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Purpose – This experimental economics study using brain imaging techniques investigates the risk-ambiguity distinction in relation to the source preference hypothesis (Fox & Tversky, 1995) in which identically distributed risks arising from different sources of uncertainty may engender distinct preferences for the same decision maker, contrary to classical economic thinking. The use of brain imaging enables sharper testing of the implications of different models of decision-making including Chew and Sagi's (2008) axiomatization of source preference.

Methodology/approach – Using fMRI, brain activations were observed when subjects make 48 sequential binary choices among even-chance lotteries based on whether the trailing digits of a number of stock prices at market closing would be odd or even. Subsequently, subjects rate familiarity of the stock symbols.

Findings – When contrasting brain activation from more familiar sources with those from less familiar ones, regions appearing to be more active include the putamen, medial frontal cortex, and superior temporal gyrus. ROI analysis showed that the activation patterns in the familiar–unfamiliar and unfamiliar–familiar contrasts are similar to those in the risk–ambiguity and ambiguity–risk contrasts reported by Hsu et al. (2005). This supports the conjecture that the risk-ambiguity distinction can be subsumed by the source preference hypothesis.

Research limitations/implications – Our odd–even design has the advantage of inducing the same “unambiguous” probability of half for each subject in each binary comparison. Our finding supports the implications of the Chew–Sagi model and rejects models based on global probabilistic sophistication, including rank-dependent models derived from non-additive probabilities, e.g., Choquet expected utility and cumulative prospect theory, as well as those based on multiple priors, e.g., α-maxmin. The finding in Hsu et al. (2005) that orbitofrontal cortex lesion patients display neither ambiguity aversion nor risk aversion offers further support to the Chew–Sagi model. Our finding also supports the Levy et al. (2007) contention of a single valuation system encompassing risk and ambiguity aversion.

Originality/value of chapter – This is the first neuroimaging study of the source preference hypothesis using a design which can discriminate among decision models ranging from risk-based ones to those relying on multiple priors.

Ours is a complex world. On these five words will be built a foundation for an alternative way of framing our thinking about risk management. Complexity means many things, but a key feature is that outcomes cannot be predicted with certainty. In the best cases, opportunities arise to analyse and develop some understanding of the uncertainty within a complex system, and in the most fortunate of such circumstances it is possible to anticipate specific outcomes with some degree of accuracy. The authors call such circumstances risks – that is, measurable uncertainties. Complexity, however, consists mainly of interconnected uncertainties and unknown/unknowable possible outcomes or effects. And, of course, complex systems can include humans whose (in)ability to perceive and interpret such environments makes things – well – more complex.

This book ultimately will focus on how the authors construct a way to lead and manage in this environment, but first it is critical that the terminology and description of this world be given some precision. Therefore, Chapter One begins with an introduction to the idea of complexity, including some mention of the principles and concepts that inform our understanding of it. In turn, this discussion introduces uncertainty. Risk, as a category of uncertainty is discussed and the implications of its measurability are presented, which leads to a discussion of human perception and behaviour under conditions of uncertainty. Attention is then drawn to the unknown and the unknowable, and to emergent phenomena. Since the focus of this book is on public sector risk management, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the idea of public risk.

Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit is, by the author’s own account, “a study in ‘pure theory’.” From pure theory, the scientific method’s “successive approximations” explain empirical phenomena. But Knight did not fully develop the boundary conditions for theory. In this chapter, the author elucidates the demarcation of pure theory in Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. For comparison and contrast, the author uses Mises’s Austrian aprioristic methodology praxeology and its strict distinction between theory and thymology. The author finds that Knight and Mises largely agree on the nature and importance of pure theory but differ on its meaning and use. The author’s findings suggest that Knight, while arguing for aprioristic pure theory, still places empirical observation first.

We explore how absolute and relative incomes affect an individual's propensity to start a new business as a pure or hybrid entrepreneur. Using a sample of 12,686 individuals from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort (NLSY79) in our empirical analyses, we find that individuals with high absolute income are generally less likely to engage in entrepreneurship. However, once absolute income is controlled, those with above-average relative income are more likely to become an entrepreneur, particularly in pure form as opposed to a hybrid one. Our findings provide more nuanced understanding on the differences between absolute and relative income levels influencing an individual's decision to become an entrepreneur, and if so, whether to engage in pure or hybrid form.

The second major area of the so-called risk treatment is risk financing. Risk financing includes measures to finance the costs of losses, risks, and uncertainties. Historically, risk financing has been virtually synonymous with buying insurance. However, over time alternatives to insurance have evolved – self-insurance, pools, captives, large deductible programmes, finite insurance programmes, banking arrangements, and capital market-based solutions. The concept of risk financing has expanded to include products that address a range of financial risks such as interest rate and credit risk. These products include derivatives and some new innovative securities.

Today, the rapid development of the risk financing market has created several practical problems. Notably, regulatory and legal structures have not always kept pace with change, leading to much confusion about risk financing alternatives. Many products look and function almost identically to others, and yet history and custom have dictated very different treatment by regulators, tax authorities, and others. There is growing pressure for significant legal and regulatory realignment.

For newcomers to the field, risk financing measures can be thought of as existing on a continuum, ranging from pure retention (all losses paid directly out of pocket) to pure transfer (where a third party accepts and bears the full costs of risk). An important recognition of the continuum of risk financing is that there are no products that are fully retention or transfer, but rather a varying blend of the two. Hedging of risk, for example, is arguably here a near perfect blending of a retention and a transfer of risk.

Purpose – Since risk management is crucial for achieving strategic objectives in a complex and uncertain environment and its effectiveness relies deeply on efforts to create a risk-conscious culture, this study aims at understanding whether risk management can be promoted and reinforced by the use of performance-based monetary incentives given to Board members and top managers.

Methodology/approach – This study is explorative in nature and investigates four case studies based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews with risk managers.

Findings – Results show that some companies have already adopted risk measures in incentive schemes. At the same time all interviewees agree with the usefulness of linking traditional performance-based monetary incentives to risk management objectives in order to improve the effectiveness of the latter and to create a risk-aware culture. However, the difficulty in identifying proper measures has been underlined.

Practical implications – The study confirms the feasibility of linking risk dimensions to reward systems and suggests that firms should move in this direction. The study also outlines and proposes some possible measures to reward managers.

Limitations – This study views risk as measurable and managerially actionable and focuses only on incentives while acknowledging the use of other mechanisms that can contribute to the creation of an informed risk culture. Furthermore, the integration of risk management with other management control systems and accounting instruments has not been analyzed.

Value of the paper – This study addresses firms and their stakeholders’ need to make top managers more accountable for risk in their decision-making.

“Economics is a Serious Subject.” Edwin Cannan.