Research in Economic History: Volume 26

Volume 26 of Research in Economic History includes six papers, evenly divided between European and North American topics. Beginning with the European topics, we have two data intensive papers and a survey/synthesis. Stefano Fenoaltea and Carlo Ciccarelli provide new estimates of social overhead investment in the different regions of Italy. This is followed by Markus Lampe's paper reporting data on bilateral trade flows in Europe between 1857 and 1875. The third contribution on a European topic is Bernard Harris's survey of the literature on gender, health, and welfare in England and Wales since industrialization.

This article presents estimates of social-overhead construction in Italy's regions. The new-construction series point to a largely common cycle in non-railway work, and largely idiosyncratic bursts of railway building. Maintenance doubles as an index of the underlying stock, which cannot be calculated from the flows alone; one finds limited convergence, and only in railway infrastructure. Industrial and overall growth are increasingly correlated both with the initial stock, and with its increment. Direct measures of welfare improvements are uncertain, but the relative increases in draftees’ mean heights correlate in particular with social-overhead investment.

This study constructs a comprehensive, internationally comparative set of foreign trade data for the period 1857–1875. The dataset is constructed using information at the commodity group-level and contains import and export values for the UK, France, the Zollverein, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, and the United States, itemised by trade partner. The study tackles three basic problems related to the heterogeneity in national statistics of the period: different definitions of aggregates, inadequate ‘official’ pricing, and the ‘proximity bias’, i.e. the misleading practice of crediting imports to bordering countries from where they physically entered, but where they did not originate. After passing successfully a consistency test, the resulting dataset contains harmonised and country of origin-corrected bilateral trade values for 7 central importers, 10 points in time, and 21 commodity groups, along with ad valorem tariff rates for all commodity groups and countries. They offer new detailed insights into the composition and evolution of trade and tariffs in the third quarter of the 19th century. Furthermore, a basic implementation of the gravity equation shows that as a consequence of the proximity bias estimates using uncorrected data are to be taken with care, especially when assessing border effects and the impact of policy variables.

In recent years, a number of historians have examined the reasons for differences in the height and health of men and women in nineteenth-century Britain, often drawing on economic studies which link excess female mortality in the developing world to restrictions in women's employment opportunities. This paper re-examines this literature and summarises the existing literature on sex-specific differences in height, weight and mortality in England and Wales before 1850. It then uses two electronic datasets to examine changes in cause-specific mortality rates between 1851 and 1995. Although there is little evidence to support the view that the systematic neglect of female children was responsible for high rates of female mortality in childhood, there is rather more evidence to show that gender inequalities contributed to excess female mortality in adulthood.

Many existing studies point to the political contentiousness of attempts by states in the 19th century to impose property taxes, which after mid-century comprised the main source of state revenues. Yet studies fail to establish a convincing connection between interest group political effectiveness and resulting favorable property tax legislation. This paper takes a closer look at one state that adopted property taxation in the mid-19th century and documents intense inter-occupational conflicts between miners and ranchers over creation and administration of the system of property taxes. These conflicts occurred for various institutional reasons, including differential costs of enforcing tax collection and the short-lived political ascendance of miners during, and in the years following, the Gold Rush. The empirical results strongly suggest short-term capture by miners of the state legislature, followed by loss of capture ability as gold declined in economic importance in the 1860s.

This paper explores the nature and causes of the cartel compliance crisis that befell the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) one year after its passage in 1933. We employ a simple game-theoretic model of the NIRA's cartel enforcement mechanism to show that the compliance crisis can largely be explained by changes in expectations, rather than a change in enforcement policy. Specifically, firms initially overestimated the probability that defection would be met with sanction by the cartel's enabling body, the National Recovery Administration – including a consumer boycott resulting from loss of the patriotic Blue Eagle emblem – and complied with the industry cartel rules. As these expectations were correctly adjusted downward, cartel compliance was lost. We support this hypothesis empirically with industry-level panel data showing how output and wage rates varied according to consumer confidence in the Blue Eagle. The analysis provides insight about cartel performance more generally.

Eugene Meyer governed the Federal Reserve Board during most of the Great Contraction. Yet his role and import are almost unknown. He was not misguided by incorrect policy indicators or the real bills doctrine; the usual explanations for the failure of monetary policy. Meyer urged the adoption of expansionary policies and created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to assist banks, especially nonmembers. However, the diffusion of power enabled the district bank Governors to stifle his efforts, although an expansionary policy was finally adopted in 1932. His unquestioning commitment to gold and lack of operational authority are the reasons policy failed.