Perceptions of a Pandemic: A Cross-Continental Comparison of Citizen Perceptions, Attitudes, and Behaviors During Covid-19

The introduction provides an overview of the book and explains what the book adds to the literature on the COVID-19 pandemic. It describes the cross-national surveys used for the analyses and the types of questions that are asked in the book. We also explain why the United States and Finland were selected as our comparative cases and detail how this comparison provides a valuable lens for understanding the pandemic. Both nations are liberal democracies with highly developed economies, both score high in terms of compliance with the rule of law, both constitutionally guarantee freedom of speech and a free press, and both share similar cultural factors such has high levels of secularism, self-expression, happiness, social capital, and individualism. Both nations also have well-developed healthcare systems, and both nations were in similar economic positions that positioned them well to pivot to an online economy. Despite these similarities, the nations differ dramatically in size and position in the world system. They also differ with respect to their welfare systems and political systems. Finns also trust their government more than Americans trust theirs, and Finns have historically supported an interventionist state while Americans have always been anti-statism. Finally, another cross-national difference that likely influenced how people perceived the pandemic is the relative levels of security in each nation. With its more generous welfare system, Finns would be more confident about successfully navigating the pandemic than would Americans. The chapter ends with a brief description of how each substantive chapter is outlined.

This chapter analyzes the behaviors people planned to change to mitigate the adverse effects of the pandemic using the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) as a frame. The TPB argues that behaviors are largely determined by an individual’s intention to engage in the behavior, and behavioral intensions are functions of attitudes, perceived behavioral control, and subjective norms. After reviewing the theoretical perspective, data on respondents’ plans to change their leisure activities such as eating in restaurants, buying take-out food or using food delivery services, traveling, gathering in public, and visiting with friends are analyzed. I also look at their planned changes in their use of public transportation, e-commerce, and other online activities. Using factor analysis, behaviors group into two distinct factors: planned changes to interactions (e.g., avoiding public gatherings, visit bars and restaurants less often, and visit friends and relatives less often) and planned changes to consuming behaviors (e.g., purchasing online services more, ordering take-out food more often). Investigating if planned changes vary across country and respondent attitudes, Finnish respondents were significantly more likely to say they planned to change their interactions than were Americans, while Americans were significantly more likely to report they planned to change their consuming behaviors. The chapter concludes by considering if people’s beliefs about what caused the pandemic explain these observed differences. This was the case in terms of changes to interactions, but it was not the case for plans to change consuming behaviors to mitigate the pandemic’s threats.

The chapter is theoretically framed using theories of risk perception and work on the risk society. We aim at answering two fundamental questions: which factors did Americans and Finns considered to be the main reasons for the pandemic spread and were there differences in the perceptions of Americans and Finns at different points in the early stages of the pandemic. We compare the perceptions of several implicit causes ranging from the immigrants and migration to business travel, lack of citizen responsibility, and ineffective political decisions. Since social response to the COVID-19 pandemic were highly politicized in Western countries, and especially in the United States, our primary focus is on the effects of political party preference. The findings show that the effects were strongest when analyzing the belief that migration and immigration played a role in the pandemic’s cause and spread. In the United States, supporters of Republican Party were more likely to perceive migrants and immigration as a cause for pandemic. In Finland, supporters of the coalition of parties in power at the time were less likely to do so. Temporal changes in the effects were also detected. Specifically, political preference was a weaker predictor of Americans’ perception in fall than it had been in the spring. Our findings highlight how citizens do not believe all news coverage and claims about the disease, but instead political beliefs and life experiences have an important filtering effect on their interpretations. These interpretations appear to be phenomena that can be controlled at the national level.

This chapter explores the financial aspects of resolving the COVID-19 pandemic, including respondents’ feelings about their country going into more debt and perceptions of how public funding should be spent. A factor analysis reveals spending priorities could be classified into three broad areas: Welfare (e.g., funding social welfare and research), Development (e.g., business, infrastructure, and international development), and Security (e.g., police and military). Finnish residents were more likely to support spending on welfare while Americans were more likely to support spending on development. There was no difference between the nations for supporting spending on the security state. Importantly, confidence in institutions was negatively correlated with supporting spending on welfare but positively correlated with supporting spending in development and security. Potentially confounding factors such as having been sick with COVID-19, worrying about the pandemic, news consumption about COVID-19, social capital, life satisfaction, and feelings toward the future were included in the model to determine if these mediated or moderated the relationship between confidence in institutions and support for various types of spending. While none of the variables mediated the relationship between confidence and spending priorities, worrying about COVID-19, social isolation, and social capital were related to increased support for spending on welfare, while being sick with COVID-19 and social capital were related to increased support for spending on the security state. The analyses reveal that pandemic-related factors influence spending priorities, but these did not overcome the influence of demographic factors and the general level of confidence one had in the institutions of society.

This chapter examines the relationship between media consumption during COVID-19 and its effect on trust in experts. Successful crisis management requires risk assessment and rapid decisions, and decision-making in the crisis is often based on multidimensional and conflicting information, which highlights the importance of trust. Here, the aim is to examine how daily media consumption is associated with trust in experts and satisfaction with government response during the pandemic. Media consumption was defined by how many different media platforms respondents used daily, grouped into three broad categories: (1) broadcast media, including television and radio; (2) journalistic media, including newspapers and periodicals; and (3) social media, including social network sites and discussion forums. The results of the analyses show that trust in experts strengthened as the crisis progressed, but satisfaction with the government declined. Omnivorous media consumption – those who consumed several different forms of media – increased trust in experts as well as satisfaction with the government. Particularly, one-sided and social media-based media consumption was related to declined trust. That is, those who used only one form of media and those who relied heavily on social media alone expressed lower levels of trust in experts. The mediation analysis showed that the association between media consumption and government satisfaction was partly indirect through trust in experts. Overall, the study reinforces the importance of media as a moderator of messages during crisis management.

