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The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

This chapter aims to examine Bank Negara Malaysia’s (BNM) approach in fulfilling its financial consumer protection mandate from unfair contract terms and the statutory framework relevant for consumer protection in the domestic market. This is a qualitative-based research. Using content analysis, this study analyses BNM’s Financial Stability and Payment Systems Report from 2012 to 2016, specifically on the ‘market conduct and consumer empowerment’ to explore BNM’s prudential regulatory, supervisory and consumer protection roles in protecting bank consumers from unfair contract terms. It is found that even if a number of standards and guidelines have been issued by BNM in improving ‘fairness and transparency’, the potential risk facing bank consumers from unfair terms in standard consumer contracts of Islamic banks especially where terms may be unfair or unclear remains unchanged. This study recommends that BNM as the Central Bank and financial regulator of Malaysia promotes self-regulation of the Islamic banks by adopting value-based banking of a consumer-focussed culture in delivering an effective protection for consumers from unfair contract terms and empowering them in their dealings with Islamic banks in Malaysia. This study will be helpful in bringing a policy formulation by BNM in identifying their weak areas and suggesting improvements in pursuing a strong consumer protection agenda from unfair contract terms.

This chapter introduces the fundamentals of portfolio and financial consumer protection from frauds in the cryptoasset space. Cryptoassets pose new risks to portfolios and financial consumers: idiosyncratic risks stemming from their unique features and systematic risks arising from transitioning from centralized to decentralized finance. Market experience indicates that these risks threaten every portfolio and financial consumer holding cryptoassets. In the consumer protection framework, cryptoasset risks are higher than traditional asset risks. Cryptoassets fall outside the regulatory domain in many jurisdictions. Moreover, their decentralized nature, technological attributes, and the momentum of financial technology cause asymmetric technology, disarming system-based portfolio and consumer protection mechanisms against frauds and abuses. Hence, the idiosyncratic and systematic risks of cryptoassets highlight the importance of developing more vigilant self-protection mechanisms.

Hisbah is one of the distinguished institutions that had emerged since the early days of the Islamic empire. Based on its cardinal duty to enjoin good and prohibit evil, over time, its functions gradually expanded, and its responsibilities increasingly grew. In light of the contemporary trend in establishing institutional framework for consumer protection, entrusting an agency with multifarious tasks may not be the best and effective way in handling consumer protection issues. Thus, this chapter attempts to explore the new paradigm of hisbah as a consumer protection institution in Malaysia with a special reference to the Islamic consumer credit industry. While utilising the doctrinal legal research methodology, relevant sources of law have been examined and analysed. This research finds that the classical hisbah institution provides a good reference point in establishing regulatory agency and dispute management body. Nevertheless, some modifications are required to remain relevant especially in terms of specialisation of role and function. Likewise, it is viewed that adjustment of the hisbah institution is also necessary regarding the characteristic of the muhtasib (ombudsman).

The chapter is prepared on the basis of previous scientific developments of the author, as well as the current legislation of the United States of America. The following laws were studied: Truth in Lending Act; Electronic Fund Transfers Act; Fair Credit Reporting Act; Consumer Leasing Act; Consumer Protection Act; Equal Credit Opportunity Act; Fair Debt Collection Practices Act; Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act; Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Act; Home Mortgage Disclosure Act; Alternative Mortgage Parity Act; Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Conflicts – Customer Code; and Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Conflicts. One of the new US laws was analyzed – Arbitration Fairness Act, 2017. Data was also used from the Final Report to Congress on the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer financial services contracts, 2015, and information resources available on the websites of financial regulators: the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Currency Comptroller, the National Administration of Credit Unions, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Agency for Housing Finance, the Financial Bureau Consumer Protection, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, and American Arbitration Association.

Methodologically, the research is based on the author's materialistic worldview, which is implemented meaningfully in a positivist approach to the scientific article. In preparing the chapter, general scientific methods were applied: formal logic, system-functional, historical, analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction; special methods: mathematical, and statistical. Also the author applied private scientific methods of jurisprudence: normative-dogmatic, method of legal and technical design, interpretation of law, and others.

The attempt to establish a common European framework for core platforms' duties and responsibilities toward other actors in the digital environment is at the core of the recent scholarly debate surrounding the Digital Markets Act (DMA) proposal. In particular, the everlasting juxtaposition between the “data power” – as emerging from recent cases (Section 2) – that dominant tech companies enjoy and the concept of consumer sovereignty (Section 3) lies at the core of the proposal's attempt to identify digital core platforms as market gatekeepers. Accordingly, this chapter critically investigates the divide between power imbalance and consumer sovereignty in light of the architecture designed by the DMA, with a specific focus on its effectiveness in identifying gatekeepers' power drivers (Section 4). After highlighting the main critical aspects of the pertinent rules, opportunities for fruitful developments are then identified through the reframing of some of the notions considered in the proposal, and namely the role of “lock-in” effects and “data accumulation” (Section 5). Lastly, this chapter suggests that the DMA advancements – while desirable – are bound to be fragmentary in the absence of a wider appraisal of the nature of data power imbalance dynamics in the modern digital markets (Section 6).

E-commerce is gaining popularity across the globe and Mauritian businesses are also increasingly making use of online platforms to engage in cross-border electronic transactions. However, there are several implications arising from online trading which need to be addressed, among which one is the validity of e-contracts. This research will therefore emphasise on two main components of e-contracts: choice of law and the applicable jurisdiction. While Mauritian laws were amended to give effect to digital signatures and e-agreements, there is no extensive or substantive domestic legal provision on choice of law and jurisdiction. Hence, the purpose of this study is to advocate for a greater clarity on the legal framework governing the applicable law and jurisdiction governing a conflict situation in e-contracts, with the view of increasing trust in international e-commerce and to bring in consistency with international commercial relations. This study will be carried out in the Mauritian context by adopting the black letter approach which will analyse the relevant rules and regulations concerning e-contract formation and validity. Additionally, a comparative analysis will be conducted on the legal framework relating to the applicable law and jurisdiction in e-contracts for selected countries: the European Union and the United States. These countries have been chosen for the comparison due to their high involvement in e-commerce and their advanced as well as comprehensive rules on e-commerce.

Product intervention power is introduced under the markets in financial instruments regulation (MiFIR) and packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) Regulation for all EU Member States and gives National Competent Authorities (NCAs), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Banking Authority (EBA) powers to monitor financial products (and services) under their supervision and to “temporarily” prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution, or sale of certain financial instruments, or to intervene in relation to certain financial activities or practice. This extends the supervisory measures defined in MiFID II to any PRIIPs (including insurance-based investment products “IBI products”) that would not otherwise fall under the scope of MiFID II. Product intervention power is given to the NCAs, and in order to use power, it requires to take the specifics of the individual case into account and a series of conditions, criteria, and factors to fulfill. Moreover, ESMA and the EBA have a type of control function and ability to override national regulators on product. The aim of product intervention powers is to ensure strengthening of investor protection, but given the potential significant impact of this power, calls into question of possibility to delay innovation and slow down product developments on the capital market.

This paper provided an overview of supervisory measures on product intervention, that is, scope of the product intervention power, criteria, factors, and risks which have to be taken into consideration when using this regulator’s tool.