Advances in Military Sociology: Essays in Honor of Charles C. Moskos: Volume 12 Part 2

Subject:

Table of contents

(31 chapters)
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Foreword

Page xi
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This two-volume book was prepared in the memory of Charles C. Moskos, a distinguished military sociologist. He addressed the role of military and their families in international and domestic conflicts. Military is an important part of conflict and war, and its role has changed distinctly over the years due to development of technology and present day politico-social contexts. In recent years, there have been very few international conflicts. Most of the conflicts are domestic where countries or coalitions of countries are often involved to save their interest, combat terrorism, and keep world peace. A new form of war, namely asymmetric warfare, has developed. Traditional armies are not prepared for this. Peacekeeping and peacemaking by international organizations like United Nations have become the rule. The attitude of the soldiers themselves has also changed. They are questioning authority more. Protests over civilian casualty and torture are being raised. The establishment of the International Court of Justice has led to many controversies amongst nations. The role of military cannot be discussed at global levels exclusively. Regional war and the role of the military in Asia, for example, is a topic of its own. Women in military and wives of the military play important but sometimes difficult roles. The value of these two books lies in the contributions of scholars living in different countries with drastically different socioeconomic conditions to come up with a generalization sought by Charles C. Moskos.

Introduction

Pages xiii-xxix
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I first met Charles C. Moskos back in 1983, at the first international conference in which I had the fortune to participate, and, since my history of relations with him parallels those of many colleagues and friends who study the military and who, like me, remember him, it seems worthwhile to introduce these studies in his honour with a personal recollection.

Although the Slovenian army is only 17 years old, it is characterised by many changes that most other armies never go through or that would require many decades to implement. Some examples of the stormy history of the Slovenian Army include the transition from the territorial defence as typical reserve to a relatively small but highly effective (post)modern army with compulsory military service and clear defence goals; the NATO approach; constant restructuring, and also the manning dilemma (conscript military service vs. all-volunteer army with career and professional soldiers). If in the first phase the largest problem was a UN weapons embargo, and therefore, as a logical consequence, the technological deficiency had followed, structural and doctrinaire difficulties also appeared very early. Some of them were the consequence of changes in the external security environment, and some were followed by different internal political ambitions and public expectations. However, the classical/conventional tasks of home land defence stepped ever more into the background, and in the foreground stepped the peace operations, increasing crisis/disaster management activities and at the end the absolutely different public requirements for the Slovenian Armed Forces.

The chapter presents comparative analysis of data from two representative sociological surveys carried out in the Bulgarian armed forces in June–July 2000 and October–November 2007.

The goal of the chapter is to investigate how possible organizational and cultural barriers operate and influence the successful development and implementation of equal opportunity policy and practices in the military and to suggest options for the improvement of policy decision-making.

In addition, the chapter analyses advantages and possible disadvantages as well as implications of the concept of diversity for the military organization from the perspective of units’ effectiveness, cohesion and teamwork and to suggest recommendations for improvement of the performance of diverse military teams.

This chapter examines the security political attitudes in Finland, a relatively modern, relatively affluent ‘western type’ EU country, where approximately 80% of the male cohort still undergoes compulsory military training. In this chapter, some of the reasons for this are examined as well as the reasons behind the marked differences in relevant attitudes between Finland and some other EU countries.

The evolution of military profession in Latin American countries has not been the subject of research as compared to civil–military relationships because of the political intervention of the latter. Since the 1980s, with the restoration of democracy in countries of the Southern Cone, the design and management of defense is no more a monopoly of the armed forces, and they are now exposed to a wide range of influences. On the basis of the framework proposed by Moskos, Williams, and Segal in their book: The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, where they argue the case of the United States of America as a paradigm of the military profession changes because of the postmodernism in industrialized countries, we pretend to make a comparative analysis of the changes or modernizations experienced by the military profession in Southern Cone's countries, mainly Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.

