Global Banking, Financial Markets and Crises: Volume 14

We compare the aggregated international assets and liabilities of banks that report to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to establish their gross and net international exposures during recent episodes of financial crisis. Initially we consider these positions worldwide and then focus on the cross-border flows within Europe, considered in terms of core and peripheral countries. These gross and net asset–liability positions are both time-varying and respond to crisis periods, through better matching of international assets and liabilities as well as the realignment of asset positions to reduce balance sheet risks. These conclusions are consistent with other studies that utilise international banking flow data, while the European experience highlights the diversity of international position taking. This is due to the complexity of managing risks within the eurozone (EZ) and peripheral countries, and those emerging European countries that retain legacy currencies.

We analyze the impact of monetary policy instruments on interbank lending rates and retail bank lending in China using an extended version of the model developed by Porter and Xu (2009). Unlike the central banks of advanced economies, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) uses changes in the required reserve ratios and open market operations to influence liquidity in money markets and adjusts the regulated deposit and lending rates and loan targets to intervene in the retail deposit and lending market. These interventions prevent the interbank lending rate from signaling monetary policy stance and transmitting the effect of policy to the growth of bank loans. Since the global financial crisis, the PBoC’s monetary policy has gone through a full cycle. The combining effects of using different policy instruments simultaneously within a short period of time were quite effective in bringing the credit and money growth in line with its desired level. Most recently steps have been taken to speed up the interest rate liberalization. Effective July 2013, the PBoC removed the floors of the benchmark lending rates.

The composition of bank liabilities has captured a lot of attention especially after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. It is argued that a compositional change in non-core liabilities reflects the different stages of financial cycle. Banks usually fund their credits with core liabilities, which grow with households’ wealth, but when there is a faster growth in credits compared to deposits, the banks often resort to non-core liabilities to meet the excess demand for loans. This chapter analyses the relationship between non-core liabilities and credits in a small open economy, namely Turkey. It investigates the relationship under alternative settings and presents consistent evidence on a robust relationship between credits and non-core liabilities under all frameworks. The study also verifies that elevated demand for credit may induce some increase in non-core liabilities. Finally, the relationship between non-core liabilities and credit growth is also affirmed in the long run.

This chapter examines how foreign banks respond to domestic monetary policy in host countries during crisis periods, in particular, the response shown toward the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. By observing 283 domestic and foreign banks in seven emerging Asian economies, we find that foreign banks are slower than domestic banks in adjusting the growth of their loans to changes in host monetary policy. This inertia by foreign banks is found to be more pronounced in the recent 2008–2009 global crisis than in the 1997–1999 Asian regional crisis, suggesting that the buffering/hampering effects of foreign banks on the effectiveness of the domestic monetary policy transmission mechanism become stronger in a recent global crisis originating from outside Asia than a regional crisis imploded within Asia a decade earlier. We also find that foreign banks’ lower sensitivity than domestic banks to host monetary policy during the crisis periods is heterogeneous, depending on factors such as the extent of the adverse impact of crises on parent banks, the scope of business operation by parent banks, and foreign banks’ mode of entry into host banking markets.

U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) have experienced dynamic changes over a period of 2000–2010. We find that the size distribution of sample banks becomes highly positively skewed with a small number of big banks becoming super-sized, and these big banks tend to take extra risk by holding derivative positions for trading purposes. The ten largest risk-taking banks hold about 70% of total assets of all the sample banks in 2010. We investigate whether the risk-taking activities of the BHCs translate into higher risk-adjusted return performance. In extensive panel regression analyses, we find that the risk-taking strategies of large banks by holding derivative positions for trading purpose do not show the clear evidence of enhancing risk-adjusted performance. We find that negative impacts of extra risk-taking on the risk-adjusted performance become bigger with the size of banks.

This chapter examines the impact of banking competition, bank regulation, and the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008–2009 on banks’ productivity changes. For the empirical analysis, I apply a semi-parametric two-step approach of Malmquist index estimates and bootstrap regression to a cross-country panel data of 8,451 commercial banks from 82 countries over the period 2004–2012. Empirical results show that (1) banking competition and capital regulation significantly enhance bank productivity, (2) a tighter bank supervision have a positive impact on bank productivity, and (3) bank productivity decreases during the GFC, but starts to increase as the GFC recovers. I also present consistent evidence that commercial banks in countries with better national governance have higher productivity growth before, during and after the GFC.

This chapter investigates the impact of policy interest rate news from the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) on stock returns and volatilities of U.S. NYSE and German DAX listed commercial banks. We find that Fed news has the most influence on both U.S. and German listed bank stocks and an unexpected policy rate increase (decrease) lowers (raises) returns and raises volatility in the majority of cases. On the other hand, ECB news generally increases bank stock volatility in the United States but has little impact within its own domestic banking industry. While our results for the U.S. listed banks confirm that their stock prices are more responsive in bad economic times and also during periods of monetary tightening, we find disparities for German banks suggesting that U.S. and European banking industries respond heterogeneously to monetary policy news but the Global Financial Crisis increased the sensitivity of all banks to monetary policy news.

