Human Dignity: Volume 88

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Table of contents

(8 chapters)

Human Dignity

Abstract

This chapter shows that Kant’s notion of human dignity can be understood as a novel ‘care of the self’ and an ‘art of not being governed’. Drawing on a Foucauldian approach, it demonstrates that Kant intends to shape an ethical subject that strives for freedom and self-mastery. It also argues Kant’s idea of dignity embodies a political and spiritual form of resistance against dominant relations of power and subjectivities. Thanks to this novel perspective, this chapter also offers novel insights on the political force of human dignity. With Kant, this notion becomes a ‘government of the self by oneself’.

Abstract

Discussions about the dignity of human beings often focus on violations of a person’s dignity that are performed by other persons. However, human beings can also violate their own dignity or at least they can expose it to a violation by others thoughtlessly or intentionally. In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states that ‘[o]ne who makes himself a worm cannot complain afterwards if people step on him’. Kant presupposes that persons can infringe or even forfeit their own dignity – for instance through servile behaviour – and that violating one’s own dignity is a violation of a duty towards oneself. Starting from the tension between dignity in terms of honour and worth in current debates and in Kant’s own thinking, as well as between understanding dignity as absolute or relational, I develop a comprehensive account of dignity as a duty to oneself. The author argues for a twofold obligation towards oneself to respect one’s own dignity: (i) a duty (as the necessity of an action done out of respect for the moral law) to respect one’s authority as an autonomous person in the Kantian sense; and (ii) beyond the Kantian framework – an obligation arising from the practical necessity that follows from one’s self-understanding as a self-determined, self-expressive individual personality in a socio-cultural context. Finally, the author outlines the consequences of the idea of ‘making oneself a worm’ for the concept of dignity in the realm of rights by discussing why, even though persons can behave like worms, others ought not to step on them.

Abstract

This chapter presents two examples of misinterpretation of the philosophical term and historical concept of human dignity in contemporary legal theory and practice. Current legal theories (R. Alexy) still introduce Pico’s concept of dignity regarding the human personality and personal (volitional and rational) abilities. The term ‘dignity’ is marginal for Pico and shows the spiritual way to the status of the original Adam. Pico’s concept of dignity is located in the area of spirit (hyperphysics), not metaphysics (soul) or physics (materials). Günter Dürig in his commentary to Grundgesetz also used the Kantian concept of human dignity. Dürig exaggerated this value and used it also for the area of physics (to protect the human being as a personality). For Kant, the term ‘dignity’ was also marginal, and he used it in the area of metaphysics (soul – especially the moral and rational parts), regarding transcendence for homo noumenon, not for homo phaenomenon. In general, it seems to be problematic to use the ideal of the dignity for the law, which regulates the social relations between concrete phenomenal personalities. There are parallels to Pico. The Kantian starting point was different from Pico, because Kant stays in the area of metaphysics (especially the moral and rational parts). Both consider freedom as a condition of dignity. The concept of autonomy of will is significant for both, but each thinks of it in different ways. For both, human being can become master of oneself, but in a different context.

Abstract

The meaning of justice and dignity have changed over time, as has the idea of a normative or moral ‘foundation’. Given that justice and dignity are commonly ascribed foundational roles in practical philosophy, this chapter charts important changes in these concepts and changes in how they have interacted. The ideas of rights and status capture the most persistent points of interaction between justice and dignity. However, because rights and status are themselves unstable concepts, and because both rely upon contextual theories of freedom and the state for their meaning, no simple reconciliation between justice and dignity as foundations is possible. In sum, we cannot treat justice and dignity as equally foundational if foundational is taken to mean the final determinant of our obligations.

Abstract

The central thesis developed during this study is the idea that human dignity must be understood as the right to be recognised as a participant in the institutional practice of human and fundamental rights. This form of association between human dignity and human rights is a response to the various barbarities of the twentieth century, whether by fascist, Nazi, and socialist regimes in Europe, either by South African apartheid or by military dictatorships in Latin America. Human dignity after Auschwitz is the foundation for the construction of a post-metaphysical institutional morality, independent of an idealised concept of rational subjective personality and closer to the historical and material conditions to guarantee the political personality of every human being. In order to defend this thesis, the study is conducted in two steps. First, two conceptions of dignity will be discussed, namely dignity of man and human dignity. Second, it is intended to discuss how the modern conception was incorporated into the practice of human rights after Auschwitz as a way of responding to a crisis in the modern model of the practice of rights.

Abstract

Human dignity is a crucial concept in international and domestic human rights law. It is understood to be the foundation of human rights, and while we know what human rights are, the nature, content, and grounds of human dignity remain unclear. The aim of this chapter is to propose scientific grounds for human dignity. In this context, the author will explore contemporary evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology, where it is claimed that human nature is constituted by tendencies to cooperate (Tomasello, 2009), or under a different formulation, by narrow altruism and imperfect prudence (Załuski, 2009). Evolutionary psychology holds that we have basic tendencies to cooperate with one another and to behave altruistically in order to achieve a common good. This means that our basic evolutionary default and scientifically proven mode of being are optimistic and can be labelled as morally good. The author argues that this human nature constitutes scientific grounds for human dignity. The author’s argument holds that since human dignity comprises the inherent worth of every human being, this positive moral fact about the scientifically understood human nature is human dignity. The author then present this issue within two broader philosophical frameworks of analytic philosophy – namely, naturalism (especially methodological naturalism) and metaphysical realism. Following this, the author contends that references to natural sciences in debates on the foundations of human dignity and human rights argue against the strongest objection to human rights – the objection of Western ethnocentrism.

General Article

Abstract

This chapter explores the language of anti-violence activists, university coordinators, and due-process activists concerned with Title IX and campus sexual violence. Using an analysis of 32 in-depth interviews with anti-violence activists, due-process activists, and campus Title IX coordinators, the authors identify key themes in Title IX discourse, including ideas about cultural change and safety. In some instances, activists and coordinators discussed the need for cultural change, though often without agreeing on which campus cultures must be confronted. The authors also found the influence of the dominant discourse of the victims’ rights movement in interview subjects’ emphasis on safety and paternalism.

Cover of Human Dignity
DOI
10.1108/S1059-4337202288
Publication date
2022-07-12
Book series
Studies in Law, Politics, and Society
Editors
Series copyright holder
Emerald Publishing Limited
ISBN
978-1-80382-390-4
eISBN
978-1-80382-389-8
Book series ISSN
1059-4337