Some key questions on rationality (responsiveness), consistency, stability and reliability of public opinion have been raised in scientific literature and in professional and lay public in recent years. The authors reply to these questions on the basis of secondary analysis of public opinion results obtained in surveys carried out in Slovenia from 1991 to 2007, examining the following group of variables: perception of threats, membership of Slovenia in NATO, the role of armed forces in contemporary society and their functions and trust into Slovene Army, the way of its manning and operating costs. The authors found that the Slovene public supported crucial projects of the state in the security field (NATO membership, transformation from conscript army into All-Volunteer Force, collaboration in peace operations); however, it did not always follow the opinion of the political elite. Nor did the public follow its own general value orientation while supporting those projects. The data revealed that public opinion about security issues has been relatively rational, consistent and stable in the examined period of time whereas greater changes of attitudes have been most often related to the changed circumstances and availability of new information.

This article presents an analysis of some particular aspects of European public opinion with respect to defence and security issues under the threat of international terrorism after September 11, 2001.

It is based on secondary data analysis from standard EUROBAROMETER surveys, Candidate Countries EUROBAROMETER surveys and Flash EUROBAROMETER surveys carried out in 2000–2006.

The analysis shows that there is an increase in the level of anxiety across European public opinion in the ‘Age of the War on Terror’ related to international terrorism and proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction.

The existing divergence in the threat perception in Western and Eastern parts of Europe in the first years following the end of the Cold War significantly diminished after September 11, 2001, is based on the common perception of the threat from international terrorism.

Security and defense policy is not a topic that traditionally attracts as much public attention as does domestic policy. Also, public opinion can be influenced by singular events such as terrorist attacks or acute humanitarian catastrophes, which create flash-like peaks in the public attention. However, it is well known that the more persistent patterns of public opinion are rather formed by long-term traits and globally affecting developments. The international mission in Afghanistan following the collapse of the Taliban regime seems to have the potential to be such a global event.

This chapter deals with the development of public opinion in Germany on security and defense issues in the last few years. It strives to investigate long-lasting patterns of security-related public opinion that can be found among the German citizenry. In order to do so, it takes an overview on some selected security and defense issues. In detail, the paper investigates the general attitude toward the armed forces, which have undergone considerable change in recent years, the public approach toward the system of military mobilization and the feeling toward the participation of Germany in international missions. It thereby gives special consideration to the current ISAF mission in Afghanistan, as this mission has created a major political debate among participating NATO-partner countries. The paper describes how the controversy about the German troop contribution within the alliance is echoed in public opinion polls. Furthermore, it tries to explain these patterns in light of the specific historical background and by using the collective self-concept that materializes in Europe and Germany in recent years.

Women in Africa increasingly bear greater burden of conflicts in which they rarely contribute to the outbreak. Historically, the Geneva Convention of 1949 and their Additional Protocol of 1977 acknowledge women as the most vulnerable members of the population and explicitly contain special measures to protect women during armed conflicts. Rape and sexual violence continue at an alarming rate in the ongoing genocide in Darfur. Rapes and other forms of sexual violence are being used as weapons of war to humiliate, punish, control, inflict fear, and displace women and their communities. These acts constitute grave violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, including war crimes against humanity. It should be noted that African women face shelling, famine, epidemics, forced displacement, detention, torture and execution like other civilians caught up in the maelstrom of war. Mass rapes in Darfur effectively terrorize women, break their will, and destroy the fabric of the society. Rape also has serious economic and social consequences in Darfurian society by making the victims ineligible for marriage and ostracized by the community and the family members. The economic and political implications of war are also noticeable in the way women that are internally displaced (IDPs) and refugees are being forced to exchange sexual favors in desperation for goods and services by the Sudanese security forces, including police deployed to protect them. It is pertinent to note that documented cases of rape or sexual violence in war time only represent the tip of the iceberg. In war and also during peace time, the stigma associated with rape and the victim's self-blame mean that the vast majority of cases go unreported. Therefore, sympathetic care and counseling for victims are essential to regain their self-esteem, dignity, and to facilitate their reintegration into society and family life. There should be greater recognition of the scourge of sexual violence, as well as public condemnation, with strict enforcement of existing national and international laws.

