Economic Institutions of Strategy: Volume 26

Charles Babbage once reproached economists for having “too small a use of facts, and too large an employment of theory. If facts are wanting, let it be remembered that the closet-philosopher is unfortunately too little acquainted with the admirable arrangements of the factory…. Nor let it be feared that erroneous deductions may be made from such recorded facts: the errors which arise from the absence of facts are far more numerous and more durable than those which result from unsound reasoning respecting true data” (1989, Vol. 8, p. 110). Plainly, the black box theory of the firm was tilted in favor of analytical convenience at the expense of the facts.

To assess the impact of TCE on the field of strategy, we first quantified the distribution of TCE-related research articles across all disciplines and fields. Specifically, we identified every article that appeared in a journal included in the Institute for Scientific Information's (ISI's) Web of Knowledge between 1975 and 2008 and that included among its keywords some variation of “transaction costs.” We then removed those articles for which this term clearly did not refer to transaction costs of the Coasean kind (primarily articles in finance and computing, for which “transaction cost” has a different meaning). Finally, we categorized each journal according to its discipline or field. Granted, this requires some judgment, but we attempted to be objective in our categorizations.¹ As Table 1 shows, articles that are self-described as part of the TCE research stream have appeared more frequently in strategy journals than in the journals of any other discipline or field. We interpret this as evidence of TCE's impact on strategy, and of the importance of the strategy field to TCE.

What is technology transfer and why is it important for strategy? Many firms focus on innovation as a central component of their strategy to achieve a competitive advantage over their rivals. To this end, companies exploit a variety of sources of innovation, both within and outside the boundaries of the firm.¹ In-house research and development leading to product or process innovations offer certain advantages relative to outsourcing, due in particular to the transaction costs associated with contracting for knowledge. At the same time, in-house innovation is costly and fraught with risk.

In this paper we explore the degree to which patents are representative of the magnitude, direction, and impact of the knowledge spilling out of the university by focusing on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and in particular, on the departments of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering. Drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data, we show that patenting is a minority activity: a majority of the faculty members in our sample never patent, and publication rates far outstrip patenting rates. Most faculty members estimate that patents account for less than 10% of the knowledge that transfers from their labs. Our results also suggest that in two important ways patenting is not representative of the patterns of knowledge generation and transfer from MIT: patent volume does not predict publication volume, and those firms that cite MIT papers are in general not the same firms as those that cite MIT patents. However, patent volume is positively correlated with paper citations, suggesting that patent counts may be reasonable measures of research impact. We close by speculating on the implications of our results for the difficult but important question of whether, in this setting, patenting acts as a substitute or a complement to the process of fundamental research.

Before firms can focus on the development and commercialization of a given innovation, they have to address a more fundamental strategic issue – namely, what is their innovation strategy and how can they organize the innovation process. This involves three basic questions: (1) whether to invest in R&D, (2) how much to invest in R&D, and, (3) which type of R&D to perform. While these three questions have typically been studied in isolation, we argue that they are intimately linked with the choice of the innovation strategy of the firm. How the firm develops and commercializes a particular innovation will be a consequence of its innovation strategy.

Entrepreneurs in a competitive economy face three fundamental problems. They need to search for and discover a business opportunity (Kirzner, 1973), evaluate it (Knight, 1921), and then seize the opportunity to reap entrepreneurial profits (Schumpeter, 1911) (Langlois, 2007). The problem that we address is how the ability to exploit business opportunities is influenced by entrepreneurial search and the economic organization of entrepreneurship (Arrow, 1962; Lippman & Rumelt, 2003b; Aghion et al., 2005; Foss, Foss, & Klein, 2007). In many cases, the discovery for a new business opportunity needs to be motivated by expected gains, since the search and evaluation of business opportunities is a costly, resource-consuming process (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004; Foss & Klein, 2005; Teece, 2007; Foss & Foss, 2008).¹ We show the critical role of expectations for understanding of the economic organization of entrepreneurship, and argue that transaction cost economics, with its insistence on bounded rationality, but farsighted contracting offers useful insights and presents rich opportunities for further theoretical and empirical research (cf. also Furubotn, 2002).

