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In this chapter, we provide a brief historical framework of the events and policy changes that impacted the prosecution of terrorism over the past 50 years with emphasis placed on the changes that resulted from the 9/11 attacks.

We provide a review of relevant literature and complete the chapter by providing new data (2015) on case outcomes derived from the American Terrorism Study, a database housed in the Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College, at the University of Arkansas.

Investigative and prosecutorial authority in U.S. terrorism cases has experienced ebbs and flows that correspond with terrorism attacks as well as missteps by the FBI, and each has impacted the success of prosecution efforts. Despite dramatic changes, the number of cases prosecuted after 9/11 is unprecedented, and conviction rates continue to climb.

This chapter provides the reader with a synopsis of the policy changes that have occurred in federal terrorism investigations and trials from the late 1960s upto the present. Based on that context, we provide an explanation of how those policy changes have impacted terrorism prosecutions.

Short-term military simulations of scenarios or conditions that U.S. military personnel might meet are generally the largest, in terms of cost and personnel, of all operational training events. That at least six such exercises were scheduled for September 11, 2001 raises serious questions about whether or not the events of 9/11 were at least partially orchestrated by U.S. command.

In light of the aforementioned military exercises and the fact that the 9/11 Commission's Final Report barely mentions them, neither were they significantly discussed nor investigated during the hearings, this essay briefly explores four key questions that will hopefully stimulate further inquiries, investigations and perhaps subpoenas that will ultimately break the silence and force declassification of the information surrounding the war games.1.Has there been a high-level suppression of information about the military drills?2.Might the military drills have been a significant factor in the success of the attacks?3.Who was in charge of the military drills and what motives may have been operating for this person?4.In what way might Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person charged in the United States for the attacks, be a link that connects to the person in charge of the games to another tragedy that may have been “an inside job” – i.e. Senator Paul Wellstone's death, and how might Moussaoui connect all of this to the Pentagon?

Despite its stated intention to be independent, impartial and thorough, the 9-11 Commission was none of the three. The Commission was structurally compromised by bias-inducing connections to subjects of the investigation, and procedurally compromised, among other reasons, by (1) its failure to take up promising lines of inquiry and its failure to try to force the release of key documents that were closely guarded by the Bush administration, the FBI and various intelligence agencies; (2) its distortion of information about pre-9-11 military preparedness, foreknowledge of the attacks or attacks of like-kind; and (3) omissions of information related to the funding of the plot and the specific whereabouts of key officials on the morning of September 11, 2001.

These structural compromises and procedural failings converged to assure that the Commission would not challenge core elements of the “official story” of the 9-11 attacks. This failure was compounded by the Commission's desire to produce a final report that would read as a “historical narrative” rather than as an exhaustive set of findings on the critical unanswered questions that arose after the attacks. The Commission's unquestioning acceptance of the official narrative also meant that it missed a perhaps larger opportunity to challenge key myths associated with American exceptionalism. Thus, the 9-11 Commission ultimately functioned as an instrument of cultural hegemony, extending and deepening the official version of events under the guise of independence and impartiality.

Inconsistencies and contradictions in the US government's story of hijackers and their masterminds are examined to account for what happened on 9-11. A little-known initial FBI list of 19, scrutinized for four names not on its final list, calls into question the FBI naming process. We discovered 11 of the FBI-named finalists could not have been on those planes, with 10 still alive and another's identity improvised by a double. The Dulles videotape, essentially the government's case that hijackers boarded the 9-11 flights, is found to have serious problems including authentication, as does the so-called bin Laden “confession” video.

Were “hijackers” known to be in the US before intelligence alleges it knew? Evidence is examined which shows that they were closely monitored by agencies which denied this knowledge; in particular, an undercover FBI agent lived with them the prior year.

Noting government refusal to disclose evidence called for by investigators, we find some pieces altered or fabricated and others confiscated or destroyed. Other revelations point to hijackers with national security overrides, protection in their alternate roles as drug traffickers, and deep political connections with government elites. We investigate patterns, reminiscent of historical intelligence involvement, revealing the presence of a covert intelligence operation disguised as an outside enemy attack.

This paper reports on a three-year study that examined the effect of 9/11 on preservice teachers’ perspectives and dispositions toward global concerns and global perspective pedagogy. Participants responded to a “before” and “after” survey in which they indicated the level of their awareness of global concerns, perceptions of their importance, perceived impact on self, and dispositions toward global-perspective pedagogy. The study utilized both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. The data revealed that 9/11 had a significant effect on preservice teachers that resulted in a shift in perspectives and dispositions toward critical global concerns and teaching about them. The findings highlight the critical importance of preparing preservice teachers to develop global perspectives, cultivate critical knowledge and perceptual understandings of global concerns, and nurture favorable dispositions toward global perspective pedagogy.