The integration of women into the armed forces of western democracies reveals a pattern of significant diversity: while some countries have integrated women, granting them real (and not only formal) access to a wide range of positions and occupations, other keep women in little more than symbolic spaces.

Among the variety of factors which account for different paths and integration levels – which range from global social-economic conditions, political factors, cultural and historical patterns, military organizational structure, or time effects – there are institutional policies. One rather common assumption is that explicit organizational policies are a crucial factor to promote integration at the organizational level. However, some studies have also reached disappointing conclusions regarding the power of institutional policies to help redress culturally entrenched stereotypes that often function as obstacles to integration.

This paper discusses the impact of organizational policies on gender integration using available empirical data from a comparative study conducted among NATO nations (Carreiras, 2006). It specifically addresses the following questions: what is the impact of organizational policies on gender integration? To what extent does the existence of explicit and active integration policies contribute to promote equality in military forces? Under which conditions are policies effective and under which conditions may their effects be blocked?

It concludes that polices may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for integration – that their impact, while positive on formal integration, may not always be so on social integration – and that conditions for change do not depend strictly on formal policies. A final suggestion is made regarding the need to analyze the specific conditions under which the efficacy of policies might vary.

The role and scope of women's participation and active role in the war of Independence of the Greek nation from the Ottoman rule (18th/19th centuries) was substantive and significant with a continuous and eminent presence. Women's contribution has been accepted in its face-value and significance through the course of history of the nation, showing leadership qualities taking arms and fighting along together with male leaders, obtaining a balance that gave them a distinct recognition and status in Greek society. The role of women within the military environment of the nation can be seen as marginal, basically polarized around the traditional axis of the family Historians and social scientists have located the double role that women were to play while making evident the lack of participation of women in other major socio-political activity or structure up to the latest part of the 20th century, such as public management of the state, church, universities, politics, etc. And yet, the Greek revolutionary intellect Rigas, under the influence of the French Constitution of 1789, had declared already in the 18th century some provisions for the equal status of women in the public life. Recruitment of women in the Greek military was late to come. The enlistment of women in the Army was introduced in 1977 (in 1946 women were introduced in the Army as military nurses) by the relevant decree of Parliament 705/1977, which determined the conditions of voluntary service, which were identical to a great extent with those under which men volunteers had served. Another relevant decree (444/1974) that made Army service obligatory for Greek citizens, including women, while still valid, has not been made effective up to now re. recruitment of women. By Law 2439/1996, Military Women in the Greek Armed Forces can reach the rank of Brigadier General. This chapter discusses the reasons behind late participation of women in the Greek military as well as existing problems and inefficiencies of political and military leadership with respect to those problems.

Since women were first admitted to the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) in 1976, gender integration has been an important issue. This chapter reviews the works of two social scientists that researched and documented the gender integration efforts of that time. It then summarizes more recent gender climate data, presents data from our study of correlates of cadet perceptions of females at USAFA, and discusses implications of these findings for gender climate and leadership development programs. In the early years of gender integration, male cadets had more traditional attitudes toward women in society than civilian males or female cadets; views that changed little by the time of graduation. Also, they often were vocally opposed to the integration of women at the Academy and in the military and viewed female cadets and officers as less capable leaders. In contrast, the females in the first cohort were less traditional in their attitudes and backgrounds and were very positively supportive of women in nontraditional roles. Nevertheless, they were “feminine” in their gender identities and, unexpectedly, became “more feminine” over the course of their Academy experience.

Despite vast improvements in the past 30 years or so, some gender integration issues remain; there continue to be gender-related jokes and comments, and a small but substantial portion of men do not believe that women belong at the Academy.

In the present study, we looked at what variables predicted men's and women's agreement with the statements: “female cadets can hack it (succeed) here” and “I have no trouble taking orders from a female officer.” We also looked at how cadets rated leadership scenarios featuring either male or female officers.

