Finding Common Ground: Consensus in Research Ethics Across the Social Sciences: Volume 1

The quest for a set of generic ethics principles remains a challenge, not least because the generation of new sets seems to be continuing unabated. This chapter has been developed from the first of a series of stimulus papers, delivered in symposia, organised as part of the Academy of Social Sciences’ initiative to promote discussion between learned societies aiming for a consensus on what might comprise generic ethics principles in social research.

This chapter is written in response to ‘The Quest for Generic Ethics Principles in Social Science Research’ by David Carpenter. I address his communitarian arguments for additional principles to inform a virtue theory approach to research ethics. These require that social researchers ensure that their research is both socially and scientifically valuable, and that they ‘involve members of the public in the designing, planning, delivery, ongoing monitoring and dissemination of research’. Carpenter underpins these principles with an appeal to the common good as a balance to the more individualistic principles characteristic of principlism. I argue that enforcement of these new communitarian principles via ethical regulation would further undermine the quality of research, and especially of academic social science.

This chapter is written in response to ‘The Quest for Generic Ethics Principles in Social Science Research’ by David Carpenter. It is also based on a response given at a workshop organised by the Academy of Social Sciences in March 2013 to help to formulate some generic ethics principles for social sciences. From an anthropologist’s perspective I argue that there is no way that ethics principles or procedures can ‘solve’ all dilemmas of conducting ethically sound research and that we need to acknowledge the difficulties and talk about them, and to build this into a reflexive research process, rather than try to protect ourselves from them through bureaucratic procedures.

In this chapter I explore the issues of whose interest and rights are at stake when social scientists conduct their research. I caution that the ethical considerations, values and principles that pertain to the social sciences are not always the same as those which rightly underpin the biomedical sciences and so not all should be imported. In particular I consider the dangers of applying a ‘participant protection model’ to social science research. I suggest that the social sciences must be regulated through a framework that understands and enables these differences rather than misconstrues and hinders good social science research.

This chapter responds to Matt Sleat’s chapter on appropriate ethical regulation for the social sciences (2017). I argue that research is a social practice which brings the researcher into relationships with a variety of institutional and individual actors including, but not limited to, research participants. In this context, I consider the range of ethical duties which may arise and the principles and values which may usefully underpin the conduct of social science research. In particular, I argue that the biomedical model should not be discarded but can be built upon to produce a more appropriate ethical framework for the social sciences.

This chapter provides a response to the chapter ‘Responsible to Whom? Obligations to Participants and Society in Social Science Research’ by Matt Sleat (2017). I outline precisely why principles of decision making in medicine and the biomedical research ethics model do not easily transfer for use in the social sciences. In particular I urge against the social researcher moving from ‘thought’ (contributing to knowledge) to ‘action’ – which could have political consequences and create a fundamental change in disposition towards the researcher’s role in society.

Formal research ethics codes perpetuate imbalances between ethics regulators and researchers in the social sciences. Some of these imbalances are an outcome of ethics regimes that use the biomedical paradigm when evaluating social science research. The bureaucratic nature in the manner by which ethics committees operate is yet another factor that produces imbalances that reshape social scientific enquiry. This chapter, however, underscores some of the less recognised ways that ethics codes produce a disequilibrium. First, ethics codes require, in effect, that researchers in the social sciences ‘other’ themselves at the expenses of their traditional stock of social scientific methodology by seeing themselves through the eyes of the colonising ethics codes. Second, ethics codes insist that researchers need to exemplify a far larger number of virtues than the very few set aside for members of ethics review committees. Ethics regimes place social scientists on the margins of the ethics world: the regime not only colonises them, but also insists that they hold on to virtues that are quite absent with respect to members of ethics committees.

This chapter considers the current standards that exist for the conduct of research and whether these standards are being met. Issues of scope and terminology are discussed and debated. Also considered are the reasons and benefits to the Academy of Social Sciences and other professional and disciplinary bodies by being involved in developing generic ethics principles in social science research.

This chapter provides a response to ‘Developing Standards for Research Practice: Some Issues for Consideration’ by James Parry (2017). This draws in particular on the experience of Canadian research agencies of developing guidance on ethics principles applicable to research practice across the natural and social sciences and engineering. This was achieved based on the concept that there are underlying principles common to all disciplines conducting research with humans.

