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The leaders of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced to negotiate a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECP) in November 2012, which is comprised of 10 ASEAN Member States (Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) and its six FTA partner countries (China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India). Embedded in the ASEAN Charter and implemented in all existing ASEAN + 1 FTAs, the ASEAN Centrality has been a corner stone principle in ASEAN-centric economic initiatives. Emerging discord in the region, complicated security climate and the rise of China, among others, have put the ASEAN Centrality under challenge. The development of the RCEP provides a timely case to assess ASEAN’s leadership role in creating the world’s most populous Free Trade Area. The RCEP may enhance ASEAN’s central role, but ASEAN needs to address challenges facing the regional integration now and beyond 2015. On the country/economy level, the chapter reviews some ASEAN Member States and their FTA Partners how they practice their ASEAN policy and seek leadership role in ASEAN. The three major players in ASEAN-Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia have reiterated the importance of the ASEAN Centrality in their foreign policy in the past, but debates emerge whether, such as in Indonesia, ASEAN Centrality best suits the national interests. The chapter also explores how the major powers, including China and the United States, respond to and collaborate with the group of smaller developing country players.

For the past decades, issues concerning the impact of economic integration on financial integration, especially exchange rate integration, has been criticized among several regions such as ASEAN. This chapter intends to: (i) test for the exchange rate integration among the ASEAN-5, including Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, using panel data techniques; and (ii) determine the impact of economic integration on the level of exchange rate integration among the ASEAN-5 countries. The purchasing power parity (PPP) is tested using panel unit root tests on monthly data. The results confirm the PPP among the ASEAN-5 countries due to lower transaction costs from ASEAN agreements. The chapter applies Multivariate GARCH (M-GARCH) models using daily data to determine the level of exchange rate integration among the ASEAN-3, including Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The results of panel cointegration tests using quarterly data of economic integration and exchange rate integration confirm the impact of international trade openness on exchange rate integration. With free trade agreements leading to lower trade barriers, lower transaction costs, and low transportation costs, the economic integration among ASEAN countries practically leads to a higher degree of exchange rate integration. The findings imply that trade liberalization has the strongest effect on the real exchange rate. As such, regulators of ASEAN countries should pay more attention to the exchange rate policies of each other because of the interdependence of their exchange rates.

Any country including India which has registered remarkable growth has done so by participating in the economic integration process led by global and regional trade liberalization. India has an emerging web of cooperation with East Asian countries, especially Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) through the ASEAN–India dialogue process, the bilateral free trade agreement with Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand and subregional initiatives such as the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC; Yong 2005).

India's free trade agreements and regional trade agreements with countries in this region have not been models of success in their implementation even when there were benefits. The main idea of the formal trade negotiation was to enhance ASEAN-India partnership, specifically in the economic arena. However, India's position in ASEAN's external trade and investment flows has not yet experienced any special momentum. The two-way trade between India and ASEAN is tilted toward ASEAN with the trade gap expanding rapidly.

Thus, to understand India's trade with ASEAN, the chapter would examine India's trade prospects with the ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam) particularly in merchandise trade. This chapter would identify new products that India can export to the ASEAN, which will increase its share in ASEAN's market. In order to achieve this, the chapter seeks to discuss the detailed microanalysis at HS 6-digit level to capture the trade creation effects based on lower unit value items for estimating product-specific potential exports and imports to/from ASEAN.

Ng (2002), and Lim and McAleer (2003) explained that if the national economies are not converging, or if the responses of national economies to random shocks are asymmetric, the cost of premature monetary integration would be high. This chapter investigates the feasibility of adopting a single currency for ASEAN-5 countries. The research uses the Kalman Filter procedure to test the economic convergence among ASEAN-5 countries, relative to Japan and the US. In addition, the symmetry of underlying structural shocks is also examined by applying a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model. The research findings showed that Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (ASEAN-3) appear to be relatively suitable for forming an Optimum Currency Area. However, the results did not show significance evidence whether the Japanese Yen or the US dollar will be a suitable currency for the ASEAN-3 countries to adopt commonly.