The findings revealed that different variables predict men's and women's attitudes toward females at USAFA.

Results are discussed in terms of continuing efforts to improve the gender climate at USAFA as well as to enhance leadership development programs.

Because of the high-risk deployments into Afghanistan, soldiers’ parents have become more important in public opinion as well as in activities of family support groups. Although their voice is heard louder than ever before, research into parents’ experiences in the course of deployment is sparse. This study among 1,098 parents of Dutch soldiers reveals, among other things, that the relationship between service members and their parents can be described as strongly cohesive and may even be strengthened by a deployment. Moreover, parent–child cohesion and parents’ appraisal of their child's deployment predict parents’ support for the armed forces and its missions.

The Italian case can be defined by means of the image of the three-sided revolution: from draft to AVF, from national to international oriented military, from all-male to mixed military. These great changes have given rise to a professional military with a lifelong career with frequent deployments abroad and formed by soldiers who are not single males anymore. Because of the rapid process of routinization of abroad deployments and the growing number of military families, the Italian military institution has been caught relatively unprepared, and it has been able to offer a kind of emergency psychological support in case of dramatic events, but less able to give rise to routine forms of family support for those situations where problems are much less tragic but anyway stressing for the private life of families affected by the professional activity of deployed soldiers. In this chapter, results from a qualitative inquiry are presented about military family situation, mainly as far as problems arising because of international deployments are concerned. Research observations have been taken from families where one member (usually the husband) belongs to units where deployment is a continuous problem to live with, but where the socio-cultural area where the unit is settled is different. Due to the country morphological structure, the territorial distribution of units gives rise to two different types of territorial family situation: a strong majority of deployable units are settled in the North of the country, whereas the large majority of soldiers comes from southern regions, that is from 500 or 1,000 kilometers of distance; but some units are on the contrary settled in the southern regions, and in these cases soldiers are really “locals.” This means that in the first type of unit, military families are often similar to migrant families, where both spouses come from far away and are cut off from their social and parental networks, or the young soldier gets married to a “local” girl and the new family can take advantage from the presence of parental and friendships ties of one of the two partners; in the second type, families and soldiers are locals, and they can maintain their basic social integration, their parental and friendship networks. This variety permits to understand to what extent deployment affects family life in situations where primary social support can be a solution, or it is absent and should be provided by the institution itself or by the society at large. Because of this variety, a number of different solutions can be tested to support military families, so that they can choose according to their true needs.

The prolonged army rule in the country has affected the policymaking procedure of the state. Specifically, defence and foreign policies of the country are normally decided by the armed forces of Pakistan as per their own priorities, which is against the norms of democratic culture and supremacy of the civilian rule.

The control of important decision-making process in the hands of the armed forces has generated an arms race in the subcontinent. The major portion of the national budget is being spent on the defence forces and other sectors such as education and health and social welfare are not getting their due share from the revenue of the country. The continued sense of insecurity and animosity with neighbour countries, especially India, has resulted in speeding the acquisition of sophisticated arms in the country.

This research discusses the effects of the military's role in the decision-making of the country and its impacts on the relations between India and Pakistan. The confidence building measures and peacemaking process in South Asia is dependent on the attitude of the military of both the countries.

The class profile of the cadets joining the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) has changed dramatically in the past 50 years. Gone are the days when children of the elite and upper-classes were still attracted to military service. None other than the current Superintendent of the PMA, General Leopoldo Maligalig (AFP) admitted that the majority of the cadets joining the Academy are from low-middle to very low-income families. Despite their working-class “habitus,” however, the entry of these cadets into the military “field” initially through the PMA and later-on through various training institutions within the military organization enable them to acquire the lifestyle and perspectives associated with a distinct military “habitus.” As was very clearly illustrated by Bourdieu in his analysis of the French educational system, this chapter argues that the military educational system through its unique system of instruction, the bureaucratic system of administration, not to mention the highly regimented daily activities, rituals, and traditions all contribute to the reproduction of a hierarchical military institution in the Philippines, where the symbolic and cultural capital of a segment of PMAers translate into economic and political capital for themselves and their progeny. As history has proven since the Marcos years, the military has now a part of the ruling and dominant class. In a sense, PMA education within the military “field” in the Philippines has provided an avenue for upward social mobility.