An important question facing business scholars is whether and how organizations may best adapt their investments, resource profiles, and strategies to the demands of their particular environments. While a broad literature describes organizational design principles that may assist in this regard, more recent work builds on Kauffman's (1993) NK model of biological evolution to explore how selection mechanisms and adaptive principles promote firms' exploitation and exploration efforts. This research stream has made contributions regarding the importance and efficacy of various internal adaptive factors in particular environmental settings. For instance, Levinthal (1997) shows that, despite extensive adaptation efforts, the influence of imprinting persists in complex environments with many local peaks. Rivkin (2000) demonstrates that NK complexity degrades the efficacy of search, compelling imitators to rely on search heuristics rather than adaptation via local learning. Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) explore the tradeoffs between exploration and stability, and describe how particular organizational attributes, such as vertical hierarchy and group- or firm-level incentive systems, influence the flow of information throughout the organization. These as well as other contributions have added precision to the conceptualization of environments and sharpened understanding of organization by describing precisely how interdependencies across investment choices and/or resource profiles affect adaptation efforts.

The goal of interfirm contract research is to examine how formal contracts impact transaction success, firm relationships, and ultimately individual and collaborative firm performance when two or more firms interact. Most contract literature uses an economic lens to examine contracts: the property rights perspective, agency theory, and TCE. Property rights-based contract research (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1967; Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; Cheung, 1969) examines how efficient property rights assignment mitigates ex ante hazards. Similarly, agency theory-based contract research (e.g., Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Harris & Raviv, 1979) investigates how incentive alignment between the principal and agent leads to the mitigation of ex ante hazards. In contrast, TCE-based research (Williamson, 1975, 1985) examines contractual safeguards to mitigate both ex ante and ex post hazards (e.g., Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1990; Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). Because the three economic perspectives dominate, most research addresses how contracts are used to mitigate ex ante or ex post hazards. Therefore, many topics still need to be investigated to enhance our understanding of interfirm contracting.

This chapter provides a retrospective analysis of Oxley (1997), placing the article in context, highlighting its main contributions, describing its impact on the strategy literature, and critiquing the research from the viewpoint of today. Recent advances in the analysis of alliance governance are surveyed, and opportunities for future research are suggested.

A key argument in transaction cost economics (TCE) is that transactions are aligned with governance structures so as to effect a discriminating – mainly transaction cost economizing – match (Williamson, 1991). The archetypical problem in TCE is the vertical integration or “make-versus-buy” decision, and the focus of transaction cost economizing in this context is on mitigation of “holdup” problems associated with investments in specific assets (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985). However, this asset specificity condition in only one example (albeit a significant one) of a more general class of contractual hazards. Indeed, in his most recent discussion of the TCE agenda, Williamson (1996, p. 3) suggests that “identification, explication, and mitigation of contractual hazards – which take many forms, many of which long went unremarked – are central to the exercise.”

An agency relationship exists whenever one party (the principal) delegates authority to another (the agent). Because agents are assumed to be self-interested and to possess goals that diverge from the principal's goals, the principal must expend resources (called agency costs) to insure that agents act in her interest (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In chains, the firm can choose as outlet managers either employees who are paid a salary (and perhaps a bonus) or franchisees who are granted the right to their outlet's profits after royalties and other expenses. In both cases, an agency problem is created because the firm delegates local decision-making to outlet managers whose interests are not perfectly aligned with that of the franchisor's (Rubin, 1978).

