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In this study the authors examine the nature and contents of key audit matters (KAMs), and the consequences of KAMs reporting on audit quality in the context of a developing country, Bangladesh. The authors’ proxies of audit qualities are discretionary accruals, small positive earnings surprise, audit report lag, earnings management via below the line items and audit fees.

The authors use content analysis of the KAMs for the period 2018–2021 to understand the nature and extent of KAMs reported by auditors in Bangladesh. The authors then use multivariate regression analysis to examine the effect of the number and content characteristics of KAMs on audit quality by using multivariate regression analysis.

Auditors in Bangladesh disclose a higher number of KAMs compared to other countries, disclose short descriptions of KAMs and industry generic KAMs. The authors document significant cross-sectional variations in the number and content characteristics of KAMs reported by auditors in Bangladesh. The authors’ pre-post analysis suggest that audit quality has improved after the adoption of KAMs. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that KAMs number and content characteristics are related to audit quality.

The authors’ findings imply that the KAMs reporting has the potential to play significant monitoring role in reducing the opportunistic behavior of managers. Hence, KAMs reporting can play a significant role in reducing the agency problem. For regulators, shareholders and corporate managers, the authors’ findings imply that if the audit quality is to be increased, the audit effort should be supported by an appropriate amount of audit fee.

The content characteristics of KAMs significantly influence managerial reporting behavior and affect the level of audit efforts.

Unlike developed countries (Gutierrez et al., 2018; Lennox et al. 2022), this study supports that KAMs reporting improves audit quality and control opportunistic behavior of managers in developing countries. The authors show that even though the KAMs disclosure quality is poor, it has the potential to improve financial reporting quality.

This study aims to examine the strategies that auditors in Bangladesh follow in identifying and reporting key audit matters (KAMs). The study also examines the factors affecting auditors’ strategies in the identification and disclosures of KAMs.

The authors have conducted interviews with audit partners, chief financial officers (CFOs) and regulators involved in KAMs reporting and monitoring. The authors have used the lens of institutional theory of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism and the concept of decoupling.

Auditors have used a decoupling strategy by identifying and reporting greater number of industry-generic KAMs than that of other countries in an effort to minimize risks and avoid regulatory scrutiny, although they disclose remote risks as KAMs and mask severe problem areas of the client. Because of the principle-based approach of International Standards on Auditing (ISA) 701 and because of the pressure and misunderstanding from the audit committee, auditors report industry-generic items and generic descriptions of KAMs.

The findings have important implications for the standard setters and local and global audit firms for the diffusion of new auditing standards in different jurisdictions. Without the development of audit firm-level capability and the corporate governance environment, changes in standards may not be effective in achieving the objectives of the standards.

Although auditors consider that the KAMs reporting requirements provide with opportunities to enhance audit profession’s legitimacy and public trusts, the actual KAMs reporting practices are driven by the market logic, an urge to maintain the status quo with clients and eventual rationalization of the impairment of professional independence.

Given the dearth of prior research on the implementation and diffusion patterns of ISA 701 KAMs reporting, this study fills the gap in the literature. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first known study to examine auditors’ strategic responses to balance among conflicting priorities in reporting KAMs.