This chapter is a preliminary step toward a more systematic study of how PMA education reinforces a military habitus (e.g., hierarchy, organization and networks, culture) that put those who share this habitus in the trajectory of the middle classes, if not the elite. It explores what has happened to selected members of the PMA 1991 graduating class since graduation and how, from their perspective, their education in the Academy has contributed to the social mobility (or immobility) of their families.

Since Mongolia confirmed its new Constitution in 1992, it became a country with democratic political regime and armed forces for self-defense. In political and geographical respects, it is a developing country in Asia, landlocked between two powers. In accordance with the Constitution, Mongolia adheres to the universally recognized norms and principles of international law and pursues a peaceful foreign and defense policy. Under the Constitution, Mongolia has adhered to its Military Doctrine, which was adopted by the State Great Hural in 1994, is still in effect, and serves as guiding principle of Mongolia's contemporary defense policy. What is more, the post-communist period offered Mongolia a renewed position in international affairs, and the opportunity to reassert its once-disregarded Asian identity. The author pays his attention to the issues of the constitutional basis of Mongolian defense policy, the external and internal environment of defense policy, and the purpose of the armed forces on the basis of legal acts and documents with some basic conception.

Charles Tilly argues that continuous wars and preparation for wars motivated early European rulers to extract resources from their subject populations, thereby expanding states’ infrastructure and establishing mechanisms to enable negotiations with societies. State capacity was thus strengthened. Tilly's argument has inspired a wave of scholarship to reconsider state building in various regions of the Third World. Analysts of the Third World employ two theoretical elements inferred from Tilly to account for the failures of many Third World states. One is that without continuous international wars (as early modern Europe had), there would be no capable and effective states. The other element is that availability of foreign aid from the global powers so unique to the Cold War Era exempted Third World states from extracting resources from their societies. I call these analyses Tillian theories of the Third World.

Tillian analysts acknowledge that the capable state in Taiwan during the Cold War stood out from its Third World counterparts. However, the Tillian generalization of the Third World does not account for Taiwan's state-building path. Taiwan's experience is situated in a perplexity between the two variables above: On the one hand, Taiwan resembles early modern European state formation with high military expenditures and a huge standing army prepared for war. In the Tillian model, this condition enhances state capacity. On the other hand, Taiwan was a huge US aid recipient in the Cold War, second only to South Korea. In the Tillian model, this degrades the state's effectiveness, contrary to Taiwan's experience. Solving this puzzle will revise Tillian logics of state building. That, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, through literature review and presentation of empirical evidences, I suggest some analytical directions for future research to enhance our understanding of Taiwan's state-building trajectory in particular and of Third World states in general.

This chapter focuses on the development of concordance theory with respect to India's civil–military relations and Pakistan's early yet significant state of discordance, which led to subsequent domestic military interventions. On a regional level, discordance is far more prevalent, and India operates in a South Asian environment where domestic military interventions are not uncommon – Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka being clear examples.

Moreover, the influence of China in the region cannot be overlooked, since India's defense policy is often a reaction to the role of China and the presence of conventional and nuclear forces. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular, threatens a delicate balance in a highly volatile region where China exerts enormous influence on neighboring states including Pakistan. An argument can be made that India's domestic concordance between the military, the political elites, and the citizenry contributes to the preservation of regional stability, because India has chosen to maintain its regional strength vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, while continuing to search for a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue with allies such as the United States. India's most recent and ongoing nuclear deal with the United States originally struck in 2005 is an example of the delicate synergies taking place to offset potential threats from China, Pakistan, and Iran, while maintaining domestic military and technological strength.

