Special Issue Law Firms, Legal Culture, and Legal Practice: Volume 52

This chapter proposes a research agenda for the study of large law firm culture and explains how the research would contribute to both legal ethics and organizational theory. It focuses on two sets of questions that are uniquely suited to investigation in large law firms. First: what is the significance of organizational culture, relative to that of professional networks and subgroups? To what extent does organizational membership shape lawyers’ understandings about “how things are done”? Second: how is organizational culture sustained? What are the mechanisms of cultural integration in volatile, multioffice firms? The chapter draws on a pilot study of law firm culture in one 500-lawyer firm.

This chapter proposes that corporate lawyers be studied as committed to their clients, asking how they advance exercises of power by those whom they have chosen to represent. Currently, corporate lawyers are studied as independent from their clients, asking how they resist client demands. Such research continues despite repeated findings that corporate lawyers are not independent. This chapter explains the puzzling persistence of independence by cultural understandings of both professionalism and law. It recovers a submerged historic voice in which corporate lawyers are judged by their position in a network of relations. It argues that it was the organization of the corporate law firm as a factory which allowed it to become a professional ideal. Market competition has led corporate law firms to move away from a factory model to one in which commitment to clients, not independence from them, is the organizing principle.

Over the last several decades, virtually all large U.S. law firms have adopted a human capital strategy that emphasizes academic performance and the prestige of the law school attended. Although this focus is rooted more in tradition than in hard empirical evidence that it produces a competitive advantage, the question has long been irrelevant for most law firms because of the perennial rise in profits. If the model is not broken, the adage runs, why fix it? Drawing upon extensive historical and contemporaneous evidence, this essay argues that the limitations of the traditional credentials-based model have been masked by a steady multidecade surge in the demand for corporate legal services. Further, various data and trendlines suggest that the growth in demand for corporate legal services is beginning to flatten out. In the coming years, many large corporate law firms will be in the unfamiliar position of competing over market share. Unlike the relative calm and prosperity of the prior era, their survival will likely depend upon a human capital strategy that asks and answers several basic empirical questions regarding the selection and development of lawyers.

Misconduct by lawyers in law firms is often attributed to pressures from increasing competition for legal services. Modern firms do face fierce competitive pressures. We can gain more subtle insights, however, by focusing on the specific markets in which particular firms operate and how forms of influence in law firms interact with common patterns of behavior in organizations. This chapter draws on this approach to analyze the experience of Jenkens & Gilchrist, a national law firm that had to close its doors in 2007 because of tax shelter work that triggered civil lawsuits and government investigations.

Over the past two decades, pro bono has become increasingly integrated into the structure of large law firms across the United States. The institutionalization of pro bono should conceivably have important consequences on firm practices, but few studies have examined this relationship directly. In this study, I examine the effect of formal pro bono programs on firm-level pro bono commitment. Through a cross-sectional analysis of large law firms, I find that a variety of pro bono policies – such as the presence of a coordinator and having a formal written policy – positively affects how much time a firm commits to pro bono work. In addition, I find that the content of a firm's pro bono policy can also affect pro bono commitment. This effect remains after controlling for organizational slack (economic performance and firm size) and firm diversity. These findings have implications for issues of access to justice and organizational theory.

The academic literature that addresses the creation and transformation of large law firms seldom mentions the presence of legal secretaries. The absence of legal secretaries, the vast majority of whom are women, reproduces law firm hierarchies in which attorneys are important in understanding the legal profession and law firm dynamics while secretaries remain invisible. Given the lack of secondary literature on legal secretaries, much of this chapter is based upon legal secretaries' responses to a nationwide survey, which I conducted in Spring 2009. Using such data, along with other primary sources, the chapter examines how legal secretaries' roles and work have changed during the past 50 years, how legal secretaries view themselves and their roles in law large law firms, and the material conditions under which legal secretaries work. Moreover, the most significant scholarship on secretaries has depicted the secretary/boss relationship as one of personal and domestic nature – what we might call the “second-wife syndrome.” The chapter explores whether such a description remains accurate and the complicated gender dynamics that exist between legal secretaries and attorneys.

Although law schools have seen rising representation of diverse racial and ethnic groups among students, minorities continue to represent disproportionately small percentages of lawyers within large corporate law firms. Prior research on the nature and causes of minority underrepresentation in such firms has been sparse. In this paper, we use data on a national sample of more than 1,300 law firm offices to examine variation across large U.S. law firms in the representation of African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans. Overall, minorities are better represented in offices located in Western states and in major metropolitan areas; offices that are larger and affiliated with larger firms; offices of firms with higher revenues and profits per partner; offices with greater associate–partner leverage; and branch offices rather than principal offices. They are equally distributed between offices with single-tier and two-tier partnerships. Distinct patterns emerge, however, when the three groups are considered separately and when hierarchical rank within firms is taken into account.