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A transfer from a richer individual to a poorer one seems to be the most intuitive and straightforward way of reducing income inequality in a society. However, can such a transfer reduce the welfare of the society? We show that a rich-to-poor transfer can induce a response in the individuals’ behaviors which actually exacerbates, rather than reduces, income inequality as measured by the Gini index. We use this result as an input in assessing the social welfare consequence of the transfer. Measuring social welfare by Sen’s social welfare function, we show that the transfer reduces social welfare. These two results are possible even for individuals whose utility functions are relatively simple (namely, at most quadratic in all terms) and incorporate a distaste for low relative income. We first present the two results for a population of two individuals. We subsequently provide several generalizations. We show that our argument holds for a population of any size, and that the choice of utility functions which trigger this response is not singular – the results obtain for an open set of the space of admissible utility functions. In addition, we show that a rich-to-poor transfer can exacerbate inequality when we employ Lorenz-domination, and that it can decrease social welfare when we draw on any increasing, Schur-concave welfare function.

In Okun's (1975) extended essay “Equality and Efficiency — The Big Trade‐Off”, reference is made to the leaky bucket experiment in the context of tax and transfer programmes. Money is carried from the rich to the poor in a bucket which leaks. This idea gives eloquent expression to the concept of efficiency loss in the use of the fiscal system to reduce inequality.

We examine individuals' distributional orderings in situations involving (a) comparisons of social welfare and (b) choice under uncertainty. There is a special focus on whether these orderings satisfy the principle of transfers (the principle of mean-preserving spreads). The results are compared with those of earlier work that was conducted in the context of inequality and of risk.

We run income inequality questionnaire in 17 universities in the USA. In the questionnaire we examine how students of economics compare inequality of income distributions, when transfers are made between income recipients. The results are analysed in terms of several personal characteristics of the respondents: family income, ethnicity, sex, geographic origin, number of siblings, age, and by ranking of the universities.

This chapter does three things. First, it estimates regional gross domestic product (GDP) for three different geographical levels in Switzerland (97 micro regions, 16 labor market basins, and 3 large regions). Second, it analyzes the evolution of regional inequality relying on a heuristic model inspired by Williamson (1965), which features an initial growth impulse in one or several core regions and subsequent diffusion. Third, it uses index number theory to decompose regional inequality into three different effects: sectoral structure, productivity, and comparative advantage.

The results can be summarized as follows: As a consequence of the existence of multiple core regions, Swiss regional inequality has been comparatively low at higher geographical levels. Spatial diffusion of economic growth occurred across different parts of the country and within different labor market regions. This resulted in a bell-shaped evolution of regional inequality at the micro regional level and convergence at higher geographical levels. In early and in late stages of the development process, productivity differentials were the main drivers of inequality, whereas economic structure was determinant between 1888 and 1941. The poorest regions suffered from comparative disadvantage, that is, they were specialized in the vary sector (agriculture), where their relative productivity was comparatively lowest.

The leaky bucket and the transfer principle are tested under conditions of individual uncertainty, behind a veil of ignorance and when positions are known. We find that choices under individual uncertainty are slightly more risk seeking than behind a veil of ignorance indicating that the conventional practice of modeling inequality aversion as risk aversion does not lead to serious error. However, our subjects can not be said to be risk seeking or risk averse but rather protect against downside risks and seek upside gain. As in previous experiments, we find that choices with positions known are quite insensitive to inefficiency and exhibit considerable antipathy to returns that accrue to others, whether richer or poorer. Richer American males are least likely to support leaky-bucket transfers that reduce inequality once positions are known. Lottery players, but not smokers show greater risk preference given individual uncertainty.

Drawing attention to the significant number of unsuccessful (abandoned) cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in recent years, the purpose of this paper is to analyze three litigated cross-border inbound acquisitions that associated with an emerging economy – India, such as Vodafone-Hutchison and Bharti Airtel-MTN deals in the telecommunications industry, and Vedanta-Cairn India deal in the oil and gas exploration industry. The study intends to explore how do institutional and political environments in the host country affect the completion likelihood of cross-border acquisition negotiations.

Nested within the interdisciplinary framework, the study adopts a legitimate method in qualitative research, that is, case study method, and performs a unit of analysis and cross-case analysis of sample cases.

The critical analysis suggests that government officials’ erratic nature and ruling political party intervention have detrimental effects on the success of Indian-hosted cross-border deals with higher bid value, listed target firm, cash payment, and stronger government control in the target industry. The findings emerge from the cross-case analysis of sample cases contribute to the Lucas paradox – why does not capital flow from rich to poor countries and interdisciplinary M&A literature on the completion likelihood of international takeovers.

The findings have several implications for multinational managers who typically involve in cross-border negotiations. The causes and consequences of sample cases would help develop economy firms who intend to invest in emerging economies. The study also offers some implications of M&A for telecommunications and extractive industries.

Although a huge amount of extant research investigates why M&A fail to create value to the shareholders during the public announcement and post-merger stages, there is a significant dearth of research on the causes and consequences of delayed or abandoned national and international deals. The paper fills this knowledge gap by discussing an in-depth cross-case analysis of Indian-hosted cross-border acquisitions.

Fighting climate change and COVID, which is currently done at the international level through the use of public goods based on subscriptions, is the case for charitable organisations within states. Such institutions lead to equilibrium situations that are clearly inefficient (not Pareto optimal). They also raise difficult questions of equity between developed, developing and emerging countries: If we want to promote more effective ways of fighting climate change or COVID type epidemics, how can we achieve such important goals at the global level without jeopardising the growth of poorer countries and making them still poorer? We will show that this is actually possible within certain limits. It will require the formation of broad-based climate or COVID coalitions that will be able to influence outsiders and force them to cooperate by sanctioning those who want to take advantage of carbon leakage. Such sanctions could take the form of carbon tariffs and other pressure measures. The result should be a solution that benefits both developed and developing countries while achieving global public goods that are efficient at the same time.