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The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between structural arrangements of public agencies of Pakistan and their autonomy.

Data were collected through a questionnaire using the key informant approach from 70 public agencies of Pakistan. Hypotheses were drawn from the structural instrumental perspective to examine the relation between structure and autonomy. In order to test the hypotheses, multivariate regression analysis was performed on the data.

The research highlights that out of the three major structural dimensions, horizontal specialization, vertical specialization and governing board, only governing board is seen to affect the human resource management dimension of autonomy while vertical specialization is related to financial management autonomy. None of the three hypotheses were completely supported. The divergence of the results from the structural instrumental perspective points to other factors related to agencies including administrative culture and context of state that matter in delegation of autonomy to the agencies by the government.

This paper contributes to an on-going debate on globalization of public management reforms with emphasis on structural instrumental explanation of the agencification in developing countries.

With performance as a core theme of public sector reforms, this article explores performance management systems in inter-organizational settings while testing the effect of performance measurement on its use for accountability and control. Using economic neo-institutional perspective in a hierarchical context with turbulent political history, the article investigates the variations in the use of performance information in inter-institutional settings across different legal categories of state organizations.

The performance management framework of Van Dooren et al. (2010) is employed as the basis for this research that explains the link between performance measurement and use. To explore the management of performance in Pakistan, the survey data was collected in 2018; after two democratic governments completed their tenures.

The research indicated a lower extent of performance measurement and use by the parent ministries in the democratic regimes. This finding adds to the implications of economic institutional theory in a politically turbulent context, where political actors place less emphasis on performance and more emphasis on procedures. It was confirmed that the ministries use the measured performance information for accountability and control on the results, but the moderating role of legal categories in the performance framework did not get confirmation.

The article empirically tests the performance management framework from a Western context in a developing country that has not been discussed frequently in the performance management systems literature.