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The purpose of this paper is to examine investors’ propensity to litigate when harmful events occur subsequent to accounting choices. Consistent with Culpable Control Theory, the authors find that investors are more likely to pursue litigation against management when managers are perceived to have more financial reporting flexibility, such as when they apply imprecise, principles-based accounting guidance. Investors are more likely to pursue litigation when they find management more responsible for harmful events, and they find management more responsible for those events when they perceive management to have more reporting flexibility. To provide additional insight, the authors investigate how the relationship between reporting flexibility and assessed manager responsibility is mediated by investors’ perceptions of management’s self-interested behavior. The authors consider monetary and non-monetary motivations for litigation against management such as recouping financial losses and punishing management. The results suggest that recouping financial losses is not the sole motivation for litigation. The authors provide evidence that punishing management is an important non-monetary component of the litigation decision. The results contribute to the limited literature on investor litigation decisions and inform the debate surrounding the potential effects of more principles-based accounting standards.

The authors test the hypotheses using an experiment with a 2×1 between-subjects design in which the authors manipulate reporting flexibility at two levels by varying the precision of accounting guidance and measure all other variables of interest. Participants are 82 part-time executive MBA program students at a major public university in the USA. Most participants work full-time (94 percent), own or have owned stocks either directly or through retirement plans (84 percent), indicate general investment knowledge (97 percent), and report high levels of familiarity with corporate financial statements, including balance sheets and income statements (92 percent). Thus, the authors conclude that these executive MBA students are reasonable surrogates for investors.

Consistent with the predictions, perceived management reporting flexibility affects investors’ propensity to pursue litigation against management. The authors find that the assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events such as investor losses, employee job losses, and economic losses suffered by a community mediates the relationship between reporting flexibility and investors’ intention to litigate. The authors also find that the relationship between reporting flexibility and assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events is not direct but instead works through the effect of reporting flexibility on perceived management self-interested behavior. As predicted, assessed management responsibility for the harmful event is positively related to investors’ propensity to litigate against management, and this relation is only partially mediated by investors’ perceptions that the litigation will be successful. This result suggests that the litigation decision is driven at least in part by corporate governance goals such as the desire for retribution or punishment of management. The second experiment provides additional support for the theory that the desire to punish management is an important component of investors’ litigation decisions.

The research makes important contributions to the literature on investor litigation and to the ongoing debate regarding principles- vs rules-based accounting standards. While some archival research addresses the conditions under which securities litigation occurs, little empirical research has directly addressed the investor decision to litigate. The paper provides additional evidence to address the question of why investors litigate. By doing so, the authors add to the debate on the desirability of shifting from more rules-based to more principles-based accounting standards.

The theory tested in this study could be used to design mechanisms to mitigate the differential propensity for investors to litigate under differing accounting regimes. As standard setters discuss a move to more principles-based standards in the USA, some observers have expressed concern that investor litigation will increase. The theory suggests that if the standard-setting body can control perceptions of management reporting flexibility such that investors believe principles-based standards provide no more flexibility than rules-based standards, they can limit an increase in the amount of investor litigation.

The authors contribute to theory by providing evidence regarding why investors desire to pursue litigation against management. The authors find that the assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events mediates the relationship between reporting flexibility and investors’ intention to litigate. The authors also find that the relationship between reporting flexibility and assignment of responsibility to management for harmful events is not direct but instead works through the effect of reporting flexibility on perceived management self-interested behavior. Furthermore, assessed management responsibility for the harmful event is positively related to investors’ propensity to litigate against management, and this relation is only partially mediated by investors’ perceptions that the litigation will be successful. Those findings provide theoretical contributions to the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of social accounting at the micro level and examines the use of social reporting for constructive purposes through internal communication devices. It explores the discourse adopted by a large organisation in social accounting and reporting (workplace flexibility) through employee newsletters. In doing so the paper seeks to answer two research questions. First, what workplace flexibility practices are evident in the employee newsletters? Second, do management use discourse (including self-accounts) in newsletters for self-serving management control purposes or for the emancipatory purposes of benefiting employees?

Content and discourse analysis are used to examine “workplace flexibility” practices portrayed within the newsletters. This study explores the discourse adopted by a large Australian financial institution, in its social accounting disclosure in employee newsletters. It does so by examining the discourse adopted by the organisation in relation to one aspect of social accounting, that is, “workplace flexibility” in the employee newsletters over the period 2003-2007.

