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A transfer from a richer individual to a poorer one seems to be the most intuitive and straightforward way of reducing income inequality in a society. However, can such a…
A transfer from a richer individual to a poorer one seems to be the most intuitive and straightforward way of reducing income inequality in a society. However, can such a transfer reduce the welfare of the society? We show that a rich-to-poor transfer can induce a response in the individuals’ behaviors which actually exacerbates, rather than reduces, income inequality as measured by the Gini index. We use this result as an input in assessing the social welfare consequence of the transfer. Measuring social welfare by Sen’s social welfare function, we show that the transfer reduces social welfare. These two results are possible even for individuals whose utility functions are relatively simple (namely, at most quadratic in all terms) and incorporate a distaste for low relative income. We first present the two results for a population of two individuals. We subsequently provide several generalizations. We show that our argument holds for a population of any size, and that the choice of utility functions which trigger this response is not singular – the results obtain for an open set of the space of admissible utility functions. In addition, we show that a rich-to-poor transfer can exacerbate inequality when we employ Lorenz-domination, and that it can decrease social welfare when we draw on any increasing, Schur-concave welfare function.
In Okun's (1975) extended essay “Equality and Efficiency — The Big Trade‐Off”, reference is made to the leaky bucket experiment in the context of tax and transfer programmes. Money is carried from the rich to the poor in a bucket which leaks. This idea gives eloquent expression to the concept of efficiency loss in the use of the fiscal system to reduce inequality.
We examine individuals' distributional orderings in situations involving (a) comparisons of social welfare and (b) choice under uncertainty. There is a special focus on…
We examine individuals' distributional orderings in situations involving (a) comparisons of social welfare and (b) choice under uncertainty. There is a special focus on whether these orderings satisfy the principle of transfers (the principle of mean-preserving spreads). The results are compared with those of earlier work that was conducted in the context of inequality and of risk.
We run income inequality questionnaire in 17 universities in the USA. In the questionnaire we examine how students of economics compare inequality of income distributions…
We run income inequality questionnaire in 17 universities in the USA. In the questionnaire we examine how students of economics compare inequality of income distributions, when transfers are made between income recipients. The results are analysed in terms of several personal characteristics of the respondents: family income, ethnicity, sex, geographic origin, number of siblings, age, and by ranking of the universities.
This chapter does three things. First, it estimates regional gross domestic product (GDP) for three different geographical levels in Switzerland (97 micro regions, 16…
This chapter does three things. First, it estimates regional gross domestic product (GDP) for three different geographical levels in Switzerland (97 micro regions, 16 labor market basins, and 3 large regions). Second, it analyzes the evolution of regional inequality relying on a heuristic model inspired by Williamson (1965), which features an initial growth impulse in one or several core regions and subsequent diffusion. Third, it uses index number theory to decompose regional inequality into three different effects: sectoral structure, productivity, and comparative advantage.
The results can be summarized as follows: As a consequence of the existence of multiple core regions, Swiss regional inequality has been comparatively low at higher geographical levels. Spatial diffusion of economic growth occurred across different parts of the country and within different labor market regions. This resulted in a bell-shaped evolution of regional inequality at the micro regional level and convergence at higher geographical levels. In early and in late stages of the development process, productivity differentials were the main drivers of inequality, whereas economic structure was determinant between 1888 and 1941. The poorest regions suffered from comparative disadvantage, that is, they were specialized in the vary sector (agriculture), where their relative productivity was comparatively lowest.
Drawing attention to the significant number of unsuccessful (abandoned) cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in recent years, the purpose of this paper…
Drawing attention to the significant number of unsuccessful (abandoned) cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in recent years, the purpose of this paper is to analyze three litigated cross-border inbound acquisitions that associated with an emerging economy – India, such as Vodafone-Hutchison and Bharti Airtel-MTN deals in the telecommunications industry, and Vedanta-Cairn India deal in the oil and gas exploration industry. The study intends to explore how do institutional and political environments in the host country affect the completion likelihood of cross-border acquisition negotiations.
