Understanding Terrorism: Volume 22

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the meaning of terrorism, with a view to highlighting the main hurdles in the way of creating a working definition, as well as the necessity of developing definitions and classifications of this phenomenon.

This chapter provides an overview of the literature on terrorism as a social/political phenomenon. It is therefore based on secondary sources.

While most literature on the topic finds it pointless or impossible to define terrorism, here we argue just the opposite. Common critiques of current definitions may be overcome by using multiple definitions and classifications.

The chapter provides the methodological foundations for a comprehensive theoretical analysis of terrorism.

The chapter applies insights from methodology of social sciences to the problem of defining terrorism.

The purpose of this contribution is to review the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic determinants of terrorism.

Review of the relevant academic literature.

This contribution shows that there is a theoretical foundation to the popular hypothesis that poor economic conditions are conducive to terrorism. A review of the empirical evidence on the economic determinants of terrorism, however, yields an inconclusive result. Some studies find that economic conditions (directly and indirectly) matter to terrorism, whereas a plurality of studies suggest that noneconomic factors are more important.

The findings of the survey indicate that it is unlikely that economic conditions are universal determinants of terrorism. By pointing at several avenues of future research (e.g., a focus on the role of ideology in terrorism), this contribution, however, argues that the opposite also does not need to be true. The influence of economic factors on terrorism should neither be overemphasized nor completely ruled out.

The contribution offers a comprehensive overview of the economy–terrorism nexus and hints at promising areas of future research.

The purpose of this study is to assess the ability of a theoretically motivated statistical model to accurately forecast annual, national counts of terror attacks out-of-sample.

Bayesian multi-level models, classification analysis, marginal calibration plots

We find that the model forecasts reasonably well, but conclude that its overall performance suggests that it is not ready for use in policy planning. This is likely due to the coarse temporal and spatial aggregation of the data.

The implications of this study are that social scientists should devote more effort into evaluating the predictive power of their statistical models, and that annual, national data on violent conflict are probably too coarse to provide useful information for policy planning.

The primary value of our modeling effort is to provide a baseline against which to evaluate the performance of more region- and country-specific models to be developed in the future.

The purpose of this study is to define the interactions that determine how secure a society is from terrorism and to propose a method for measuring the threat of terrorism in an objective and spatio-temporally comparable manner.

Game-theoretic analysis of the determinants of security and discussion of how to implement these interactions into a measure of security.

We show that governments concerned with popularity have an incentive to over-invest in security and that, in certain situations, this leads to a deterioration in net security position. Our discussion provides an implementable means for measuring the levels of threat and protection, as well as individuals’ perceptions of both, which we propose can be combined into an objective and scientific measure of security.

The implication for researchers is the suggestion that efficiency, as well as scale of counter-terrorism, is important in determining a country’s overall security position. Furthermore, we suggest that individuals’ perceptions are at least as important in determining suitable counter-terrorism policy as objective measures of protection and threat. The limitations of this research are found in the vast data requirements that any attempt to measure security will need.

We propose the first method for objectively measuring the net security position of a country, using economic and econometric means.

This aim of this chapter is to outline the rationale and methodology behind the development of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), a composite index which attempts to measure the unobserved latent impact of terrorism across 158 countries covering over 99% of the world’s population.

The GTI attempts to capture the multidimensional direct impact of terrorist related violence, in terms of its physical effect, as well as emotional wounds and fear, by attributing a single-weighted average national level score. It is based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This chapter also details selection of the indicators, weighting methodology and method of normalisation.

The GTI aims to be a reference point from which one can further discuss how researchers and the general public collectively define, interpret and contextualise the social, political and economic impact of terrorism.

Certain issues related to the data remain intractable (e.g., missing injury data in the GTD and property damage). The chapter also suggests a number of areas in which the basic index design could be expanded upon.

By presenting the GTI the chapter provides a relative measure of terrorism. Its value rests in the possibility to compare the impact of terrorism between countries and scores, analyse trends over the time and assess the aggregate global impact of terrorism.

Terrorist events are unforeseen and have the potential to shake and rattle markets and investors. The purpose of this study is to examine whether major terrorist incidents have affected the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) in four European countries.

An index is constructed that weights the severity of each event and then used to evaluate through the use of vector autoregressive and impulse response analysis estimation techniques whether or not and to what extent the ESI has been affected.

Effects were more pronounced and evident in the case of France and Germany while the ESI in Spain and Great Britain did not appear to be particularly affected by terrorist incidents.

The effects of terrorism on economic sentiment in other countries will provide additional evidence that will allow more robust and conclusive statistical inferences.

The impact of terrorist activity on the ESI for the four European countries studied here has not been examined before using VAR and impulse response analysis.

