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The chapter (re)assesses the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on global foreign direct investment (FDI). Based on updated data and renewed analyses, the author explores the crisis’ overall effects on global FDI flows, the different consequences on developed and developing countries, and the subsequent rise of emerging economies as both recipients and sources of FDI. Implications for policy and international business theory are delineated. By so doing, the author extends the theoretical and empirical studies on FDI determinants to the global level and provides lessons that are particularly useful against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The 2008 financial crisis emerged in the United States. However, the crisis spread across other countries very rapidly. The European Union countries were also affected by the crisis. The uncertainties and the decreases in balance sheet assets observed in European countries complicated the discharge of debts of countries, which have more fragile structures, and turned the financial crisis into a debt crisis in the year 2010. The European debt crisis caused a significant pressure on the Eurozone, put the financial sector under stress, and expanded the gaps in capital budgets. In order to restructure after the crisis and to eliminate the effects of the crisis, many measures were taken, and various mechanisms were developed. As a result of the measures are taken and the policies implemented, recovery was seen in financial and economic indicators as of the year 2012, but the COVID-19 pandemic emerging in the year 2019 brought a new shock wave. As a result, it became necessary to review the economic and financial measures taken before, to add new ones to the current mechanisms, and determine and monitor the vulnerability of the system. For this purpose, in January 2021, European Commission declared that a new strategy was set. In the present study, the measures taken and the mechanisms developed after the 2008 crisis were summarized and the advancements in financial and economic variables were examined by making use of the statistical data. Moreover, also information about the new strategy set after the year 2021 was provided. It is projected that, in the long run, the consistent and uniform implementation of measures taken and ensuring the efficient functioning of mechanisms developed would strengthen the economic and financial structures of European economies, support the integration, and increase the competitive power.

The purpose of this study is to show how socially responsible investment (SRI) could represent a powerful tool (trust recovering in political and economic institutions) in the case of failure or stagnation of economic and financial growth. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the current status of SRI in the context of the recent financial and economic crises. The main objective of this analysis is to consider the different benefits and challenges that this type of investment transactions bring into the international economy, and how SRI entrance could represent a major benefit not only for investors a different approach to corporate sustainability but as an important possibility in times of global economic and political crisis.

By analysing the literature about SRI, it has been developed a discussion regarding its benefits and obstacles in today’s financial scenario. By evaluating the performance of SRI in the context of the global financial crisis and the important opportunities regarding development, we would like to present the SRI as an important tool in today’s Post 2015 development agenda.

After revising the existent literature, it has been found that there are two important discussions in the field of SRI. The first one is related with the financial performance of SRI in contrast with the conventional investment funds while the second one is related with important considerations about the SRI in the context of the global financial crisis. After considering the arguments from the different authors, we address some conclusions regarding the importance of SRI in nowadays sustainable development discussion.

Due to failure in the traditional modus operandi of financial institutions and the recent global crises, investors, corporate executives and governments are increasingly paying more attention on the social, environmental and ethical behaviour of individual managers, shareholders and institutional investors. Therefore, it is being observed a shift and maturing process in SRI from an exclusive practice of few and specialised niche investment funds with minor financial implications and limited economic importance, to mainstream adopted by a growing number of institutional investors at the international level. This shift may influence companies and managers to adopt universal values and to assume a committed and strategic CSR agenda to respond to markets and societal expectations, in order to have guilt-free and sustainable investment and sustainable financial markets.

Within the context of the Post 2015 development agenda, the role of business and the private sector has become crucial for funding the new sustainable development goals (SDGs). This chapter not only discussed the relationship between SRI as an alternative to overcome financial crises and lack of sustainability in investment, but it does also conceptually demonstrates the potential of SRI to achieve the funding of the SDGs.

This chapter identifies three crisis warning indicators driven from trading in emerging markets’ carry trades, and empirically examines whether these indicators could predict two major financial crises that hit the global financial markets in the last decades — The 1997–1998 Asian crisis and the 2007–2008 global crisis. The probit regression is used to examine the power of the three indicators in forecasting financial crises, using data from eight Asian emerging countries which serve as proxies for emerging markets, independent of the origination of the crisis. I use both fixed effect and random effect estimation to measure crisis impacts. The empirical results show that financial crises could have been predicted. Probit estimation show that carry trade returns can predict a financial crisis, and the estimation results are robust to both panel level and country-level analysis. These three indicators are by no means an exhaustive list of all possible predictors of financial crisis. The literature suggests other fundamental indicators of financial crises such as the current account deficit and foreign debt. However, this chapter cannot fully consider these indicators for lack of data at this point in time. Although financial crisis may be better predicted by the well-known fundamental indicators, the contribution of this chapter is simply that carry trade-related indicators can help in predicting crises.

In business, globalization refers to the process of integrating the economies of the world, which results in the emergence of an interdependent business world. Nations are now living in a globalized business world. The globalization process began in the 1980s, developed rapidly in the context of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s, and entered the new millennium with great fanfare. Booming consumerism, rapid economic growth, rising incomes, and massive financial flows and transactions became the order of the day. Hardware-industrial China and software-service India rode the wave. With a high growth rate, prosperity seemed unending.

Then the anticlimax of 2007–2008 and later occurred. Financial crisis emerged from sub-prime crisis, bank failures, sudden credit collapse, market uncertainties, stock market crash, and the disappearance of business confidence. The crises certainly ushered in a “Great Recession,” which through vigorous international efforts stopped falling short of a “Great Depression.” The focus has again turned on China and India who are expected to lead in the recovery.