According to TCE, different forms of economic organization – markets, hierarchies, hybrid forms of various kinds, etc. – are characterized by different “syndromes of attributes,” or coherent sets of features (Williamson, 1991). Because each form of organization implements a distinctive set of governance features, each is efficient for a different type of transaction, implying trade-offs among the forms. The two key categories of features are the allocation of decision-making authority among and within firms and the intensity of the incentives facing firms and members of them. By concentrating decision-making authority, hierarchies have the benefit of facilitating “cooperative adaptation”; that is, coordinated change among two or more parties. Adaptation to new economic circumstances is, after all, the main function of an economic system (Hayek, 1945). Hierarchies are said to facilitate cooperative adaptation better than markets because unlike for markets, courts will not intervene in internal disputes and fiat is available as a last resort. This leaves more scope for the management hierarchy to use its authority to promote cooperative adaptation to unanticipated circumstances (Williamson, 1975, 1991). On the other hand, hierarchies feature weaker incentive intensity, that is, weaker links between individual or unit performance and individual or unit reward. This is because market-like levels of incentive intensity would inhibit cooperative adaptation by stimulating “autonomous adaptation” instead. Autonomous adaptation refers to adaptation by individual firms or organizational members that occurs without regard to its effects on other parties. Williamson (1985) also argues that market-like incentives lack credibility within hierarchies due to the ultimate availability of fiat. Thus, for TCE, the most fundamental trade-off between various forms of internal organization is between cooperative adaptation and incentive intensity.

Corporate acquisitions have received less attention than the “make-versus-buy” paradigm problem within transaction cost economics. However, recent research that has been conducted on acquisitions is a valuable source of ideas that can be put to use in organizational governance studies more broadly. In this paper, I provide a brief review of the M&A literature with the aim of developing two arguments. First, information economics has provided important theoretical underpinnings for this literature and complements transaction cost economics by emphasizing the ex ante exchange hazards that economic actors face. Second, research using information economics offers the potential to enrich the organizational economics research agenda in strategic management and vice versa.

A widespread consensus in strategy literature argues that firms acquire positions of advantage and competitive capability by assembling or “organizing” sets of uniquely complementary resources, activities, or assets. In this regard, value is created not only in identifying unique and valuable combinations of existing resources, but also in seeing unique and valuable ways to modify or cospecialize these assets. With the envisioned strategic bundle defined, the manager must then determine how to form, organize, and create this bundle. In particular, the manager must decide which assets, activities, and resources must be “owned” and which can be accessed contractually. We argue that although integration does have certain advantages over market transactions, it does not necessarily lead to the expansion of the scale and scope of the firm, because firms would also fail, particularly as they become larger in size. While established theories articulate this organizational failure puzzle in terms of incentive explanations and measurement difficulties, recent advancement in organizational economics and business strategy sees this as a result of influence activities, and social comparison and social attachment processes. These elements can serve as new building blocks for a more comprehensive theory of the nature and the boundary of the firm. Three future research trajectories – both theoretical and empirical in this realm – are suggested.

Ronald Coase's landmark 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm,” framed the study of organizational economics for decades. Coase asked three fundamental questions: Why do firms exist? What determines their boundaries? How should firms be organized internally? To answer the first question, Coase famously appealed to “the costs of using the price mechanism,” what we now call transaction costs or contracting costs, a concept that blossomed in the 1970s and 1980s into an elaborate theory of why firms exist (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; Grossman & Hart, 1986). The second question has generated a huge literature in industrial economics, strategy, corporate finance, and organization theory. “Why,” as Coase (1937, pp. 393–394) put it, “does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more?” In Williamson's (1996, p. 150) words, “Why can't a large firm do everything that a collection of small firms can do and more?” As Coase recognized in 1937, the transaction-cost advantages of internal organization are not unlimited, and firms have a finite “optimum” size and shape. Describing these limits in detail has proved challenging, however.¹

Scholars of business, economics, and law have long recognized that rights to intellectual property (IP) intimately shape innovative activity and the pursuit of profits. More than 60 years ago, Michal Polanyi voiced the following concerns about awarding property rights to creations of the “intellect”:The law…aims at a purpose which cannot be rationally achieved. It tries to parcel up a stream of creative thought into a series of distinct claims, each of which is to constitute the basis of a separately owned monopoly. But the growth of human knowledge cannot be divided into such sharply circumscribed phases. Ideas usually develop gradually by shades of emphasis, and even when, from time to time, sparks of discovery flare up and suddenly reveal a new understanding, it usually appears that the new idea has been at least partly foreshadowed in previous speculations. (Polanyi, 1944, pp. 70–71)

We examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation. Recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to R&D. Yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid-1980s. We explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 U.S. semiconductor firms during 1979–1995. The results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of U.S. patent rights spawned “patent portfolio races” among capital-intensive firms, but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms.