Nested within the interdisciplinary framework, the study adopts a legitimate method in qualitative research, that is, case study method, and performs a unit of analysis and cross-case analysis of sample cases.
The critical analysis suggests that government officials’ erratic nature and ruling political party intervention have detrimental effects on the success of Indian-hosted cross-border deals with higher bid value, listed target firm, cash payment, and stronger government control in the target industry. The findings emerge from the cross-case analysis of sample cases contribute to the Lucas paradox – why does not capital flow from rich to poor countries and interdisciplinary M&A literature on the completion likelihood of international takeovers.
The findings have several implications for multinational managers who typically involve in cross-border negotiations. The causes and consequences of sample cases would help develop economy firms who intend to invest in emerging economies. The study also offers some implications of M&A for telecommunications and extractive industries.
Although a huge amount of extant research investigates why M&A fail to create value to the shareholders during the public announcement and post-merger stages, there is a significant dearth of research on the causes and consequences of delayed or abandoned national and international deals. The paper fills this knowledge gap by discussing an in-depth cross-case analysis of Indian-hosted cross-border acquisitions.
The leaky bucket and the transfer principle are tested under conditions of individual uncertainty, behind a veil of ignorance and when positions are known. We find that…
The leaky bucket and the transfer principle are tested under conditions of individual uncertainty, behind a veil of ignorance and when positions are known. We find that choices under individual uncertainty are slightly more risk seeking than behind a veil of ignorance indicating that the conventional practice of modeling inequality aversion as risk aversion does not lead to serious error. However, our subjects can not be said to be risk seeking or risk averse but rather protect against downside risks and seek upside gain. As in previous experiments, we find that choices with positions known are quite insensitive to inefficiency and exhibit considerable antipathy to returns that accrue to others, whether richer or poorer. Richer American males are least likely to support leaky-bucket transfers that reduce inequality once positions are known. Lottery players, but not smokers show greater risk preference given individual uncertainty.
Curbing (without banning) potentially environmentally‐damaging activities that have global, rather than local, effects raises challenges analogous to those faced by a…
Curbing (without banning) potentially environmentally‐damaging activities that have global, rather than local, effects raises challenges analogous to those faced by a community lacking legislative powers that has to restrict access to a common pasture in order to make its use sustainable. A local community achieves autonomy in a matter such as this by consensual cooperation. In the absence of a world coercive authority, global environmental problems (in which a measure of world autonomy is needed) have to be met similarly by consensual co‐operation among governments. The conditions under which local consensual cooperation have been observed to be successful may also be relevant to global consensual cooperation. In particular there must be clear rules, and devices for interpreting them; they must be acceptable to all parties; and monitoring of compliance is crucial. Even in such cases of quasi‐voluntary compliance, graduated sanctions for infringement, or analogous arrangements, are quite likely to play a vital part. In an international regime for reducing greenhouse‐gas emissions, it is essential that rules should be devised that will appeal as fair and practically tolerable to opinion in both rich and poor countries and to both high and low per capita emitters. This will rule out a regime of uniform percentage reductions without balancing compensation. It will also rule out a regime based on equal per capita claims to engage in the restricted activity. It is desirable that the rules also act to make the allocation of the reductions in the potentially damaging activity efficient. This will favour rules under which financial signals reflecting marginal costs or benefits play some part in the allocation of any target aggregates. It will probably be essential, given prevalent views of justice and differing valuations of environmental goals between rich and poor nations, that the arrangements involve transfers of resources from richer, higher‐per‐capita polluting countries to poorer, lower per capita polluting countries. Nevertheless, reducing emissions sufficiently through a system of tradable quotas summing to the targeted total of emissions – which might seem to meet both this requirement and the need for efficient marginal incentives – has, in its simple form in which the quotas issued are proportional to countries’ populations, little chance of being acceptable to rich, high‐emitter nations. An attempt is made to explore solutions to these dilemmas, leading on from the arrangements made under the Kyoto protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.