The aim of the chapter is to outline a framework for a cultural analysis of terrorism. It is based on an analogy between the logic that characterizes terrorism and the logic that characterizes the “worlds” of artistic and cultural production.

This chapter critically examines some explanations of the logic of terrorism which respectively assign a central role to individual psychology, the rational choice of the group and values. It is therefore based on secondary sources.

The chapter argues that the logic of terrorism can be fully understood only as a result of the “cultural” construction of collective and individual identities.

The chapter provides a framework for a cultural analysis of terrorism.

The chapter borrows the concept of a “political world” and makes of it a central tool to explain the set of symbolic products that characterizes terrorism.

This chapter explains how economic analysis can contribute to the delineation of the lone wolf’s opportunities and choices in a manner that allows operationally relevant advice to be contributed to the investigative process.

Using a risk-reward analytical framework we examine the lone wolf’s attack method opportunities and choices and identify those attack methods that would be chosen by lone wolves with different levels of risk aversion. We also use prospect theory as an alternative methodology for the determination of the lone wolf’s preference orderings over the available attack methods in a context where he references his actions against those of a predecessor whom he wishes to emulate.

We find that lone wolf terrorists with different levels of risk aversion can be expected to choose different attack methods or combinations of attack methods. More risk averse lone wolf terrorists will choose attack methods such as assassination. Less risk averse lone wolf terrorists will choose attack methods such as bombing, hostage-taking and unconventional attacks. Also, we find that lone wolf terrorists who reference their actions against ‘predecessor’ lone wolf terrorists will choose differently from among the available attack methods depending on which predecessor lone wolf is being referenced.

The analysis provides two different perspectives on terrorist choice but by no means exhausts the analytical alternatives. The analysis focuses on the fatalities and injuries inflicted whereas other perspectives might include different ‘payoffs’ series, including news or media coverage.

The chapter contributes an analysis of the order in which lone wolf terrorists with particular characteristics will choose from a set of available attack methods. During the course of our discussion we point out the consistency between the ‘rise’ of the lone wolf terrorist and the diseconomies to scale that are evident within the terrorism context. This presents the opportunity for new debates.

An investigation of parallels between homegrown, international, and domestic terrorism.

A comparative method is used to analyze data from two main sources, ITERATE data on international and the TWEED data on domestic terrorism. The similarities are tested in various dimensions – target types, severity, and the method of the attacks.

Homegrown terrorism is inherently motivated by domestic issues. Moreover, variables of ethnic heterogeneity, political inclusiveness of fringe groups, and problems in the democratization process are good predictors of the occurrence of other forms of domestic and homegrown terrorism alike.

Number of observable cases of homegrown terrorism are low. The two main datasets have potentially overlapping incidents.

Provides and operational definition of homegrown terrorism and test empirically the similarity between homegrown and other types of terrorisms.

This chapter examines the phenomenon of cyberterrorism, which is a form of terrorism that could be potentially devastating as terrorists could, through computer networks, wreak havoc in the critical infrastructure of an advanced country.

Review of relevant literature.

The chapter argues that there are actually two types of cyberterrorism: “Hard-Rock” and “Lite.” Both are potential “force multiplier” for terrorists. The former relies on attacking a country’s infrastructures via computer networks and blocking the working of critical functions like water and energy distribution and the like. Because of its complexity and costs, this type of cyberterrorism is far from frequent and actually almost non-existent. The latter type (Lite) is much more commonplace and is the capability by terrorist organizations to use the Web (and the Internet) to communicate with their affiliates, recruit new elements and, most importantly, publicize their deeds.

Because the use of the Web and the Internet by terrorists give intelligence agencies more opportunities to actually monitor them, this form of terrorism is much more a “double-edged sword” than regular terrorism.

The chapter tries to better classify and compare the two forms of cyberterrorism; it also shows how remote the prospect of Hard-Rock Cyberterrorism still is.

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate on the relationship between terrorism, criminal organisations, and the so-called ‘new wars’.

Review of the existing literature on the ‘new wars’ and on the terrorism–crime nexus; estimate of the financial revenues gained by terrorist groups engaged in illicit activities.

Terrorist and criminal groups can develop several forms of collaboration. Whether terrorists convert to criminal activities or not depends on a variety of factors, both internal and external. In some cases these links are occasional and opportunistic, associated with the possibility of exploiting the availability of specialised competences in a stateless environment, in other cases the warring parties are directly involved and create stable relationships as a way to finance their war activities.

Lack of reliable data limits a comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, the study has important consequences for designing and adopting more effective policies regarding terrorism, organised crime, as well as conflict resolution.

The study presents an overview of different strands of the literature on terrorism; a discussion is articulated on the interplay between ‘new wars’ and the terror–crime connection. Potentially fruitful avenues of investigation are suggested for future research.