War, Peace and Security: Volume 6

There has been drastic change in the world's political economy during the last two decades. The era of super power rivalry is over. However, examples of ethnic conflict and human rights violations are abound. As a result of globalization, the emergence of economic super powers like China and India threaten future military confrontation with the U.S. and Western World. The military expenditure of the U.S. has again increased, and it is now more than 60 percent of the world total. There has been no peace dividend, and military spending by major countries including India and China is increasing. The lingering conflict in the former Soviet Union is still alive. Potential nuclear confrontation has emerged due to the possibility of Iran becoming a nuclear power. The cycle of nuclear confrontation with North Korea is not over. A possible nuclear deal with the U.S. and India is seen by many as a breech of non-proliferation agreement. The eternal conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine, and recent conflict in Iraq, will keep it burning for years to come. Many people think that Middle East conflict is nothing but conflict over energy in another form. In the 21st century, the prospect of conflict over water is looming. Another subject that will lead to confrontation between nations is an environmental conflict starting with global warming, water conflict and environmental health. All these factors will threaten human security

To many scholars, this preface may seem to be highly critical of their work in this and other volumes. It is also critical my own books and the many articles I have written in the past on peace economics and peace science. For the moment, I refrain from being critical of the work of peace science scholars since peace science is a new science, less than half a century old.

There are two main doctrines about the relation between war and national economy. The first considered that economy based on the market is a cause of war. The second one established that market and economic knowledge are essential for the realization of peace.

Peace, war and international security is an area in which economists are often conspicuous by their absence, to a degree that rivals the importance of economic issues to the problems at hand. It is getting to the point where the supposed ‘imperialism’ of economics in the social science (Fine, 2001) is reversed and the political scientists, international relations and other such groups exclude the economists and take on the economics themselves. It is not unusual to find studies of post-conflict reconstruction in which economics is surprisingly found to be important. In the case of the World Bank, it came as a great shock to the other social scientists when economists started to argue that economics might have a major role to play in understanding civil wars (Collier et al., 2003). Economists do have the gift of overstatement and a tendency to state unpleasant truths in a clear and precise way that can disturb other social scientists, whose indignation and overreaction reflected this. More recently the debate has reached a more civilised recognition of the complexity of such issues (Arnson & Zartman, 2005; Berdal & Malone, 2000).

Defence economics is often not perceived as a subject, but as a series of questions that arise in the intersection between the spheres of strategy (the art of a general, the specialist in the use of force) and the sphere of economy (the processes of production, distribution and incentives). This overlap between economics and strategy occurs at the individual, the national and the systemic levels. This intersection or overlap is a contested terrain since economists and strategic studies specialists bring very different presuppositions to the party. Defence economics study take account of the realities of strategy, but the models it brings to the party are those of economists.

F. Fukuyama resumed the idea, according to which the humanity inevitably progresses toward a pacification of the international relations after the end of the cold war in his theory of the end of history. Observing the political turnovers at the end of the 1980s and the world spreading of democracy and liberalism he so considered that wars would be less and less likely. But 15 years after the end of the cold war, the perspectives of a durable international disarmament have been disappointed by the ascent of the international terrorism and the American rearmament. The phenomenon of the globalization has made most industrialized countries more vulnerable to attacks, due to the globalization of communications, the development of international transport (notably aerials), the concentration of populations and resources in urban zones, etc. The greater liberalization of international economic activities does not so seem to correspond to a pacification of the international relations and does not thus confirm the liberal hypothesis of the peace by free trade set up as dogma from the end of the 18th century with the English classic school. The main current world economic power, the United States, is engaged in a process of unprecedented increase of its military expenditures, based on a new doctrine that weakens the international strategic balance and increases the risks of military conflicts.

The end of the Cold War has led to several changes in the arms industry at the world level. The expected “peace dividends” did not appear, as the crisis on arms markets, due to the decrease in military expenditures, was not yet overcome when the defence budgets picked up again. Since the 2000s, the market logic has been encouraged in Western countries to restructure the arms industries: the development of generic or dual technologies was encouraged, as well as the diversification on civil markets. If the consolidation of the American arms industry has been quickly achieved, thanks to a strategy of rationalization and cost reduction, as well as of integration of military activities, the results have been less convincing in Western Europe, while the countries of ex-Warsaw pact suffered from a dramatic industrial crisis.

The European defence industry has changed considerably since the late 1980s. The end of the Cold War required the industry to undertake major restructuring, especially when governments, expecting to reap a “peace dividend,” drastically cut procurement spending. In the early 2000s this restructuring was also influenced by the new context of international security, even though defence budgets have started to increase again since 1998. The European defence industry could not expect to escape from a radical transformation, beyond the specific crisis engendered by the end of the Cold War.

