findings of the main empirical part show that corruption is positively associated with accrual-based manipulation and negatively related to real earnings management. In essence, in economies with a high level of transparency, managers adopt the manipulation of operating activities as a less detectable practice of earnings management instead of engaging in accounting procedures.

This study contributes to the literature highlighting the diversification of these firms' manipulation strategies according to the national level's corruption status.

Prior research suggests that firms manipulate earnings through accruals to achieve certain reporting objectives. Recently, especially following the Sarbanes‐Oxley (SarbOx) Act, researchers have turned their attention to real account manipulation as an alternative. However, there is no evidence on whether the likelihood of being detected by outsiders is different for firms using these alternative manipulation methods. The purpose of this paper is to examine this research question in the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs).

First, the authors compare SEOs to a matched sample of non‐SEOs to document income‐increasing manipulation. Next, they identify SEOs that prompt lawsuits and compare sued and non‐sued firms to determine whether using a particular method of manipulation is more likely to be detected and associated with litigation.

The authors find evidence of income‐increasing accrual and real manipulation for SEOs in the year prior to the offering in the pre‐SarbOx period, and find some evidence of a shift to real account manipulation post‐SarbOx. The authors examine the subsequent litigation pattern of these SEOs, and find that firms that are subsequently sued have a higher prevalence of income‐increasing discretionary accruals when the lawsuit allegations involve accounting issues. Following SarbOx, investors are paying less attention to accrual manipulation through accounts receivable and there is more scrutiny of real account manipulation.

The implication in this paper is that firms that engage in income‐increasing earnings management are more likely to be sued when they engage in accrual manipulation while other forms of manipulation may be less understood. This finding is important to investors and regulators.

Lebanon has faced one of the most severe financial and economic crises since the end of 2019. The practices of the Lebanese banks are blamed for dangerously exposing economic agents and precipitating the current financial collapse. This paper examines the patterns of manipulation of the 10 biggest banks before and after implementing the financial engineering mechanism.

The authors apply Benford law for the first and second positions of the reports of condition and income and four out of the six aspects of the CAMELS rating system (Capital Adequacy, Assets Quality, Management expertise, Earnings Strength, Liquidity and Sensitivity to the market) by excluding Management and Sensitivity. The deviations from BL frequencies are tested using Z-statistic and Chi-square tests.

Banks seem to have manipulated their Capital Adequacy, Liquidity and Assets Quality in the pre-financial engineering and considerably in the post-financial engineering periods. Fraudulent manipulations in the banking sector can distort depositors, shareholders and regulating authorities.

This study has many implications for governmental authorities, commercial banks, depositors, businesses, accounting and auditing firms, and policymakers. The Lebanese government needs to implement corrective fiscal and monetary policies and apply amendments to the bank secrecy and capital control law. The central bank should revamp its organizational structure, improve its disclosure practices and significantly reduce its ties to the government and the political elite.

The study findings suggest that the central bank should revamp its organizational structure, improve its disclosure practices and significantly reduce its ties to the government and the political elite.

The study is the first to examine the patterns of fraudulent manipulation in the Lebanese banking industry using Benford Law (BL).