The paper finds the financial institution used its internal newsletters to influence employee attitude and behaviour, not as claimed for social “betterment” – justice, welfare, emancipation. The possibility of social accounting's emancipatory potential was suppressed by those responsible for providing the accounts. The paper found that management used discourse (including self-accounts) in the newsletters for self-serving management control purposes and not as claimed for benefiting employees.

The idea that the organisation provides workplace flexibility for the sake of benefitting employees is questionable. The discourse found in the newsletters suggests that flexible work options instead appear to be aimed at garnering employee loyalty, with subsequent employer benefits of improved organisational performance. The organisation used the discourse on workplace flexibility to blur the boundaries of work and life and persuade the employees to work harder and longer, to continuously increase productivity. In doing so, the organisation camouflaged its own economic sustainability and profitability as workplace flexibility.

We investigate the social and legal blame that investors assign to auditors following unfavorable outcomes using the precision of accounting guidance described as principles-based (i.e., less-precise) or rules-based (i.e., more precise), and why investors assign blame at differing levels. We also examine how the precision of accounting guidance is related to perceptions of auditors’ ethical characteristics. We posit that blame assigned to auditors differs based on auditors’ perceived decision-making control. Results indicate a significant association between the precision of accounting guidance and social blame, and a positive association between social blame and legal blame under standards described as less-precise. Investors are also more likely to make negative evaluations of the auditor’s ethical characteristics under less-precise accounting following an unfavorable outcome, which helps explain the association between social and legal blame. Our findings suggest that auditors could face additional blame as a result of a trend toward less-precise accounting guidance, with investors being more likely to question the auditors’ ethical characteristics following unfavorable outcomes.

The flexibility of managers to respond to risk and uncertainty inherent in business decisions is clearly of value. This value has historically been recognized in an ad hoc manner in the absence of a methodology for more rigorous assessment of value. The application of real option methodology represents a more objective mechanism that allows managers to hedge against adverse effects and exploit upside potential. Of particular interest to managers in the merger and acquisition (M&A) process is the value of such flexibility related to the particular terms of a transaction. Typically, stock for stock transactions take more time to complete as compared to cash given the time lapse between announcement and completion. Over this period, if stock prices are volatile, stock for stock exchanges may result in adverse selection through the dilution of shareholder wealth of an acquiring firm or a target firm.

The paper develops a real option collar model that may be employed by managers to measure the market price risk involved to their shareholders in offering or accepting stock. We further discuss accounting issues related to this contingency pricing effect. Using an acquisition example from U.S. banking industry we illustrate how the collar arrangement may be used to hedge market price risk through flexibility to renegotiate the deal by exercising managerial options.

Prior research provides evidence that firms make accounting choices to avoid violation of debt covenant provisions and the resulting costs of technical default. We extend this research by asking why some firms refrain from making accounting policy changes when faced with costs of technical default. We considered two possible explanations. First, we hypothesise that these defaulting firms may lack the flexibility to make accounting changes. Second, we hypothesise that these defaulting firms may lack incentive to change accounting methods. Results confirm prior research and indicate that defaulting firms make more accounting changes than non‐defaulting firms. The decision by defaulting firms to change or not change accounting methods during the three years ending in the year of a technical default of debt covenants can be explained in part by the ability of the firm and by the incentives of the firm to make a change.

After graduation, many female accountants tend to ordinarily have professional work experience to obtain an ideal position in the career; but under the influence of both internal (in the profession) and external (in life) adverse conditions, the application of their potential talent would be failed and they cannot utilize their abilities to progress in the career. Relevant studies in this field are in developed countries with minimal attention to females in other countries. This study contributes to the literature by examining the case in a developing country–Iran.

A mixed-method study was undertaken to gather data by a postal questionnaire distributed in 2016–2017 and structured interviews with females who assuredly have working experience in the corporate finance department of firms listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange.

It is concluded that the primary issue affecting the career vision of women is to achieve a better working environment. This issue admittedly can be considered as a reason for women to change their employer. The salaries and benefits are also the least important to them. Most women prefer to work in the educational part because of flexible working hours, and they broadly obtain almost no desire to work in the field of tax and cost accounting.

When answering the questionnaire or during the interviews, women are supposed to think about events that happened in the past, so it is recognized that they may selectively remember such events and interpret them with reference to the intervening events and the values that they hold at the time of the data collection. Moreover, all selected respondents may be naturally influenced by a desire to provide socially acceptable answers. Accordingly, the inherent limitations of the results are acknowledged. However, the prime focus of this paper is to consider and give voice to the female experience, which may or may not replicate the experience of their male counterparts.

