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Compiled by Indexing Specialists (UK)Ltd covering the following journals published by Emerald: Facilities Volumes 8‐20; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐20; Property Management Volumes 8‐20; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐20.

During the period 1962-2001 (9/11), the author identified 25 terrorist acts in the English-speaking Caribbean. Apart from US action in Grenada in 1983, the extra-regional response to these acts was minimal. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US has introduced a number of counter-terrorist measures into the region from Washington through such agencies as Southcom, the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security, now including the Coast Guard, to forestall future acts of terrorism. Also the UN, the OAS, and the CARICOM, at the instigation of the US, have encouraged Caribbean nations to adopt resolutions and pass anti-terrorist legislation at the local level in the fight against terrorism. US policy toward the region is based on its own self-interest since it considers the Caribbean its “Third Border,” one that is difficult to close to security threats. In all of this, the Caribbean nations welcome the security, more so because of the incidental protection it offers to their fragile tourist-dependent economies that are sensitive to political and other threats. This coincidence of interest has seen the US merge drug-trafficking and terrorism into one consolidated threat. Traditionally, the Caribbean region has not allocated a large part of its budget to security concerns, but with external assistance, particularly from the US, the region's police and military forces have been called upon to adapt to the global threats of the post-9/11 era by strengthening operational capacity, mission readiness, and intensify regional cooperation. This new thrust also includes making border tightening security measures more comprehensive and robust as well as the sharing of information, including intelligence. As long as the US perceives the terrorist threat a priority, Caribbean security policy will continue apace.

This chapter first examines evidence concerning departures of the four flights out of Boston, D.C., and Newark, including identifications of the aircrafts involved, some evidence regarding the flight paths, and then the hijackings. Alleged video evidence at airports for the hijackers themselves is examined, but found to be unacceptable.

The fact of a conspiracy is uncontested by all. Three alternative conspiracy possibilities regarding the planes are examined: the ‘official’ one of suicide hijackers skillfully guiding planes with steeled determination into targets (independent of the hijackers’ identities); use of beaconing or electronic control, similar to ordinary commercial landings, into the targets; and use of ‘drone’ airplanes. The third alternative is not supportable at this time, but the other two are possible explanations, not necessarily equally likely.

The issue of insider trading before 9-11 is addressed. Publicly available data from OptionMetrics are provided and analyzed, indicating that many early reports were not using accurate data. Turning to an academic study in the Journal of Business which relies upon confidential, superior data, the findings are summarized that, indeed, there is evidence of insider trading before 9-11 on American Airlines and United Airlines. Larger concerns of insider trading are also summarized. Lastly, we give brief consideration to the profits certain capitalists make out of 9-11.

Al-Qaeda is conventionally portrayed as a monolithic, hierarchical organization whose activities – coordinated by the network's leader Osama bin Laden – are the source of international terrorism today. Al-Qaeda is considered a radical tendency within the broader Islamist Salafi movement, legitimizing its terrorist operations as a global Islamist jihad against Western civilization. Al-Qaeda's terrorist activity today is considered, “blowback” from long finished CIA and western covert operations in Afghanistan.

The conventional wisdom is demonstrably false. After the Cold War, Western connections with al-Qaeda proliferated around the world, challenging mainstream conceptions of al-Qaeda's identity. Western covert operations and military – intelligence connections in strategic regions show that “al-Qaeda” is a network whose raison d’etre and modus operandi are inextricably embedded in a disturbing conglomerate of international Western diplomatic, financial, military and intelligence policies today. US, British, and Western power routinely manipulates al-Qaeda through a complex network of state-regional and human nodes. Such manipulation extended directly to the 9-11 hijackers, and thus to the events of 9-11 itself.11This paper advances an original argument based partially on research in Ahmed (2005), supplemented here with significant new data and analysis. Also see Ahmed (2002).

The events of September 11, 2001 forever changed policing with state and local law enforcement now playing a central role. In this new role many agencies have begun to re‐assess how they best fulfil the demands of homeland security and provide traditional law enforcement. Intelligence‐led policing (ILP) has been advocated as one approach with the potential to confront both terrorism and traditional crime problems; however, the degree to which ILP has been widely embraced remains relatively unexamined. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate whether level of involvement with homeland security related intelligence subsequent to 9/11 has had a significant impact on interactions between state and federal agencies, and facilitated organizational change in state law enforcement agencies.

