Elites, Nonelites, and Power: Volume 41

In this chapter, we review the historical development of elite theory, and then we propose a way forward beyond it. Elite theory emerged as a critique of democracy in the late 19th century. Although it used historical materials illustratively, it tended to be ahistorical theoretically because its primary aim was to demonstrate the perdurance of elites even in conditions of mass suffrage. Lachmann was the first scholar to develop elite theory as a truly historical and explanatory framework by combining it with elements of Marxism. Even Lachmann's theory, however, remained inadequate because it did not rest on a fully articulated theory of power. In this introduction, we suggest a “relational power theory” as a remedy to this situation, and we use it to formulate a general heuristic for the study of elites, nonelites, and their interrelationships. To illustrate its utility, we show how it can illuminate the chapters in this volume (though they were not necessarily written for these purposes).

While oft-ignored, grievances remain a central part of revolutions. We argue that the theorization of grievances requires conceptually unpacking specific complaints and relating them to mobilizing mechanisms. We thus focus on one set of grievances – corruption – that is especially prevalent in 21st century revolutionary episodes. Drawing on prior conceptualizations of corruption, we hypothesize that four different configurations of corruption influence five different mechanisms of contention. First, everyday street-level corruption creates the potential for sudden and spontaneous protest and creates the basis for widespread, coalitional mobilization. Second, institutional corruption focuses attention on the regime to make it a target of revolutionary claims. Third, competition among elites creates the potential for cross-class alliances but may forestall durable sociopolitical change and, in some cases, even allow for authoritarian consolidation of power through anti-corruption drives. We illustrate these dynamics through one clearly successful case of revolution in Tunisia in 2011, one case of mixed results from political revolution in Ukraine from 2004 to 2014, and a negative case of revolution in China since 2013.

Following the tradition of scholarship showing that elites institutionalize their tastes via cultural philanthropy, this chapter investigates patronage of Asian art at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Drawing on content analysis of museum press releases and other documents, I conceptually elaborate and empirically illustrate different patterns of Asian art patronage among Asian and white patrons as well as among Asian patrons from different ethnic groups. Engaging theory asserting that elites legitimate art tied to their ethnoracial heritage through supporting it at cultural organizations, I elaborate how Asian elites are especially committed to supporting Asian art at the museum. In addition, I illustrate how, compared with each other, Asian elites particularly champion art from their respective ethnic groups – for example, Chinese elites support Chinese art at higher levels than Asian elites who are not Chinese, and Indian elites support Indian art at higher levels than Asian elites who are not Indian. This chapter advances theory about elites and cultural legitimation, elites and organizational contributions, and progressiveness within the elite.

The repercussions of Portugal's colonialism are not widely discussed. The marks of colonialism in the public space are still present in the urban landscape of Portuguese cities. Despite the growing activity of the Black movement's in the country, they are still not being systematically considered in the design of public policies. Moreover, the Portuguese census does not include any data collection on ethnic belonging. Therefore, it is difficult to deepen the knowledge of the Black communities. The Black community has been growing in Porto, the second-largest city in Portugal and it remains highly invisible. Starting from a collaborative project between Portuguese and American professionals, acting in the fields of sociology and socially engaged curatorial and contemporary art practices, an experimental approach was developed to map and cocreate with the Black community in Porto. By using digital tools while collecting, analyzing, and sharing data, and by applying an ethnographic approach and techniques of exploration from documentary photography, the team developed a collaborative project side by side with the community. An exchange between disciplinary knowledge and “various subject positions,” with all participants engaging in an exploration of how to begin decolonizing the city through those tools took place at the project TRAVESSIA. This chapter explores how the Black nonelite is expressing and questioning race and ethnic inequalities in Porto by discussing the results of this collaborative project.

We leverage Lachmann's insight on elite conflict to explain the politics surrounding industry regulation in contemporary America and argue that conflicts between political elites create both constraints on industry players and opportunities for them to shape regulation. The widening urban-rural polarization of American society, in particular, has made urban political elites more liberal than those in state politics. The greater the political polarization of a state, the more local restrictions the nascent US hydraulic fracturing (fracking) industry – generally regarded as conservative – face in that state. Players in the industry thus seek interventions by conservative elites at the state government level. The dominance of conservative state legislators and the presence of affiliates of the right-leaning American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) are bound to strengthen the industry's lobbying efforts in that state. These, in turn, increase the likelihood of the enactment of state preemption laws that nullify local restrictions. We discuss the implications of this on the study of elite conflict, the politics of industry regulation, and the industry's political strategy.