At the same time, new military and political factors have emerged, which determine the strategy of the Russian defense industry, rates of its development, and change of the structure. On February 8, of the current year, the chief of Pentagon, R. Gates spoke at a session of the Committee for the Armed Forces of the Chamber of Representatives of the Congress, declaring that USA should be ready to possible military conflicts with other countries including Russia and China: “We need the whole spectrum of war facilities for army involving conflicts, since we do not know what could happen in such places as Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and other.”¹ As a result, the USA military policy is encircling Russia with antimissile defense systems. They are supposed to install a powerful radar in the Czech Republic and shaft-basing missiles in Poland. A superpowerful floating radar is to be transferred from Hawaii islands to Aleut islands, etc. Thus, the whole territory of Russia will be surrounded with radar-missile complexes. These activities will produce an increased attention to elaboration and manufacturing of constituents of the antimissile defense system and by-pass systems, possible withdrawal from the Treaty on conventional weapons in Europe and the Treaty on medium-range strategic missiles etc., which may change the direction and paces of development of the defense industry.

The increase in the military expenditure of the United States was committed since 2000, after several years of reduction. As well as the tax cuts, the military expenditure contributes largely to the current rise of the American public deficit. Considerable appropriations were granted to armament industries, such as for example the launching of the programme of fighters F-35, for an amount of 220 billion dollars (for 3,000 apparatuses). The American rearmament since 2000 again reversed the tendency, digging the technological “gap” between the American industry and rest of the world. With the Afghanistan and Iraq wars included, the USA military expenditures represent 50% of the world expenditures.

Using data over the period from 1950 to 2000, we estimate a model of bilateral international trade to explore the linkages between (a) alliances, (b) joint memberships in international institutions, (c) mutual cooperation and (d) conflict, (e) mutual economic freedom, and (f) democracy and bilateral trade. We incorporate exporter and importer effects as well as reciprocity into a gravity model and cross-validate it against annual out-of-sample data. The resulting, empirical findings show the importance of second and third-order dependencies in bilateral trade data. Military alliances, membership in IGOs, international cooperation, and mutual economic freedom are shown to be strongly associated with bilateral trade. Conversely, conflict and the level of democracy do not demonstrate strong, discernable linkages to bilateral trade.

From the Zealot rebellion against the Roman Empire that occurred in the first century to the Baader-Meinhof Group in the 1970s to Al-Qaeda today terrorism has evolved. A new era came within the scope of geopolitical and economic issues since the collapse of the USSR. Economic deregulation, globalization, and the growth of international organizations have been unable to prevent crises and could not explain the reasons for the growth of terrorism. Of course, economics does not explain all the reasons for terrorism as ideology, religion, and belief are all very important. Before, terrorism was based on a particular political context and struck a particular state, but now it is no more the state, but the symbol that it represents which is struck (Morin, 2001). The Twin towers symbolized power, wealth, capitalism, democracy, and domination. Today, it is a fact that the motivations of terrorists have shifted from nationalism, separatism, or Marxism to religious ideology and fundamentalism. Al-Qaeda is the perfect example of this mutation, with no state, no national territory, yet with an international network and financing. If that is the case, there are several ways to analyze terrorism. According to one definition:Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants to obtain political or social objectives through the intimidation of a large audience, beyond that of the immediate victims. (Enders & Sandler, 2007a)

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of UN peacekeeping operations deployed and their expenditures have significantly increased. Out of an estimated total amount of $44.81 billion spent on 61 UN peacekeeping operations, approximately $41.02 billion, or almost 92%, went to financing 50 missions between 1990 and 2006. There are two main reasons for this significant increase in spending: one is that international security is now threatened with multiple conflicts arising within nations; the second is the significant increase in UN responsibilities in international security. With the end of the Cold War, international strains have been replaced with civil unrest. Intrastate conflicts that were contained until then freely emerged in many developing countries, particularly in Africa. These sorts of conflicts can quickly spread to neighboring countries and seriously affect international security if no measure is taken for their resolution.