This chapter examines how the pandemic altered exposure to online hate. We investigate if the pandemic affected previously observed patterns of exposure to online hate in Finland and the United States. We ask, did online hate become more prevalent as the pandemic unfolded and became increasingly politicized? It is important to consider online hate exposure in the early stages of the pandemic because the pandemic fanned the flames of hate. This increase in hate can then lead to fewer people complying with recommended health-protective behaviors and increases in hate crimes, which would increase the overall toll of the pandemic. Thus, this chapter explores if the landscape of online hate in the United States and Finland changed in the initial stages of COVID-19. Initially, rates of exposure were higher in Finland than in the United States, and, as predicted, rates of exposure increased between April and November 2020. However, this increase was observed only in the United States. The increase in exposure in the United States combined with the stability in exposure in Finland resulted in the country differences that were observed in April disappearing by November. The chapter concludes by exploring the likely role of the political leaders of the two nations played in this pattern of online hate exposure. Specifically, President Trump’s use of racialized descriptions of the pandemic are contrast to Prime Minister Marion’s more scientific descriptions to demonstrate how policy rhetoric can encourage or discourage online hate.

This chapter examines which coping mechanisms citizens used during the pandemic and how these mechanisms related to overall well-being. Using the Transaction Theory of Stress and Coping to frame the analysis, the chapter investigates predictive factors for various coping strategies and identifies which groups were more likely to use adaptive as opposed to maladaptive strategies. I examine how coping strategies used in April 2020 predict change in well-being, measured by life satisfaction, in November 2020. Americans reported greater use of maladaptive coping and less use of the adaptive coping strategies compared to their Finnish counterparts. Americans reported more frequent use of religious coping strategies. Interestingly, worrying about COVID-19 did not increase the use of maladaptive coping for Finns or Americans. Regarding the effect of the coping strategies on life satisfaction, the analyses revealed that those who reported using maladaptive strategies in April 2020 showed a significant decrease in life satisfaction in November 2020. However, this finding was only significant for Finnish residents. Unexpectedly, Finnish and US residents who reported using Active/Expressive and Planning coping reported a decrease in life satisfaction from April to November 2020. Finally, Finnish and US residents who were married, had higher self-esteem, or had higher social capital were more likely to report an increase in life satisfaction from April 2020 to November 2020. These findings raise questions for future research. The context of the pandemic may have created a unique situation that rendered coping mechanisms to behave in unusual ways.

This chapter documents how the early request for citizens to participate in health-protective behaviors to quell the spread of the disease became politicized. Health-protective behaviors, such as social distancing and mask wearing, were found to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Yet, despite the evidence that compliance helped control the pandemic’s spread, mask wearing became a politicized symbol during the early stages of the pandemic. Particularly in the United States, bipartisan stances for and against mask wearing developed quickly as conspiracy theories, supported by President Trump, downplayed the seriousness of the pandemic. As vaccines appeared by late 2020, this polarization continued, again with President Trump aiming blame that the release of the vaccine was timed with 2020 election and raising questions with its safety. In comparison, Prime Minister Marin took a pro-science, global approach to Finland’s mandate and vaccine response. Using regression analysis, I examine the growing political divide that occurred between April 2020 and November 2020, highlighting the growth of politicization for both mask wearing and vaccine intention in both the United States and Finland. While analyses from April 2020 show support for the party in power (Republicans for the United States and left-leaning parties for Finland) was not a significant predictor of mask wearing in either country, by November 2020, political party significantly predicted both mask wearing and vaccine intention in both countries. Additionally, other important predictive factors, particularly state/citizen collaborative dimensions, are reviewed and discussed.

This chapter weaves the finding from the previous chapters together to explain how perceptions of and responses to a pandemic are not static but change over the course of the pandemic and in between the governance and social welfare structures of the nations they affect. We consider the cross-national differences in outcomes and relate these to a variety of strategies used to curb the pandemic’s spread. We then conduct a series of analyses that examine our underlying arguments using data collected in November 2023, approximately 6 months after the pandemic was declared to be over. We find that compliance with health-protective recommendations is correlated with positive health outcomes. Specifically, we investigate how compliance correlates with the number of times an individual became ill with COVID-19. We then use variables discussed throughout the book to investigate how these factors correlate with complying with protective health measures, including being vaccinated and wearing face coverings during the pandemic. We find that collaborative factors are good predictors of compliance with health-protective recommendations. We then investigate how factors such as planned behavioral changes to mitigate the pandemic’s effect, attitudes toward government spending, media consumption, political party, and exposure to hate materials relate to the compliance factors. Ultimately, we demonstrate how the behavior of elites and the perceptions and attitudes of citizens during the initial stages of the pandemic shaped the pandemic’s long-term consequences. The chapter concludes by summarizing the findings from the previous chapters to set the stage for the concluding chapter.

The concluding chapter uses insights from the previous chapters to derive recommendations for how to cope with the next pandemic or other crisis. We note the necessity for properly preparing for the next crisis and how such preparation has numerous benefits. Building on the fundamental insight that social solidarity and confidence in those running major institutions was a primary factor in predicting COVID-19 outcomes, we offer a variety of suggestions for building solidarity and confidence prior to the next crisis. Many of these suggestions are related to the dangers of political polarization during crises, and we provide several suggestions for addressing the growing political divide that is evident in many liberal democracies in the early 21st century. We then consider several strategies for maintaining solidarity and confidence during the next crisis. Many of these suggestions focus on how governmental leaders and experts should frame their messages about the crisis and how to best mitigate its effects. Many of these lessons are drawn from the several mistakes that were made during the COVID-19 crisis that have now become visible with hindsight.