Where did the world go wrong? Here comes the Gandhian Thought and Philosophy. The paper seeks to explain how “greed” overtook “need,” “speculation” overtook “sensible thinking,” “self-aggrandizement” overtook “trusteeship,” and “consumerism” overtook “modest consumption.” Business everywhere should have been based on trust, transparency, and truth. But this foundation seems to have disappeared. These facts are analyzed, the relevance of Gandhi is brought out, and future perspectives are discussed.

The finance literature has not documented the feeling, the shock and the pain that ordinary people had to go through during the 2008 global financial crisis especially in the United States where it all began. In an effort to shed new light on the global financial crisis, it has become important to present a view of the financial crisis from the lens of those who were affected by the crisis, those who were responsible for the crisis, those who could have prevented the crisis, as well as the views of other observers. The views or quotes in this chapter are concise, useful and thought provoking. They create an opportunity to help reconsider the events of 2008 from a fresh perspective, so that a lot more can be done by everyone, including banks, governments and citizens, to prevent a repeat of those events in the future of finance. Finally, most of the views or quotes reported in this chapter have within them some important lessons and wisdom to guide us on what to do before another future crisis comes.

Purpose — Analyze and assess the actions taken by the government of Iceland prior to a banking crisis that resulted in the collapse of Iceland’s largest banks in October 2008. Was the government’s behavior prior to the crisis dishonest in the sense that it deliberately tried to fake reality or was the government honest but incompetent in the sense that it did not see the problem coming, and was therefore not trustworthy?Design/methodology/approach — Review of the existing literature, analysis, and assessment of this literature. Case study of Iceland.Findings — The government showed negligence and made mistakes by not taking credible actions to manage risks following a rapid cross-border expansion of Iceland’s largest banks. This had severe consequences and resulted in the collapse of the largest banks in October 2008. Instead of addressing the problems in the economy the government launched a PR campaign and the analysis of various scholars may have helped to justify inaction. According to the Special Investigation Commission (SIC),¹ the government did not address an obvious problem and could perhaps on that basis be charged with dishonesty, including faking reality with PR campaigns. As some scholars put it, the authorities gambled for resurrection, and failed. The analysis carried out by a number of other scholars who downplayed the problem may have confused the government and it may have been honest in its inaction. In that situation one can argue that the government was honest but incompetent and not trustworthy, as according to the SIC and several international scholars the problem was obvious.Research limitations/implications — This is a case study. The study does not present results that can be evaluated on the basis of statistical significance and generalized. Some of the lessons, however, can have a wider relevance than for Iceland only. This is especially true for small countries with a large banking sector, using its own currency, and with limited fiscal space to support the banks during a crisis.Practical implications — The combination of a risk seeking behavior of businesses, in this case in the banking sector, and inactive or negligent governments can result in the collapse of a country’s economy. The Icelandic government should encourage and enforce more risk mitigation via regulations, monitoring, and supervision of the private sector’s cross-border activities. This does not only apply to the banking sector but also to other sectors such as the energy sector.Social implications — Less risk seeking behavior and more risk mitigating actions can stabilize Iceland´s economic growth in the medium and long term, and reduce the risk of an economic collapse that typically has severe social consequences.Originality/value — The so-called Viking spirit of Icelandic business people accompanied with aggressive risk taking and bold business behavior can be very detrimental for a small economy especially when global economic and financial crisis hit.

This study takes the position that the concept of fraud is socially constructed. Moreover, it asks why and how different understandings of fraud have emerged. Insights from the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 2003; Lakoff, 2002, 2004, 2009) are used to analyze language revealing dominant worldviews and metaphors regarding fraud. The research method is a case study (Yin, 2014), and the analytical approach used parallels the one described in O’Dwyer (2004). The research setting is a report issued by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which provides a context to study different understandings of fraud due to the report’s divided nature. The analysis reveals three alternative worldviews, representing different assumptions about reality, that are at the root of the different understandings of fraud. These worldviews also lead to the usage of different conceptual metaphors which allow the commissioners to interpret facts in a manner that supports each worldview’s assumptions. The paper also concludes by providing a nuanced and critical examination of the results of the commission concerning its understanding of fraud.

In the euro’s initial years, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain observed capital flow bonanzas and credit-booms, two cycles known to precede banking crises. Domestic banks fuelled those cycles via funding obtained from foreign financial institutions. Yet, these countries’ banking and financial crises have unfolded in different modes. In Ireland and Spain, credit-booms propelled real-estate bubbles, which dragged banks into crises, with governments’ accounts later being affected when rescuing banks (Spanish regional banks, and all Irish major banks). In Greece and Italy, extra monetary means perpetuated government imbalances (e.g. debt levels above 100% of GDP, large yearly deficits). More severely in Greece, banks were brought into crises by sovereign crises. In Portugal, a mixture of private and public sector–led crises have occurred. Our comparative study finds that these crises: (1) are connected to shocks and imbalances caused by dangerous banking sector cycles during the monetary integration process; (2) were not mere expansions of the US subprime crisis; (3) were not only caused by country-specific features and institutions; and (4) followed distinct paths, therefore, a uniform model encompassing all post-euro crises cannot exist.