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The 11th September terrorist attacks on America continue to affect the corporate real estate industry, and this paper is intended to address a number of those ongoing effects. It first discusses property insurance coverage in general and then proceeds to analyse whether damage from acts of terrorism is covered under pre‐11th September and post‐11th September property insurance polices. It also addresses the current status of proposed US Government intervention as a terrorism insurance backstop. It then describes the strategies which certain clients located within the areas directly affected by the terrorist attacks implemented in order to be able to gain immediate access to alternative space. Finally it examines selected lease clauses to which landlords and tenants should pay closer attention in light of the terrorist attacks, including operating expense provisions, force majeure provisions, waiver of subrogation provisions, use prohibitions and alteration provisions.

The intent of this paper is to provide an overview of the principal provisions of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (the ‘Act’),1 which became law in the USA on 26th November, 2002, and the practical effects which the Act has had on the state of terrorism insurance coverage as it had evolved between 11th September, 2001 and the passage of the Act. The Act voids some of the exclusions which had made their way into insurance policies (particularly post‐9/11) relating to losses from certain ‘acts of terrorism’ (as defined by the Act) and requires insurers meeting certain criteria to ‘make available’ terrorism insurance coverage to their insureds. The Act also establishes a temporary federal reinsurance programme which provides a system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from certain certified acts of terrorism. From the standpoint of the average insured, however, the practical impact of the Act has been far less dramatic than may appear on the face of it. As The Department of the Treasury explained in its Final Rule,2 one of the main purposes of the Act was to address market disruptions that resulted in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the USA and to ensure the availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for certain risks associated with acts of terrorism. In addition, the Act was designed to provide a transitional period for the private insurance markets to stabilise, thereby allowing insurance companies to resume pricing terrorism insurance coverage. The Act also sought to build capacity in the insurance industry to absorb any future losses, while preserving insurance regulation and consumer protections in the individual states.

It is hard to find good news stories about disasters. Disasters seriously damage an organisation’s health. Of businesses that experience a disaster, 40 per cent never reopen and 30 per cent close within 2 years. Perhaps because of this, over 80 per cent of UK facility managers in a recent survey now report that they maintain a Business Continuity Plan which most of them review at least once a year. An increasing number, however, now find themselves responsible for a portfolio of international facilities spanning continents and time zones. This paper looks at some real life implications of global business recovery planning. In the wake of September 11th, one can hardly do less. This paper provides strategies and justifications for international emergency planning procedures and processes. Practitioners will gain valuable information from actual events and case studies to validate the concepts offered as a model. It may seem that some of the information and processes which are outlined in this paper are obvious; but that is the point. The obvious can be overlooked, and excuses can be made for the lack of implementation of emergency plans. But those excuses will not stand in the light of real disasters and cataclysmic events.

Although the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 can be blamed for a number of problems currently plaguing the US airline industry, their effect on the service and safety quality of post‐9/11 airlines is mixed. This study places current industry quality in historical context by examining trends in both areas beginning in 1987. The findings indicate that the service quality improved among major US carriers for the period 1987‐1993 but began to deteriorate after this date, although it did not return to 1987 levels. Service quality again improves in 2001 and reaches its best level ever in 2002 as post‐9/11 changes appear to have improved on‐time performance, reduced overbooking, and lowered customer complaints. Two factors identified as important in service and safety quality, maintenance spending and load factor, were also explored. Results indicate that both service and safety quality improve as the level of maintenance spending increases.

The case of food poisoning which affected some 150 persons at Derby appears to be undoubtedly a genuine case of ptomaine poisoning. During the last few years many isolated deaths have occurred, after the consumption of some particular kind of food, which have been attributed to ptomaine poisoning, but the evidence put forward in support of this view has not unfrequently been open to grave doubt. At Derby, however, the nature of the outbreak and the symptoms presented by the patients were characteristic, and if further proof were needed it would be contributed by the interim report of Dr. SHERIDAN DELEPINE, of Manchester, who made an examination of the suspected pies and their ingredients. Most people are fully acquainted with the history of this out break, which was not confined to Derby but extended to various parts of the country, in every case the persons attacked having consumed portions of the infected pork pies. Dr. DELEPINE has issued an interim report in which he states that he has isolated a bacillus belonging to the colon group which is, in his opinion, undoubtedly responsible for the pathogenic properties of the pies. The evidence as to the relation of the bacillus to the epidemic is, says Dr. DELEPINE, absolutely clear. The bacillus in question has been isolated from a pork pie, from a pork bone pie, from the blood, spleen and intestines of one of the persons who died, and from the blood, spleen, bile and intestines of several animals which have died in two or three days from the effects of feeding on a pork pie. The bacilli obtained from all these sources were identical in appearance. Animals inoculated with this bacillus have died, and in their blood the same bacillus has been again found; and four specimens of blood obtained from patients who had been ill after eating a portion of a pork pie have given, on examination, a clear serum reaction, but the blood of normal persons and also of patients affected with typhoid fever has given no similar clear serum reaction. Dr. DELEPINE has also been able to ascertain the presence of the same bacillus in a pork pie which Dr. ROBERTSON, of Sheffield, had sent him. This statement appears to leave no room for doubt as to the dangerous nature of the pies, and Dr. DELEPINE's complete report will be awaited with considerable interest.

This paper seeks to understand business requirements for supply chain risk management (SCRM) from a practitioner perspective.

Based on the findings from an exploratory quantitative survey and qualitative focus group discussions with supply chain managers, some issues of SCRM are derived and structured along the three conceptual levels of “philosophy”, “principles” and “processes”.

The survey showed that 44 per cent of all eight responding companies expect the vulnerability of their supply chains to increase in the next five years. However, the concept of SCRM is still in its infancy.

The paper contributes to our knowledge on SCRM by presenting the business requirements from a practitioner perspective and by deriving a structure for an integrated approach to SCRM which can guide further research.

An address delivered at the University of Valladolid, Spain. Asks the Question‐What is Cybernetics?. Discusses popular notions and genuine difficulties. Looks at the origins, derivations and definitions of cybernetics. Considers intrinsic control and Socio‐Economic Governance in real‐time. Relates cybernetics to the current world situation.

This study provides an analysis of two regional samples on R&D activities in manufacturing small and medium‐size firms in the UK. The results show that there are statistically significant regional differences between the North East and the West Midlands (χr² of 11.8 s.s. at p < .01), where the North East SMEs seem to engage less in R&D activities. The results may be of some interest to the relevant R&D funding bodies.