This paper contributes meaningfully to the debate on the issues affecting the career vision of women and may result in their departure.

The impact of the dual work–life burden of women on career progression is assessed which contributes to the extant literature on the career progression of women in the context of developing countries such as Iran.

This paper proposes a framework to facilitate description of national financial accounting systems. Its first element, broad aims, identifies the fundamental purpose of national financial accounting systems as being to effect a macro‐user or micro‐user orientation. From this emerges the second element, institutional environment, which describes the nature of regimes put in place to effect regulation. This influences the third element, the specific accounting rules and practices adopted. Aspects of international practice relating to each of these three elements are illustrated. The pedagogical benefits of the framework are demonstrated. The standard vocabulary and the structured format of the framework is used to describe, in capsule form, the national financial accounting systems of Korea and Indonesia. The framework seems likely to enhance understanding of the similarities and differences in national financial accounting systems and to contribute useful insights to international accounting matters.

This paper aims to examine the applicability of real options methodology with respect to developing internal transfer pricing mechanisms. A pervasive theme in existing models is their inability to handle the dynamic and volatile nature of today’s business environment, as well as their lack of objective managerial flexibility. The authors address these and other issues and develop a transfer pricing mechanism based on Black–Scholes and the binomial options pricing methodology, which is better suited in today’s dynamic business environment.

The authors use a conceptual approach in developing theoretical justifications and show, practically, how a transfer price can be developed using two different real options pricing models.

The authors find that real options transfer price mechanism (real options framework [ROF]) can effectively deal with many of the issues that permeate a modern organization with complex multi-dimensional operations. The authors argue that uncertainty and behavioral issues commonly associated with setting transfer prices are better handled using a transfer pricing mechanism that preserves flexibility at the business unit level, the managerial level and the firm level. The approach allows for different managerial styles in both centralized and decentralized sub-units within the same organization. The authors argue that an open multi-dimensional framework using real options is suitable under conditions of uncertainty and managerial opportunism.

ROF-based transfer pricing may be significant in that firms can use it as a tool to manage an organization by setting the prices centrally and at the same time allowing managers to select the transfer price that best suits their specific situation and operating conditions. This may result in a more efficient and more profitable organization.

The contribution of the paper is the melding of the ROF from the finance literature with the accounting problem of setting a transfer price for items lacking a competitive market price. The authors also contribute to existing research by explicitly developing a framework that values managerial flexibility, takes into account uncertainty and considers the behavioral aspects of the transfer pricing process. The authors establish the conditions under which a generic real options model is a feasible alternative in determining a transfer price.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss how a decision of restructuring and firing people in a Portuguese company was based on financial data, and how the interpretation of such data made the process quite complex. This complexity was particularly relevant in the litigation that followed. At the core of the restructuring decision was the evolution of the firm's operating income; and a central point in litigation was precisely what should be considered the operating income of the company under analysis, and how it could influence the case's court outcome.

In 2008 a Portuguese company fired people in its finance department. The main reason presented by the management to the laid off persons was the evolution of the firm's operating income, which was negative for several consecutive years. The paper, after a background analysis of restructuring decisions and financial performance, will focus on this case and the correspondent issues, that are mainly related to the concept of operating income, the style of communication between managers and affected employees, and court procedures. It will also compare the Portuguese accounting regime in 2008, with the present one, introduced in 2010 and based on IFRS, as far as the nature of operating income is concerned.

The main conclusion is that standards of accounting and financial reporting can have an important role in justifying restructurings and lay off decisions, and are quite complex to discuss in court cases related to labor laws. Also, changes in accounting systems can have a significant impact in measures of economic performance, opening a wide field of interpretation and legal uncertainty about case outcomes. Judges must have the capacity to navigate through such intricate questions, and see financial information numbers in the light of a company's true economic function.

The paper highlights the problems that can arise when financial data are the basis for layoffs. Given the nature of accounting conventions, if litigation follows, a significant degree of complexity can be brought to the legal process. Also, managers must state, in very clear terms, reasons for restructuring, and, when they stress financial performance, related indicators must have an objective nature.

The paper has value for managers engaged in restructuring processes and also for the legal professions, as far as the relation between layoffs and financial performance based on accounting data is concerned.