Although India's successful domestic course encourages partnerships among international political and corporate allies, Pakistan's continuous domestic discordance has resulted in recent difficult relations with the United States, India, and Afghanistan. Pakistan's inability to quell al-Quaeda extremism has contributed to a lack of domestic confidence in General Musharraf's political agenda. Musharraf has continued the discordant political and social relationship begun by his predecessor Ayub Khan. As a result of Khan's initial and dramatic alienation of the East Bengali community, Pakistan's military and political elites have never recovered the domestic credibility needed to partner with other political groups and the citizenry – a credibility so vital to domestic concordance and international foreign policy.I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any.– Mahatma Gandhi

Since the democratic transition in 1986, the Philippines has made considerable progress in re-establishing the legal/constitutional basis of civilian supremacy. Legislative control over the military's budget and appointment as well as the use of paramilitary units were re-instituted. Congress also assigned civilian court jurisdiction over human rights cases involving state security forces. An independent human rights commission was given power to investigate allegations of abuses. Constitutional limits were written into the President's ability to mobilize and deploy the military during emergency situations. Notwithstanding, the present structure of the Philippine security forces remains problematic. Of the three services, the army is primarily focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, with the police and paramilitary providing support. The army relies on large formations for its COIN operations and less on Special Forces, which owing to historical interventionist and coup-plotting proclivities, has been numerically emasculated.

Using a case study method, the chapter probes how local civilian authorities in Leon, Iloilo (a town in central Philippines) are able to monitor, supervise or control security sector activities within their area of jurisdiction. A considerable gap exists between each force's understanding of its functions and what they actually do in relation to other state security forces. The army performs mostly non-combat tasks in line with COIN as well as non-traditional tasks. The police are involved mostly in law enforcement and provide augmentation force to army-led COIN operations, but greatly handicapped in detection and investigation matters. The paramilitary is utilized primarily for COIN as territorial defense forces but not for other emergency tasks as envisioned in the law. A tighter relationship exists on the ground between the army unit and the paramilitary, whereas a gap is evident between the army and the police regarding the geographic scope of response to rebel threat. The local government played no significant role in the peace initiative brokered in the 1990s nor has the town peace and order council been the framework of choice in seeking more constructive engagements between the civilian authorities and security forces.

The EU harmonisation has created changes in the military's formal and informal influence in the directions of decreased formal and informal military influence in civilian politics. The EU reforms have created changes in the mindset of the citizens, by creating changes in the security culture of the citizens and in the civil-military related political culture. The desired level of alignment has not been reached. Therefore, the study examines the areas where further alignment is required. Moving from Rebecca L. Schiff's concordance theory, the article examines the relationship between the Turkish military, the civilian politics and the society before and after the EU harmonisation process. It examines the effects of the EU harmonisation process on the changes in the civil-military balance of power, and on the related security culture and political values. The analysis focuses on: (i) increased civilian control and consequent changes in the policy of accountability; (ii) transparency building in the defence sector; (iii) parliamentary oversight; and (iv) the change in the political culture related to the civil-military issues. It also investigates the extent the EU harmonisation has achieved in building democratic civil-military relations in order to align with the EU standards.

This chapter attempts to explore the convergence and divergence on perceptions of security issues by military professionals and civilians and then to portray its implications for civil–military relations in South Korea.

Since the 1990s, South Korea has experienced the development of political democracy and the improvement of the relationship between South Korea and North Korea. Although South Korea suffered from serious economic crisis in the late 1990s, it soon restored its economic basis to the earlier level. However, the country has become to encounter ideological cleavage and cultural diversity among people. Traditional views on national security and international relations, which were based on national consensus in the past, have been replaced by a new conception of diversification, heterogeneity, and even sharp opposition. Thus, we examine the consensus or dissension between military and civilian sectors on various issues related to national security, the role of the armed forces, and South–North relations.