Using data collected from a survey of state law enforcement agencies, the paper examines whether involvement in homeland security and the allocation of resources toward intelligence have had an impact on organizational change consistent with ILP.

Findings suggest increased involvement in homeland security significantly increased interaction between some state and federal agencies and significantly impacted organizational functions of intelligence, grants, and planning. However, contrary to expectations, allocation of resources had little impact on levels of interaction between agencies or broader organizational functions.

Findings suggest that while advances are being made which are consistent with ILP, improvements could be made in the role of theory and evidence‐based practice in driving reforms. More thoughtful distribution of homeland security grants targeting organizational change may be useful in stimulating such efforts. The findings are instructional in how the contemporary context and emerging trends such as ILP are likely to affect organizational change. Specifically, they suggest that if ILP is a desired model for reform in policing, further incentives to pursue its objectives may be necessary.

Most studies of ILP focus on case studies of single agencies. There are no studies which explicitly examine the degree to which principles of ILP have been reflected in organizational change within a broad sample of agencies. The present paper assesses such changes within a national (US) sample of law enforcement agencies.

Managers need a framework for assessing various kinds of risk and uncertainty that will continue to confront corporate decision makers as the 9/11 event plays out over the following months and years. The authors suggest an innovative scenario process, one that provides business continuity planning and medium‐term operational planning with a more rigorous analytical grounding, but without overburdening the process with excessive and ultimately counter‐productive complexity. The authors have introduced alternative scenario‐based tools to respond to this specific need for continuity assurance and near‐term operations planning. Case one: business continuity planning (BCP) for the management of one leading global financial services firm committed to a process of identifying and remedying gaps in the recoverability of its key assets. Workshops developed strategies that would close unacceptable asset recovery gaps in two scenarios. Case two: medium term operational planning for a professional services firm in the weeks that followed 9/11 evaluated the plausible range of impacts on their business and operations as the USA and the world took action and terrorist groups responded further. Case three: three years ago the US Coast Guard developed scenarios for very long range strategic planning for their long view project. The Coast Guard developed ten basic strategies from these scenarios. The fourth strategy was “Acquire full maritime domain awareness”. The goal was to give the Coast Guard the ability to acquire, track, and identify in real time any vessel or aircraft entering America’s maritime domain. Maritime domain awareness (MDA) turned out to be highly relevant for USCG decision making both before and after 9/11. Of all the major US federal services involved in the 9/11 response operation, the Coast Guard was singled out for its agility and preparedness.

The City of New York was suddenly and deliberately attacked on September 11, 2001, killing thousands of people and leaving unbelievable destruction. Thirty-eight buildings and structures were destroyed or damaged, including seven buildings in the World Trade Center site completely leveled. Almost five years later, two very large contaminated buildings, Deutsche Bank at 130 Liberty Street and Fiterman Hall of Borough of Manhattan Community College, have yet to be cleaned up and demolished. Some 30 million square feet of commercial space was lost. Transportation was disrupted, including the loss of the World Trade Center PATH station, the 1/9 subway line and portions of Route 9A and Church Street. Cars were not allowed south of Canal Street for a week. For Americans this was a terrorist attack and a crime. It was a time for mourning losses and responding to disaster. There was the shock that something like this could happen. And there was more. The destruction of the WTC also posed competing environmental, economic and social threats.

This paper provides an overview of the Post 9/11 GI Bill and outlines the steps that the Obama administration has taken to provide for the educational and training needs of veterans and other eligible dependents.

This paper offers a policy analytic review of the extant literature on veterans’ education and regulations pertaining to the Post 9/11 GI Bill.

It is found that although the Post 9/11 GI Bill was enacted with the right intentions, several changes had to be made to protect both veterans and tax payers as well as the integrity of the GI Bill.

To help educators understand the role that the Obama administration has played in advancing veteran education and training.

Things will never be the same, some say, because of 9.11. We feel more vulnerable, more threatened, more at risk. It was the worst terrorist attack on U.S. soil, goes the refrain. It was dramatic beyond our worst nightmares. Like millions of others, I watched the events of that lovely morning unfold on television. When the South Tower fell for a few seconds I could not see it collapsing. My blindness wasn’t because of the smoke and dust. It was a cognitive blindness. I could not believe my eyes and so, somehow, my mind denied my brain the truth of the moment.