Since their inception in late 2007, the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) funds, which help Chinese investors to invest in foreign capital markets, have experienced significant portfolio losses and persistent fund outflows. While these losses are large in absolute terms, QDII funds, on average, performed better than Chinese A-share funds, but slightly worse than a group of foreign mutual funds. Our study focuses on the QDII industry, and asks three interrelated questions: (1) why have there been large fund outflows from the industry? (2) what explains QDII funds’ poor performance? and (3) why have QDII funds been so heavily exposed to the Hong Kong market? Our empirical analysis shows that the persistent capital outflows were primarily a result of disappointing fund performance. This poor performance can, in turn, be explained by the deficiency of knowledge required of QDII fund managers to successfully invest in foreign capital markets and manage global portfolios. Finally, our study goes some way to explain the phenomenon of QDII funds’ large asset allocation in the Hong Kong market. This ‘Hong Kong bias’ is shown to be consistent with the well-documented ‘home bias’ behaviour in cross-border portfolio investment, but is greatly exacerbated by the lack of global investing experience of QDII managers.

We investigate the return and volatility spillovers from major UK banks to Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE 100) index using Gaussian estimation and continuous time models as well as discrete time multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) modelling approaches. Using daily, weekly and monthly data over the period December 1999–December 2010, which includes the recent 2007–2009 global financial crisis, empirical estimates of uni- and/or bi-directional return and volatility spillovers are provided. The bivariate MGARCH results reveal strong return spillovers from the FTSE to the banks, and no return spillover from the latter to the FTSE. Nevertheless, strong bi-directional volatility transmission is verified. The continuous time analysis provides mixed evidence of feedback effects over the different models.

This chapter investigates the impact of the euro crisis on Asia’s short-term economic outlook. This chapter tries to answer this question by examining both the trade and financial channels of crisis transmission. More specifically, it looks at the effect of euro crisis on Asian exports and growth, contagion from EU financial markets to Asian financial markets, and influence of EU bank lending on credit growth in Asia. The chapter also touches upon Asia’s policy space to assess how well the region is positioned to weather another major external shock. This chapter finds that the impact of euro crisis on developing Asia points to a sizable but manageable short-term impact. Furthermore, our analysis points to a significant effect on the region’s financial systems, especially its banking sector. This chapter informs policymakers of the impact of the euro crisis and advice to continue to keep a close eye on eurozone developments and their ramifications for their economies.

This chapter explores the impact of international financial integration on credit markets in Latin America, using a cross-country dataset covering 17 countries between 1996 and 2008. It is found that financial integration amplifies the impact of international financial shocks on aggregate credit and interest rate fluctuations. Nonetheless, the net impact of integration on deepening credit markets dominates for the large majority of states of nature. The chapter also uses a detailed bank-level dataset that covers more than 500 banks for a similar time period to explore the role of financial integration – captured through the participation of foreign banks – in propagating external shocks. It is found that interest rates charged and loans supplied by foreign-owned banks respond more to external financial shocks than those supplied by domestically owned banks. This does not hold for all foreign banks. Spanish banks in the sample behave more like domestic banks and do not amplify the impact of foreign shocks on credit and interest rates.

The Eurozone debt crisis has indeed jeopardized the recovery plans put in place post global crisis by regulators, policymakers, and the sovereigns. Though the crisis is epicentered in the Eurozone, the knock-on effects of the crisis are felt all across the globe. The emerging and developing economies (EDEs) are also expected to post lower growth on account of worsening external environment and a weakening internal demand. This chapter analyzes the causes for sovereign debt crisis, presents the implications of sovereign debt crises, and draws lessons for banking sectors more particularly in the context of emerging markets like that of India.

In this chapter we study the intra-group transactions between the parent bank and its foreign subsidiaries in European Union (EU) countries during the crisis. We use hand-collected data from annual statements on related party transaction and find that they may create a serious problem for the stability of the foreign banks’ subsidiaries. Moreover, as some of those subsidiary banks were large by assets in some of the member states the related party transactions with the parent bank created a serious threat to the host countries’ financial system stability. We attribute this transaction to the weak governance in foreign subsidiaries. We suggest improvements in governance as well as greater disclosure of related party transactions in bank holding companies in Europe.

This chapter surveys papers and the related literature on the relationship between banks’ creditor structure and bank risk during the period of liquidity crises. Departing from the conventional banking literature, which points to deteriorating asset quality to be the culprit for the amplified bank risk in the midst of financial crises, the studies in the aftermath of the global financial crisis look into the liability side of the bank balance sheet as a potential source for the augmented bank risk during the financial crisis when there is a liquidity contraction. Recent studies theorize and provide empirical evidence that banking institutions with a greater share of large lenders and an economy with high noncore bank liabilities in the banking sector may experience heightened bank risk or country risk. We also search for policy implications from this survey.

This chapter examines the effect of creditors’ monitoring role on the profitability of firm acquisitions. We use the shares retained by the lead arranger of a syndicated loan as a proxy for monitoring level. We find that acquirer announcement returns are positively related to the shares retained by the lead arranger. The effect of the lead arranger’s shares on the acquirer’s return becomes pronounced in cash acquisition deals, and when there exist financial covenants. Our results suggest that lead arrangers are important not only for monitoring loans but also for successful acquisitions by borrowers. An important policy implication of the main findings of this chapter on bank monitoring is that policy makers should design financial covenants to improve the efficiency of monitoring activities by lead arranging banks in syndicated bank loan deals.