According to the 2005 Human Development Report, if the number of conflicts has decreased since 1990, the last two decades are still ridden with violent disputes. These conflicts are distinct from previous periods in the sense that victims are no longer primarily soldiers or military personnel, but also civilians. Women and children are the most vulnerable in these conflicts (the number of civilian loss today is about 90%, the majority being women and children). Because of their social status and sex, women are subjected to several types of violence: rapes, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, mutilation, or forced sterilization. Far more than the number of victims, the consequences of these conflicts on human development in terms of growth reduction due to infrastructure damages, and to food, health, and education system dislocations are important cost factors and must be taken into account (UNDP, 2005). And nevertheless, all of which revolves around the conflicts has always been considered as men's prerogatives. National and international institutions responsible for these issues are generally composed of men. Decisions, made about conflicts and peace, are often issued by men. Women's needs, opinions, and expectations are rarely taken into account. The specificity of the woman's role has not yet been put in integrated decision-makings, whether concerning the reintegration of women fighters after conflicts, their participation in the resolution process and the prevention of conflicts, or whether concerning postconflict reconstruction. Women associations have worked a lot to be heard and to be represented in various political authorities.L’absence des femmes dans les lieux de décisions et de pouvoir (ou quand elles sont représentées la place singulière qu’elles occupent) est l’un des symptômes qui révèlent un dysfonctionnement de la démocratie et oblige à reconsidérer les contours mêmes de la notion de citoyenneté, étant entendu que les femmes ne sont pas le seules cibles de l’exclusion et que ces questions s’inscrivent dans un contexte politique plus large ou exclure est devenu un mode de gouverner¹. (Apfelbaum, 1996)

The political economy of the humanitarian is a new or a very old concept. On the one hand, if we have the main reference of the “humanitarian interventions” such as they were applied these last decades, there is no specific analysis of political economy on the question. On the other hand, if we introduce the concept of “humanitarian missions,” this one is already more ancient, but not older of two centuries. However, “humanitarian interventions” must not be mixed up with “humanitarian missions.” The first are military actions against a State to protect people within its borders from suffering grave harms. The second are peaceful actions and economic decisions to protect the life of victims of war, internal violence, natural or technologic disasters….¹ Thus, there are two “political economies of the humanitarian,” expressed both in the civil and military fields.

“We must have information superiority: the capability to collect process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same” (DoD, Joint Vision 2010). Since the end of the 1980s, the world economy has evolved, and there has been a rapid movement towards globalization. The end of the Cold War coincided with the end of “traditional” conflicts and a new dominant paradigm appeared. The terms of economic war and international competitiveness became inescapable issues dealt at the same moment by economists and the whole politico-administrative sphere. However, as Krugman (1996) noted this vision can turn out dangerous if it leans on erroneous diagnoses. Economic intelligence appears in this particular context. From a theoretical point of view, economic intelligence is presented in Michael Porter's works, for example in his article with V. E. Millar, “How information gives you competitive advantage”. Empirically, economic intelligence is not a new phenomenon. For example, it was practiced in the Middle Ages, when the Venetians passed information onto the Palace of the Doges through their ports and Mediterranean fleet during competition between the commercial cities of the North of Italy and Flanders.

The subject matter of international security and sustainable development is extraordinarily wide-ranging and involves three crucial issues to be addressed in the twenty-first century: (a) how to live (i.e., questions of development), (b) how to live with each other (i.e., questions of security), and (c) how to live with nature (i.e., questions of sustainability). It is just not clear how the three issues hang together. For example, even if we lived in a perfectly safe and secure world, we would still need to deal with the topics of development and sustainability and even if we had both of these, we would still not necessarily be safe and secure from each other.

Is conflict driven by environmental scarcities or an abundance of natural resources? For quite some time, this question has generated a lively academic debate. The theoretical literature and empirical evidence it offers are inconclusive. On the one hand, authors such as Homer-Dixon (1994) have emphasized the importance of resource scarcities in explaining conflict. On the other hand, scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler (1998) have tried to link conflict with a relative abundance of natural resources. We believe that the failure to provide a coherent explanation upon which rigorous predictions can be based is due to the neglect of institutions in understanding resource use. What we will try to highlight here is the importance of institutional settings to explain this apparent paradox.

Since December 1998, the European Union (EU) has institutionalized its defence policy by implementing the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and realizing major improvements by way of a bigger investment of EU members. Nevertheless, since national capabilities are different and the incentives to contribute voluntarily are still weak, not all countries have followed the same pattern in financing the ESDP. Thus, what are the budgetary stakes for an effective and efficient ESDP? Before responding to this question, it seems important to provide an accurate definition of ESDP by putting forward the expected goals and the institutional design to achieve them. As Howorth (2007) notes, a flow of misleading allegations surrounds the ESDP. Among them, the idea that the ESDP corresponds to a European Army is very frequent in the press, when in fact, “each military or civilian mission mounted by ESDP has had its own terms of reference, its own volunteers from a range of EU members States (and indeed from a range of non-EU members states as well), its own logistics and command arrangements, and its own lifetime. When the mission is terminated, the resources, both human and material, initially assigned to it, revert to their national owners” (Howorth, 2007, p. 40).

The shift from color-consciousness to culture-consciousness in world politics has coincided in part with a shift from the legacy of European colonialism to the new global pressure of the American imperium. The old European empires in Africa were ultimately based on doctrines of racial gradation, hence the concept of “the white man's burden”. The new American imperium is ultimately based on a presumed clash between democratic and antidemocratic political systems.