This study explored perspectives of secondary social studies teachers, who reported using live media broad-casts to engage students in an examination of terrorism on 9/11. Specifically, this study queried these teachers’ perceptions of preparedness on 9/11 to engage it as a learning event. Respondents (N=29) in one Mid-Atlantic state who were teaching in secondary social studies classrooms on September 11, 2001 (9/11), were asked to reflect on their level of preparedness to adapt and implement real-time teaching to address unfolding events. A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for matched pairs revealed that respondents’ current perceptions of self-efficacy to teach about an unfolding terrorist act were positively modified by their experiences teaching about terrorism on 9/11 [Z = -4.507, p <.001 (two tailed)]. Respondents reported gains in confidence to teach about terrorism because of their teaching experiences on 9/11. Results add to the small knowledge base on the topic, even as they highlight the need for further research on the classroom response to 9/11.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the tragic events of 9/11 on the self‐employment entry/exit decisions of native‐born Hispanics.

The paper uses the difference‐in‐differences approach with native Whites as the control group. The dynamics of entry and exit decisions are examined using data from 1999‐2003 CPS‐ORG.

The estimates reveal a negative impact of 9/11 on Hispanics' self‐employment entry decisions, which is mainly the result of less entry from the wage sector, and it has increased Hispanics' self‐employment exit, which is mainly the result of increased exit to the wage sector.

The results suggest that native Hispanics may have experienced increased job opportunities in the wake of 9/11 and hence became less likely to be “pushed” into self‐employment and more likely to be “pulled” out of self‐employment. The improved labor market opportunities stem from government increased sanctions against undocumented immigrants, which reduced the demand for illegal immigrant workers, many of whom are Hispanic immigrants, and that native‐born Hispanics are likely to be relatively close substitutes for immigrants Hispanics. A limitation of the research is that the estimates are statistically insignificant, possibly due to the relatively small sample size.

Existing studies that examine the impact of 9/11 on the Hispanic's labor market outcomes are all focused on immigrants or wage‐employment. The paper complements the literature by examining the impact of 9/11 on native‐born Hispanics and in particular their self‐employment decisions, and thus provides a more complete picture of the impact of 9/11 on Hispanics.

The purpose of this introduction is to review some of the major issues that arose after 9/11 and set the stage for the articles that follow.

A literature review was undertaken using both academic and mass media sources.

The events of 9/11 have produced potentially positive as well as negative consequences, some anticipated and others unforeseen.

Relatively little research has been conducted on the events following 9/11, making it difficult to arrive at solid conclusions at this time.

This special issue links the events of 9/11 with the management of organizations, a topic that has received little attention, and hopefully will encourage more scholarship in this area.

It is important to more fully understand why 9/11 happened and what measures need to be taken to reduce the likelihood of future terrorist attacks, as well as improve the resiliency of both citizens and their organizational employers in dealing with the aftermath of such attacks should they occur again.

This study aims to examine the effect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on suicide terrorism in different regions of the world and changes in the trends in suicide terrorism according to regions before and after 9/11.

Using the data obtained from the Global Terrorism Database from 1981 to 2019, the descriptive statistics were computed first and then, independent samples t-tests were run to compare the monthly mean percentage of suicide-terrorism incidents that occurred in each region between the pre-9/11 and the post-9/11 periods. Finally, to statistically assess the effect of the 9/11 attacks and changes in the trends for the dependent variables over time, monthly interrupted time-series analyzes were conducted.

The results of monthly interrupted time series analyzes showed that after the 9/11 attacks, the trends for suicide-terrorism rates decreased significantly in three regions including South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa and Europe, while the trend for suicide-terrorism rates increased significantly in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, no statistically significant changes in the trends in suicide-terrorism rates occurred in three regions including North America, East Asia and Central Asia and Southeast Asia before 9/11, during November 2001 or after 9/11.

This study indicates the critical importance of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in suicide terrorism and its impact on these events in different regions of the world. The research also provides some recommendations concerning the effectiveness of defensive and offensive counterterrorism policies against suicide terrorism.

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether organizations have increased their crisis response planning in response to the terrorist attacks of 9‐11. While organizations were encouraged to implement crisis response plans or improve their existing plans after the events of 9‐11, there is mixed research on whether firms have taken such actions.

This study used a survey to explore if the number of firms implementing crisis response plans had increased since 9‐11. The survey also looked at employee perceptions of their company's preparedness for a crisis. By using subjects in New York and California, the survey also explored if there were geographical differences to the crisis response planning which occurred after 9‐11.

The survey found that firms have not responded as well as researchers and the government had hoped. The survey did find that the west coast firms seem to be responding quicker than the east coast companies.

Limitations of the survey include asking people to recollect the past. Another limitation is not having control over who filled out the survey since the survey was e‐mailed to the executives. The respondents also may have been susceptible to the social desirability bias.

This paper should impress upon organizations the need for an organizational crisis response plan. After the events of 9‐11, Hurricane Katrina has more recently focused attention on how firms were not prepared for a natural crisis and that firms may not be prepared for the Avian Flu.

The value of this paper is that it shows empirically the need for organizations to prepare crisis response plans. Future research should focus on exactly which elements should be included in a firm's crisis response plan.