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The purpose of this paper is to provide a labour process theory interpretation of four case studies within the Australian construction industry. In each case study a working time intervention (a shift to a five‐day working week from the industry standard six days) was implemented as an attempt to improve the work‐life balance of employees.

This paper was based on four case studies with mixed methods. Each case study has a variety of data collection methods which include questionnaires, short and long interviews, and focus groups.

It was found that the complex mix of wage‐ and salary‐earning staff within the construction industry, along with labour market pressures, means that changing to a five‐day working week is quite a radical notion within the industry. However, there are some organisations willing to explore opportunities for change with mixed experiences.

The practical implications of this research include understanding the complexity within the Australian construction industry, based around hours of work and pay systems. Decision‐makers within the construction industry must recognize a range of competing pressures that mean that “preferred” managerial styles might not be appropriate.

This paper shows that construction firms must take an active approach to reducing the culture of long working hours. This can only be achieved by addressing issues of project timelines and budgets and assuring that take‐home pay is not reliant on long hours of overtime.

March 9, 10, 1970 Redundancy — Calculation of payment — Normal working hours — National agreement providing for remuneration based on shifts for a five‐day week — Provision for district or local arrangements to be negotiated “forthwith” for working additional shifts — Mineworker emloyed for 20 years as continuous shiftman on seven‐day week — Whether presumption that additional shifts arrangements made covering colliery or district in which situated — Continuity of operations ceasing — Employee working and paid for five‐day week — Whether consensual variation of contract of employment to be inferred — Contracts of Employment Act, 1963 (11 & 12 Eliz. II, c. 49), Sch. 2, para. 1 — Redundancy Payments Act, 1965 (c. 34), s. 1(1), Sch. 2(5)

The aim of this paper was to analyze the effect according to knowledge and behavior, respectively, through a simplified health information model launched in a selected city district.

The intervention in this study encompasses information meetings where two educational computer programs highlighting the “five a day” concept, and food hygiene were showcased in conjunction with a group discussion. In total, 92 people living or working in a selected city district participated. The effect of the intervention was determined by means of inquiries (multiple‐choice) that were carried out prior to, immediately following, and three weeks after the intervention.

A statistically significant improvement in knowledge of the concepts “five a day”, cross‐contamination, and recommended storage temperature (for smoked salmon and raw mince meat) was observed, however, no major change in behavior was reported.

The knowledge improvement suggests that the education programs, in conjunction with discussions, are a useful information model for raising awareness about the notion of “five a day” and food safety. The results of the study make it clear that there are difficulties in getting people to change their behavior, let alone getting them to participate in health education offered locally.

Intervention projects are a communication tool that may be used in order to increase knowledge and produce behavioral change. The project is working from the inside out, i.e. it examines the needs first and then develops solutions for them.

A distinction must be drawn between a dismissal on the one hand, and on the other a repudiation of a contract of employment as a result of a breach of a fundamental term of that contract. When such a repudiation has been accepted by the innocent party then a termination of employment takes place. Such termination does not constitute dismissal (see London v. James Laidlaw & Sons Ltd (1974) IRLR 136 and Gannon v. J. C. Firth (1976) IRLR 415 EAT).

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent of directors breaching the reporting requirements of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Corporations Act in Australia. Further, it seeks to assess whether directors in Australia achieve abnormal returns from trades in their own companies.

Using an event study approach on an Australian sample, abnormal returns for a range of situations were estimated.

A total of 13 (seven) per cent of own‐company directors trades do not meet the ASX (Corporations Act) requirement of reporting within five (14) business days. Directors do achieve abnormal returns through trading in shares of their own companies. Ignoring transaction costs, outsiders can achieve abnormal returns by imitating directors' trades. Analysis of returns to directors after they trade but before they announce the trade to the market shows that directors are making small but statistically significant returns that are not available to the market. Analysis of returns to directors subsequent to the ASX reporting requirement up to the day the trade is reported shows that directors are making small but statistically significant returns that should be available to the market.

Future research should investigate the linkages between late reporting by directors and disadvantages to outside shareholders and the implementation of internal policies implemented to mitigate insider trading.

Market participants should remain vigilant regarding the potential for late/non‐reporting of directors' trades.

Uncovering breaches of reporting regulations are particularly important given that directors tend to purchase (sell) shares when the price is low (high), thereby achieving abnormal returns.

