Blurring the line between public and private sectors: the case of police officers’ off-duty employment

Citation

Monk, K.M. (2008), "Blurring the line between public and private sectors: the case of police officers’ off-duty employment", Policing: An International Journal, Vol. 31 No. 4. https://doi.org/10.1108/pijpsm.2008.18131dae.001

Blurring the line between public and private sectors: the case of police officers’ off-duty employment

Blurring the line between public and private sectors: the case of police officers’ off-duty employment

Article Type: Perspectives on policing From: Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Volume 31, Issue 4

James A. Brunet,Public Personnel Management,Vol. 37 No. 2,2008,pp. 161-74

Brunet (2008) examines how police organizations balance the needs of the public (the collective society) and the private (individuals or companies) by regulating off-duty employment of their officers. The author uses data collected through interviews and reviews of off-duty employment policies from 18 of the largest police departments (more than 100 sworn officers) in North Carolina. Brunet’s (2008) study examines three main questions regarding off-duty employment by police officers. First, the author examines how much off-duty work officers undertake. Second, the author examines how police agencies regulate the practice of off-duty employment of their officers. Finally, Brunet (2008) explores the issues and/or conflicts that emerge from the blending of public and private sectors.

To address the first question raised regarding how much off-duty work police personnel undertake, Brunet (2008) used telephone interviews with representatives for all 18 departments in the sample. The author asked the departments to estimate the percentage of sworn officers who took on additional work at least once during the year. Levels of participation in secondary employment in North Carolina ranged from 25 percent or less in the cities of Ashville, Greensboro, and Wilmington, to 90 percent in Durham, Burlington, and Chapel Hill. According to Brunet (2008) the off-duty work rates for the state of North Carolina exceeded national off-duty employment rates for police professionals reflected in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ data. However, this difference is mostly likely due to due to the intermittent, seasonal, and variable nature of police off-duty employment, which may not be captured during the Bureau’s sampling time frame.

The author next examined how police agencies regulate the practice of off-duty employment of their officers. Brunet (2008) suggests North Carolina is similar to many other states because it uses a variety of approaches in regulating off-duty employment. The author found, regardless of the approach used, each department in the state followed what was referred to as a “General Order”. The General Order provides basic guidelines for agencies to use such as the proper process of assigning jobs, prohibited jobs (e.g. working as private investigators, providing security inside an establishment that serves alcohol, or working as bill collectors, etc.), wage rates, equipment requirements, and hour restrictions.

Brunet’s (2008) research indicates, along with the guidelines contained in the General Order, agencies in North Carolina follow three main management models for regulating off-duty employment:

1. 1.

   the officer contract model;

2. 2.

   the management model; and

3. 3.

   a mixture both models.

In this study, Raleigh, Winston-Salem, Fayetteville, High Point, Ashville, Gastonia, Wilson, and Burlington used the officer contract model. In this model, the officers are responsible for locating outside employment and negotiating wages with employers. In this approach, the employers typically pay the officers in cash directly without tax withholding.

At the other end of the spectrum, Charlotte, Greensboro, Wilmington, and Greensville exhibited the characteristics of the department contract model. In this model, the department strictly regulates all aspects of the job process. Job assignments are centralized and guided by procedures to ensure fair distribution among officers. Payments for the officer services, according to the author, are made directly to the city or department and the officer is compensated following the standard payroll procedures. This process ensures the appropriate taxes are withheld.

Six agencies in the sample used elements from the department and officer contract model. Specifically, the cities of Durham, Cary, Rocky Mount, Concord, Hickory, and Chapel Hill borrowed elements from both models. For example, these agencies would follow the department contract model in terms of job assignments and salary scale, but use the officer contract model when it comes to payment.

Lastly, Brunet (2008) discusses some of the issues and/or conflicts that emerge from the blending of public and private sectors. The author argues that the private employment of public employees, such as police officers, involves a blurring of traditional lines between the public and private sectors. One reason for this blurring of lines is that police officers are highly visible, public service-oriented workers who have desirable skills and authority to exercise the power of the state. However, because a private company purchases or pays for service of public employees for private gains, the values and motives of the public and private sectors get mixed.

Brunet (2008) illustrates this dilemma when private employers ask officers to modify their “publicness” to adapt to the needs of the business environment. The officer is considered an employee of the business; as such, they are expected to comply with rules and regulations given to them by their supervisors. The moral dilemma for the officer occurs when a supervisor may ask the officer to follow a directive that requires the officer to exercise their public authority for private benefit.

Further complicating matters, officers must follow departmental rules regarding off-duty employment, which may clash with their off-duty job. Officers must wear their regular uniforms when working off-duty, for example. In addition, officers must adhere to the departmental policies regulating the amount of hours they work off-duty so there is no interference with on-duty performance. According to Brunet (2008), approximately half of North Carolina police agencies have guidelines which state officers can be called away from their private job at any time to respond to an emergency because public safety takes precedence over private employment contracts. This means officers can enter law enforcement status when witnessing a crime.

Brunet (2008) suggests while there may be issues between private entities utilizing public employees, public benefits could be maximized if police administrators would do more systematic and strategic thinking about deployment tactics. For example, with careful planning, off-duty officers could be employed in areas where officers would readily assist their on-duty colleagues.

Khadija M. MonkUniversity of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA