Advanced search

An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Subjective Performance Assessments Versus Objective Performance Indicators as Determinants of CEO Compensation

Fanny Caranikas‐Walker
Sanjay Goel
Luis R. Gómez‐Mejía
Robert L. Cardy
Arden Grabke Rundell

Management Research

ISSN: 1536-5433

Publication date: 1 April 2008

Abstract

The empirical support for agency theory explanations for the great variance in CEO pay has been equivocal. Drawing from the performance appraisal literature, we hypothesize that boards of directors incorporate human judgment into the evaluation and reward of CEO performance in order to balance managerial risk with agency costs. We test Baysinger and Hoskisson’s (1990) proposition that insider‐dominated corporate boards rely on subjective performance evaluation to reward the CEO, and we argue that R&D intensity influences this relationship. Using a sample of Fortune firms, findings support our contention that human judgment is important in evaluating and rewarding CEO performance.

Keywords

Citation

Caranikas‐Walker, F., Goel, S., Gómez‐Mejía, L.R., Cardy, R.L. and Grabke Rundell, A. (2008), "An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Subjective Performance Assessments Versus Objective Performance Indicators as Determinants of CEO Compensation", Management Research, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 7-25. https://doi.org/10.2753/JMR1536-5433060101

Download as .RIS

Publisher

:

Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2008, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

To read the full version of this content please select one of the options below

You may be able to access this content by logging in via Shibboleth, Open Athens or with your Emerald account.
To rent this content from Deepdyve, please click the button.
Rent from Deepdyve
If you think you should have access to this content, click the button to contact our support team.
Contact us
Manage cookies

We’re listening — tell us what you think

Join us on our journey