Elite Conflict and Industry Regulation: How Political Polarization Affects Local Restriction and State Preemption of the US Hydraulic Fracturing Industry

Abstract

We leverage Lachmann's insight on elite conflict to explain the politics surrounding industry regulation in contemporary America and argue that conflicts between political elites create both constraints on industry players and opportunities for them to shape regulation. The widening urban-rural polarization of American society, in particular, has made urban political elites more liberal than those in state politics. The greater the political polarization of a state, the more local restrictions the nascent US hydraulic fracturing (fracking) industry – generally regarded as conservative – face in that state. Players in the industry thus seek interventions by conservative elites at the state government level. The dominance of conservative state legislators and the presence of affiliates of the right-leaning American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) are bound to strengthen the industry's lobbying efforts in that state. These, in turn, increase the likelihood of the enactment of state preemption laws that nullify local restrictions. We discuss the implications of this on the study of elite conflict, the politics of industry regulation, and the industry's political strategy.

Citation

Yue, L.Q. and Wen, Y. (2024), "Elite Conflict and Industry Regulation: How Political Polarization Affects Local Restriction and State Preemption of the US Hydraulic Fracturing Industry", Emigh, R.J. and Riley, D. (Ed.) Elites, Nonelites, and Power (Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 41), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 113-139. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0198-871920240000041005