This chapter reports that there are similarities on some issues (e.g., security situation assessment, attitudes toward neighbor countries, and trust in the military), while substantial differences are found on others (e.g., threats to national security, Korea–US relations, and threats from North Korea) between the military and the civilian society. These findings suggest that overall the views of military professionals are not so different from civilians on security issues in Korea even though divergences emerge on some other issues. This chapter concludes by stating that civilian society and the military are “different, but not separate.” This statement renders implications for civil–military relations in South Korea.

The purpose of this chapter is to trace the long-term trend of professionalization of the military and the civil–military relations of modern Korea. It reviews the patriarchal relation between the king and the military officer in ancient Korea and how the patron–client relations of a parochial society have continued between the political ruler and the military of modern Korea. The history of modern Korea is examined according to the level of development and the nature of civil–military relations. The Korean military has gradually changed from a parochial army to a professional one, and the civil–military relations of modern Korea have been normalized.

In the 21st century, disputes between military and civilians are to occur in the arena of security or defense policies. The civil–military relations of Korea might be shifted from the political conflicts between political elites and military leaders to the democratic governances of the military sector.

This chapter examines the existence of civil–military gap in the perceptions or attitudes on the security or defense issues. The samples are classified into six subgroups. The military is classified into “commissioned officers (COs) and non-commissioned officers (NCOs)” and “conscripted soldiers,” and the civilians into four subgroups according to sex and age. There is not much acute or urgent, serious civil–military gap in the analysis. Sometimes the perceptional gap rather resides between the male and the female or between the youth and the elder generation than in between the military and the civilian. But there are some differences in perceptions and attitudes between the military and civilians. These are related to the interests of national security affairs, to the military threat from North Korea, and to the confidence in the defense management. Owing to their different life conditions, the perceptional differences between civilians and military are inevitable to some degree. But to develop better civil–military relations and to enhance the consensus in the national security issues in the 21st century, institutionalizing the democratic governance might be necessary. It is recommended to have more discussions between the military and civilians, to share more information about the security issues, to increase transparency in the defense management, and to have more participation of the civilians in the security sector.

After the Korean War, South Korean politics was dominated by national security concerns. Reversing Carl von Clausewitz's well-known dictum, in South Korea, “politics is the continuation of war by other means.” Until the late 1980s, politics in South Korea was far from democratic. South Korea had five direct presidential elections (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007) and six national assembly elections (1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008) after the democratic transition of 1987. In 1992, a civilian candidate, Young Sam Kim, was elected president. Young Sam Kim (1993–1998) prosecuted and punished former generals turned presidents Doo Hwan Chun (1980–1988) and Tae Woo Roh (1988–1993) for corruption, mutiny and treason in 1995. Dae Jung Kim (1998–2003) was elected president in 1997. For the first time in South Korean political history, regime change occurred between a ruling party and an opposition party.

In this chapter, the change and continuity of civil–military relations through the fluctuating dynamics of the democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea is examined. A positive consolidation of democratic reform is one that, while securing indisputable civilian supremacy, grants the military enough institutional autonomy for the efficient pursuit of its mission. Civilian supremacy should be institutionalized not only by preventing military intervention in civilian politics but also by ensuring civilian control over the formation and implementation of national defense policy.

In sum, despite three terms of civilian presidency, civilian supremacy has not yet fully institutionalized. Although significant changes in civil-military relations did occur after the democratic transition, they were not initiated by elected leaders with the intention of establishing a firm institutional footing for civilian supremacy. South Korea's political leaders have not crafted durable regulations and institutions that will sustain civilian control over the military.

More than six decades, Korea is still divided. The most highly militarized zone in the world lies along the demilitarized zone. How to draw the line prudently between seeking national security and promoting democracy shall be the most delicate task facing all the civilian regimes to come in South Korea. That mission will remain challenging not only for civilian politicians but also for military leaders.

Subject Index

Pages 557-565
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DOI
10.1108/S1572-8323(2009)12_Part_2
Publication date
Book series
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development
Editor
Series copyright holder
Emerald Publishing Limited
ISBN
978-1-84855-892-2
eISBN
978-1-84855-893-9
Book series ISSN
1572-8323