Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research: Volume 7

In the text, use the form Rosman et al. (1995) where there are more than two authors, but list all authors in the references. Quotations of more than one line of text from cited works should be indented and citation should include the page number of the quotation; e.g. (Dunbar, 2001, p. 56).

Prior tax compliance research has largely ignored low-income individual taxpayers, as they have historically been viewed as having an immaterial impact on Federal tax revenues. However, the earned income tax credit (EITC) program has altered the Federal tax revenue landscape in this regard. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigated the magnitude of EITC tax overpayments for tax year 1999 and concluded that between 27 and 31% of EITC filings were overstated, resulting in over-payments of between $8.5 and $9.9 billion (IRS, 2002). These excessive payments represented about 0.5% of total Federal revenues and 2.8% of the total tax gap. Thus, to the extent that low-income individual taxpayers intentionally under-report their incomes in order to receive higher EITC’s, the Federal budget is noticeably affected.

This study extends and complements extant tax research by examining the compliance intentions of low-income individual taxpayers. Relying on the theory of planned behavior, we examine the extent to which perceived tax equity (vertical, horizontal and exchange), normative expectations, and legal sanctions affect tax compliance intentions. Consistent with the hypotheses, the results indicate a significant positive relationship between compliance intentions and: (1) equity perceptions of the tax system; (2) normative expectations of compliance; and (3) penalty magnitude. Additionally, the findings suggest two-way interactions between penalty magnitude and exchange equity, and penalty magnitude and normative expectations. Research results reported herein hold important policy implications related to the Federal government’s efforts to reduce tax cheating and increase compliance among low-income individual taxpayers.

Prior research has identified a number of variables that influence tax professionals’ judgments. However, these variables have usually been examined in isolation. This study has two main findings. First, using a structured questionnaire that allows for the collection of variables related to actual tax planning engagements, this study validates the findings of numerous laboratory studies using factor and regression analysis. Factors representing risks and rewards associated with the client and the IRS, along with task characteristics and client aggressiveness significantly affect the aggressiveness of tax advice given to clients. Second, tax professionals do not appear to charge a premium for aggressive tax advice. However, regarding the fee charged, a significant gender effect is found even after controlling for time spent on the engagement, experience, firm size and education.

The generally accepted method of presentation with respect to going-concern reporting in a global context is to modify the auditor’s report with an explanatory paragraph in addition to having a separate note to the financial statements. In Canada, however, the auditor’s report is clean, and the going concern uncertainty is restricted to the endnotes. This research, using Canadian students as subjects and conducted as a between-subjects experiment, examines unsophisticated investor’s behavior to the signal conveyed by different reporting formats by auditors (U.S. versus Canadian). The results indicate that the form of the auditor’s report does significantly influence subjects’ decisions to invest and their perception of risk.

Over the past two years, fraudulent financial reporting has become a major concern of both the Securities and Exchange Commission and investors. These concerns have been spurred by evidence that several high-profile companies such as Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and HealthSouth have published false and/or misleading financial reports. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82 specifies that auditors have a responsibility to assess the likelihood of management fraud and identifies specific risk factors that should be considered when making that assessment. Apostolou et al. (2001b) examined how internal and external auditors rate the relative importance of these factors. This study extends Apostolou et al. (2001b) by examining how forensic experts at four Big 5 professional service firms assess the factors specified in SAS No. 82. These assessments produced two different models of relative importance: (a) a statistical model (produced by the Analytic Hierarchy Process); and (b) a subjective model (based on subjects’ assessment of the relative weights). These models are then used to assess the self-insight of and the degree of agreement among the forensic experts. The results indicate that forensic experts have a moderately high degree of self-insight. A moderate to high degree of consensus among experts’ judgments about the relative importance of fraud risk factors was noted.

The purpose of this study is to investigate differences between individual and collective budgeting decisions with respect to budgetary slack creation and task performance. While a great deal of research exists in the area of budgeting, to our knowledge, no prior studies have dealt with budget settings in a collective (e.g. small group or cross-functional team) environment. Accordingly, the current study examines differences in slack creation and task performance using a two (decision mode: individual vs. collective decision) by two (incentive contract: slack-inducing vs. truth inducing) between-subjects experimental design. A total of 295 students participated in the experiment (79 individuals and 72 three-person collective units). As expected, individuals and collective decision-makers created significantly more slack under a slack-inducing contract than a truth-inducing contract. Additionally, as anticipated, collective decision-makers created more slack than individuals under a slack-inducing contract. Unexpectedly, however, collective decision-makers created more slack than individuals using a truth-inducing contract. Task performance was significantly different between individuals and collective unit members, such that performance of former exceeded latter, as hypothesized. Finally, preliminary analysis indicated that choice shift occurred in the collective units, such that the units became more cautious in setting budget goals than individuals under both incentive contract conditions.

Organizations rely on budget teams for capital investment decisions. This study examined conditions that affected budget team performance. Variables included the formulation of cooperative, competitive and independent team budget goals and the mediating effect of budget information analysis between goals and budget performance. Two antecedents to budget goal formulation were examined, the budget knowledge of individual team members and organizational feedback control. Posited hypotheses were supported. Asymmetric budget knowledge between team members significantly increased independent and competitive budget goals and decreased cooperative budget goals. Organizational controls discouraged independent and competitive goals and encouraged cooperative budget goals. Cooperative (competitive and independent) budget goals improved (hindered) budget information analysis that in turn positively (negatively) affected budget performance.

The purpose of the study is to examine whether superiors (i.e. principals), who evaluate the performance of their subordinates (i.e. agents), take information asymmetry into account by assuming that subordinates shirk when the accounting system does not provide information on subordinates’ effort levels. A decision making experiment was conducted to examine the effect of information asymmetry on effort attribution and the effect of effort attribution on performance evaluation. The results show that the presence of an agency problem significantly affected managers’ beliefs regarding the level of effort they attributed to the subordinate, which affected their evaluation of the subordinate.

The importance of alignment between users’ and providers’ expectations of accounting services has long been recognized as paramount in the auditing profession. The importance of expectations, and especially expectations gaps, is even more compelling for new assurance services, where the importance of marketing the service is pronounced. This paper develops the Assurance Gaps Model, which describes expectations gaps in general, defining these holistic differences between users’ and providers’ perceptions of assurance services as assurance gaps. The model suggests that assurance gaps really have a number of components – expectations, evaluations of performance and disconfirmation – all of which impact users’ satisfaction with the service. The magnitude of each of these components, as well as the emphasis placed on each one, is important in describing the nature of the gap. This model is consistent with previous research in auditing as well as a large body of research in marketing studying expectations and the satisfaction process (Oliver, 1997). To illustrate potential applications of the Assurance Gaps Model, hypotheses are developed and tested using an online simulation of the ElderCare assurance service proposed by the AICPA/CICA. Results indicate that users and providers demonstrate similar magnitude of each of the factors in the model, but differ in that users emphasize performance in forming satisfaction judgments while providers emphasize expectations. The study and results illustrate the usefulness of the model for performing detailed analysis of assurance gaps and for suggesting appropriate courses of action to manage the factors that contribute to them.