This chapter reviews and compares Southeast Asia country practices on global, regional, and local practices for disaster risk assessment (DRA). DRA research and practices include and create a disaster risk management (DRM) solution. There are 11 countries in Southeast Asia, but only 10 countries are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), except Timor-Leste. The key objective of ASEAN’s formation is cooperation in economic growth, social, regional peace and cultural development, disaster management cooperation, and humanitarian assistance at the regional level. The DRM system practiced in ASEAN member countries is discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, the system and findings of DRAs are also addressed. Globally, two DRA structures are discussed and compared, namely Index of Risk Management (INFORM) and World Risk Index (WRI). In addition, regional vulnerability assessment guidelines for regional and national levels are discussed. However, several selected studies and practices such as the Indonesian Risk Index (InaRISK) are being discussed at the local level. Overall, there is space for improvement of coordination in terms of data and technology sharing for DRM, especially for assessment. The finding of this review highlighted the complexity of DRA at the global and regional levels and encouraging community DRA among the ASEAN members.

This chapter analyses the how, who, where and why of rapid rise in intra-regional investment by companies from ASEAN since 2009.

The chapter analyses the push and pull factors of intra-regional investment in ASEAN, the resulting patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the accompanying rise of strong regional players.

The region’s FDI landscape is changing in terms of investment sources, players, FDI trends and dynamics of the region. This trend is strongly affected by stepped up efforts by ASEAN governments to encourage their national companies to invest in the region and the influence of the ASEAN Economic Community.

Regional integration and emerging business opportunities are providing an impetus not seen before in driving intra-regional investment. As more ASEAN companies position and prepare for AEC 2015, this intra-regional investment wave is likely to gather force.

The chapter lists the regional and global ‘footprint’ of the top 50 largest ASEAN companies by revenues. The thus identified companies include companies operating in oil and gas, mining, agri-business, telecommunications, food and beverages, manufacturing, banking, power generation, infrastructure, real estate and healthcare services

This study analyzes the impact of exchange rate volatility (ERV) on inbound tourist arrivals from four ASEAN countries namely Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand during 1970–2017. Volatility in the exchange rates between the tourist currency and ringgit Malaysia is measured using the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity model. The results from Autoregressive Distributed Lagged models indicate that ERV has no significant impact on tourist arrivals from ASEAN to Malaysia. This implies that tourists from these countries may not be sensitive to ERV when choosing Malaysia as their travel destination. There are two possible explanations for the results. First, Malaysian ringgit has been depreciating against major currencies and regional currencies in recent years, which makes ringgit relatively cheaper than other ASEAN currencies. Second, the empirical results of the study support the argument that ERV has a more serious impact on tourist spending compared to tourist arrivals.

This chapter uses a global trade model, supplemented with household survey data, to explore the potential impact of ASEAN trade liberalization on poverty in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam. Our tentative results suggest that ASEAN liberalization is likely to bring substantial gains to the region and lead to significant reductions in poverty. In a simulation of full removal of intra-ASEAN tariffs, we find 320,000 people are moved out of extreme poverty, with a further 1.4 million lifted above the $2 per day poverty line. Poverty reductions are particularly significant in the case of agricultural and rural diversified households and for Cambodia. Under broader ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 liberalizations, we find a similar pattern of poverty reduction and the overall reduction in poverty is much higher.

In the years leading up to United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS), Southeast Asia drew the attention of the drug policy world because of its refusal to drop the goal of becoming a drug-free region and for the extreme methods used in striving to achieve it. This chapter presents an analysis of the official positions taken by governments in the regional body known as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations from before until after the UNGASS in the context of one of the most punitive drug policy environments in the world and offers a perspective on what we could expect from them in 2019.

Why have so many overlapping regional institutions been established in the Asia-Pacific? Is there any possibility of a convergence of these institutions into a single (or a few) “authoritative” regional institution(s)? What implications do the emerging overlapping regional institutions have for an evolving regional architecture in Asia? I argue first that the proliferation of regional institutions reflects complicated strategies taken by the countries to respond to the increased insecurity and uncertainty caused by the structural changes. Second, the countries of the region are taking a variety of national strategies through regional institutions, ranging from engagement to soft balancing and risk-hedging, to respond to these changes. Third, all the states of the region want to maintain a variety of institutional choices to respond to their uncertain futures. Fourth, what makes the institution-building so complicated lies in the fact that there are two major (and uncertain) powers to whom the regional countries have to respond through regional institutions: the United States and China. This makes the bargaining game for regional institution-building more complicated and competitive. Fifth, the amalgamation or convergence of the existing institutions into a single (or few) “authoritative” institution(s) through “institutional competition” will not take place in the foreseeable future. Sixth, the countries of the region may engage in “forum shopping.” Seventh, the roles of these institutions have been and will be quite modest. However, the regional institutions could to some extent contribute to moderating inter-state tensions and putting institutional constraints on the deviant behaviors of member countries.