The Academy of Social Sciences has promoted discussion among its member learned societies in order to explore the possibility of defining common elements among the various disciplines’ approaches to research ethics. This chapter provides a context for and an overview of principles developed by the Academy’s Working Group at the end of a series of symposia to encourage working towards common principles for social science research ethics.

This chapter offers an anthropological commentary on the work of the Academy of Social Sciences’ Research Ethics Group and the process through which five generic ethical principles for social science research was created. I take an anthropological approach to the subject and, following the structure of Macdonald’s essay Making Research Ethics (2010), I position myself in relation to the process. I discuss various features of the REGs work including the enduring influence of medicine and biomedical research ethics on the ethics and ethics governance of social science research; the absence of philosophers and applied ethicists and their incompatibility with the kind of endeavour pursued by the Research Ethics group; and the antipathy many felt towards the creation of a common code resulting in a preference for generic principles. This chapter offers insight into the work of the Research Ethics Group and the creation of the five ethical principles for social science research, subsequently adopted by the Academy of Social Sciences.

This chapter considers the opposition to formal ethics review and the reasons for this. The history and a summary of the Fredericton Conference, the ‘Ethics Rupture Summit’ in October 2012 are discussed. This ultimately culminated in the production of the New Brunswick Declaration, aiming to pave the way forwards beyond the rigidities of formalised ethical review.

A growing tendency towards interdisciplinary and international social science research has resulted in the need for codes of ethics and guidelines that cross disciplinary and national boundaries. One set of such documents was developed by the RESPECT project, which produced Europe-wide professional and ethical guidelines for social sciences. This chapter builds on a semi-structured interview conducted with the Principal Investigator of the RESPECT project. Her thoughts are contextualised within the broader discussions of ethics and professional standards codes and guidelines as identified by other scholars in the field. Drawing on an experience-based account, the chapter offers guidance in overcoming some of the common concerns when developing international, interdisciplinary ethics codes and guidelines for social science research.

This chapter considers the difficulties faced when trying to develop an ethics framework for all social sciences because of the variety of disciplinary approaches and traditions involved. In recognition of the need for issues of research governance to operate separately from researchers and ethics committees the former Social Science committee of Science Europe organised a workshop in June 2015 with representatives of the Member Organisations to assess the state of art and to present ideas on how to move this issue forward. The key issues discussed and the recommendations resulting from this workshop are explored in this chapter.

This chapter presents the main findings of the EU-funded SATORI project on ethics assessment of research and innovation (R&I) in its first 18 months. It offers summarised descriptions of the ways in which ethics assessment and guidance of R&I are currently practiced in different scientific fields, in different countries in Europe, the United States and China, and in different types of organisations.

The main findings include the following. Although the most extensive institutions, policies and activities exist in the medical and life sciences, there is evidence of a growing institutionalisation of ethics assessment in non-medical fields. Increasing coordination and cooperation between ethics assessors can be observed at the EU and global levels. Each of 15 types of organisations that were studied performs an important role in ethics assessment, which may not always be well established and sometimes poses significant challenges. Although significant differences exist among the countries that were studied in terms of the degree to which ethics assessment of R&I is institutionalised, all seem to be expanding their ethics assessment and guidance infrastructures.

The findings are an important means by which partners in the SATORI project will take their next steps: the identification of best practices, the development of proposals for harmonisation and shared standards, and, to the extent possible, the proposal of common principles, protocols, procedures and methodologies for the ethical assessment of research and innovation in the European Union and beyond.

This chapter considers the implications of the lack of uniformity, consistency and harmonisation in defining and regulating research integrity across Europe. In view of this, recent initiatives of the Council of Research Ministers and of the European Commission aim to provide a common point of reference in institutional terms and legal terms. However researchers and institutions themselves remain ultimately responsible for detecting, investigating and adjudicating any allegations of scientific misconduct through their established procedures. Therefore, a complementary approach between the Commission’s initiatives and the self-regulatory approach of local/national structures is desirable. A major step towards this direction could be the formulation of a single European-wide definition of research integrity.