Choosing where to expand is an important firm strategy. We review and structure research in international location choices. First, we categorize research based on the motive for expansion, distinguishing market-seeking and resource-seeking explanations. Within these two categories we assess the progression of the literature toward an increased acknowledgment of strategic interaction among firms. We also evaluate work that begins to account for different modes of expansion. This emerging research explores the role of geography in acquisitions and begins to incorporate firms' often complex geographic configurations. Building on these developments, we highlight the following areas for future research: examining further the role of location in acquisitions, exploring the role of geography in postexpansion restructuring, and investigating the interaction of vertical and horizontal spillovers to entrants.

The 1980s and 1990s constituted a boom period for foreign direct investment. The opening of dozens of new nations to foreign direct investment and the associated confidence in these countries' long-term growth potential led more multinational firms from more countries to undertake investment of greater magnitude in more countries than in any previous historical period. In his 1983 Harvard Business Review article “The Globalization of Markets,” Theodore Levitt (1983) famously advised companies that if they wished to survive, they should expand quickly to global scale. More recently, Thomas Friedman (2005) reinforced Levitt's conclusion in his book “The World Is Flat: Distance is dead. Markets have now converged.” Governments were helpless in the face of the power of global finance. The question posed to managers of multinational corporations was not where to invest globally but rather how fast. During this period, the United Nations reports that the magnitude of global foreign direct investment surged in real terms from $89 billion to $471 billion (constant 2,000 USD) or from 0.5% to 4.4% of global output. The percentage of those flows destined for developing and transition economies soared from 13.9% to a peak of 41.4%.

This article posits that the effect of political hazards on the choice of market entry mode varies across multinational firms based on the extent to which they face expropriation hazards from their potential joint-venture partners in the host country (the level of contractual hazards). As political hazards increase, the multinational faces an increasing threat of opportunistic expropriation by the government. Partnering with host-country firms that possess a comparative advantage in interactions with the host-country government can safeguard against this hazard. However, as contractual hazards increase, the potential benefit to the joint-venture partner of manipulating the political system for its own benefit at the expense of the multinational increases as well, thereby diminishing the hazard-mitigating benefit of forming a joint venture. A two-stage bivariate probit estimation technique is used to test these hypotheses on a sample of 3,389 overseas manufacturing operations by 461 firms in 112 countries.

This paper develops an organizing framework for research on corporate political strategy. It reviews the literature and then identifies a number of open research questions and streams for potential investigation. The paper closes by developing a theory to explain why, when, and how a firm will pursue multi-forum political action as part of its nonmarket and integrated strategy.

There exists a tremendous number of studies in strategy and management journals concerning contracting issues between private firms. Those studies are usually grounded in competing theoretical frameworks such as transaction cost economics, the resource-based view of the firm, incentive and agency theories and few others. However, very few studies, especially in those reviews (this is also true to a lesser extent in economic journals), are concerned with the issue of contracting between private firm and government. This is particularly surprising since existing theoretical frameworks qualified to tackle contracting strategies between private firms can also provide insights into issues related to contracting with government.

Why and in what direction do organizations change?¹ Early responses to these questions generally fell into two camps. Adaptationist scholars proposed theories based on the assumption that organizations have wide latitude to change their structure, strategy, and scope. In the adaptationist view, organizations are able to change in the direction dictated by their environment or by the choices of organizational decision makers, whether in the pursuit of rational action (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Williamson, 1985) or blind action (Weick, 1979). In its extreme form, the adaptationist view implied that firms can and do adapt nearly frictionlessly, suggesting that if there is a performance penalty associated with inappropriate organization, misaligned firms will change so as to reduce or eliminate this misalignment. Alternatively, selection-based theories, notably structural inertia theory within organizational ecology, contended that inertial forces tend to stymie attempts at organizational change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). In its extreme form, the selectionist view implied that firms can rarely change successfully; instead, if there is a performance penalty associated with misalignment, misaligned firms will be “selected out” of the population.