Hyperinflation is a rare form of macroeconomic crisis that often results from extreme political events, such as revolution or regime change. The 1989–1990 Argentine hyperinflation is puzzling because it occurred in the absence of such an event. Moreover, conventional fiscal mechanisms linking political processes to hyperinflation do not sufficiently explain the Argentine case. Previous theories emphasizing distributional conflict and institutional weakness contain key elements of an explanation of the Argentine hyperinflation but do not capture the range of mechanisms that produced extreme financial instability. This chapter offers an elite theory approach that subsumes elements of these approaches within a broader theory of elite fragmentation, competition, and conflict. Elite fragmentation inhibits collective action in both economic and state elites, resulting in deficits in policymaking capacity. Fragmentation among state policy elites leads to policy volatility and incoherence, while fragmentation among politically mobilized economic elites results in elite stalemates constraining the options of policy elites. These policymaking patterns lead to prolonged delays in the adjustment of unsustainable organizational structures, resulting in explosive forms of crises.

This chapter proposes a framework explaining the evolution of property rights in land, assuming two unequal groups of actors: elites possessing means of violence and nonelite land cultivators. It then shows that all intermediary groups – those acting between the chief violence holders (i.e., rulers) and cultivators – are in effect (greater or lesser rulers and cultivators). Using this framework, this chapter explains most of the developments in the evolution of land rights in 19th century colonial Bengal. The proposed theoretical framework explains how different, hierarchically arrayed claims over land and the resulting allocation of rights was a function of asymmetries in power and information between three groups: rulers, direct cultivators, and intermediaries without their own coercive means. It explains inter alia why private property in land was not likely to emerge in this configuration, and that the (non-private) property rights of the other two groups wouldn't attain stability as long as rulers perceived an information asymmetry. In such a situation, land rights would attain neither “private,” nor “public” character.

Ethnoracial categories and classifications can change over time, sometimes leading to increased social mobility for marginalized groups or nonelites. These ethnoracial changes are often attributed to emulation, where nonelites adopt the elite's social, cultural, and political characteristics and values. In some cases, however, nonelites experience ethnoracial shifts and upward mobility without emulating elites, which events can help explain. I argue that the type of event, whether endogenous or exogenous, affects the ability of elites to enforce their preferred ethnoracial hierarchy because it will determine the strategy – either insulation or absorption – they can pursue to maintain their power. I examine this phenomenon by comparing the cases of Irish social mobility in 17th-century Barbados and Montserrat. Findings suggest that endogenous events allow elites to reinforce their preferred ethnoracial hierarchy through insulation, whereas exogenous events constrain elites to employ absorption, which maintains their power but results in hierarchical shifts. Events are thus critical factors in ethnoracial shifts.

A “state-driven” approach suggests that colonists use census categories to rule. However, a “society-driven” approach suggests that this state-driven perspective confers too much power upon states. A third approach views census-taking and official categorization as a product of state–society interaction that depends upon: (a) the population's lay categories, (b) information intellectuals' ability to take up and transform these lay categories, and (c) the balance of power between social and state actors. We evaluate the above positions by analyzing official records, key texts, travelogues, and statistical memoirs from three key periods in India: Indus Valley civilization through classical Gupta rule (ca. 3300 BCE–700 CE), the “medieval” period (ca. 700–1700 CE), and East India Company (EIC) rule (1757–1857 CE), using historical narrative. We show that information gathering early in the first period was society driven; however, over time, a strong interactive pattern emerged. Scribes (information intellectuals) increased their social status and power (thus, shifting the balance of power) by drawing on caste categories (lay categories) and incorporating them into official information gathering. This intensification of interactive information gathering allowed the Mughals, the EIC, and finally British direct rule officials to collect large quantities of information. Our evidence thus suggests that the intensification of state–society interactions over time laid the groundwork for the success of the direct rule British censuses. It also suggests that any transformative effect of these censuses lay in this interactive pattern, not in the strength of the British colonial state.