This paper aims to examine performance of firms with a negative second-day return after the Initial Public Offering (IPO) relative to stocks with a positive second-day return after the IPO. Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that firms which have done an IPO or an SEO underperform similar firms over three- and five-year investment horizons. Loughran and Ritter (2002) also document that firms that go public “leave money on the table”, with this amount being almost twice as large as the fees paid to the investment banks.

The study’s null hypothesis is that stocks with a negative return on the second day of the IPO perform better than firms with a positive return on the second day of the IPO. The authors estimate the second-day return based on first- and second-day closing prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices, and they use a regression model and Jensen’s alpha to test the hypothesis.

The authors find evidence that rejects the paper’s working null hypothesis of superior performance of negative second-day return IPO firms relative to positive second-day return IPO firms in the three-year and five-year period samples. They fail to find statistically significant evidence in the entire period samples which suggest that negative second-day return IPO firms perform similarly to positive second-day return IPO firms.

The findings in this study raise interesting questions with regards to the ideas developed by Loughran and Ritter (2002) and the “money left on the table”. These findings are of interest to both entrepreneurs and investment bankers who advise them during the underwriting process. If there is not a benefit in terms of IPO performance to investors, then the question becomes – shouldn’t owners possibly consider actually “taking money from the table”. After all, the return to investors will be the same either way but if entrepreneurs make more money at IPO they would be motivated to start more companies in the future.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

The purpose of the study is to investigate and document a new approach to best practice benchmarking called rapid benchmarking. Rapid benchmarking is defined by the authors as an approach to dramatically shorten the typical length of time to conduct a successful best practice benchmarking project.

The methodology involved a case study exploration of a multinational dairy company's best practice benchmarking approach using structured interviews and data collection to examine the speed and results achieved through its benchmarking approach and whether it was justified in naming it as rapid benchmarking. A comparison of the speed of the dairy company's approach was undertaken against 24 other organisations that had utilised the same benchmarking methodology (TRADE Best Practice Benchmarking). In addition, a literature review was undertaken to search for other cases of rapid benchmarking and compare rapid benchmarking with other rapid improvement approaches.

The findings revealed that the approach used by the dairy company was unique, with best practices being identified and action plans signed off for deployment within a five-day period (far quicker than the average time of 211 days reported by other organisations). Key success factors for rapid benchmarking were found to be allocating five dedicated days for the benchmarking team to spend on the project, identifying the right team members for the project, obtaining sponsorship support for the project and providing intensive facilitation support through a benchmarking facilitator.

Only one company was found to use a rapid benchmarking approach; therefore, the findings are from one case study. The depth of analysis presented was restricted due to commercial sensitivity.

The rapid benchmarking approach is likely to be of great interest to practitioners, providing them with a new way of finding solutions and best practices to address challenges that need to be solved quickly or with minimal expense. For organisations that have been using benchmarking for many years, the research will enable them to re-evaluate their own benchmarking approach and consider if rapid benchmarking could be used for some projects, particularly for internal benchmarking where it is easier to apply.

This research is the first to identify and document a rapid benchmarking approach and the first to provide a detailed analysis of the length of time it takes to undertake best practice benchmarking projects (and each stage of a benchmarking project).

This paper aims to identify which types of creative R&D employees prefer which daily and weekly working schedules.

This paper builds on an original repeated survey of creative R&D employees from Estonia and presents multinomial logit regression estimates based on a sample of 153 individuals from 11 entities.

The probability of women preferring their weekly work to be concentrated in three to four days is 20 percentage points higher than in men, and the case is similar for less-educated creative R&D employees. The more educated prefer the standard five-day working week. Men have a stronger preference for their week of work to be dispersed over six to seven days. Sleep patterns appear to relate to working time preferences as morning-type individuals have a stronger preference for a working day with fixed start and end times. Those who sleep 7 h or more per day prefer the standard five-day working week more, while employees who sleep less than 7 h favour a working week of six to seven days. Employees who desire more creativity intensity at work have a stronger preference for irregular daily working hours, as do those with poorer general health.

The results indicate that individual characteristics have a significant impact on the preferences for working time arrangements. Similar working time regulations for all employees appear outdated, therefore, and may make work inefficient and harm individual well-being, at least for creative R&D employees.