Managerial discretion, say on pay, and CEO compensation

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of managerial discretion on the effectiveness of say on pay (SOP) as a governance mechanism. This goal covers an important gap since the issue of how effective SOP is in promoting more aligned compensation has proved somewhat controversial.

Design/methodology/approach

This empirical research opted for a panel methodology for the period 2003–2017, using a sample of large UK listed-companies (specifically, 3,445 firm-year observations). Data were obtained from several sources (Manifest Ltd, BoardEx, Worldscope, Factset Ownership and DataStream).

Findings

Results show that managerial discretion plays an important role in the effectiveness of SOP as a mechanism for increasing aligned CEO compensation. While individual discretion (latitude of objectives) exerts a negative effect, contextual discretion (latitude of action) increases SOP effectiveness. The global effect of managerial discretion is positive when there is high level of both individual and contextual discretion.

Originality/value

This empirical study provides evidence concerning an emerging topic in the literature regarding the impact of SOP as a shareholder activism mechanism of corporate governance on executive compensation. By taking managerial discretion into consideration as a relevant moderating factor, it also offers a better explanation of SOP effectiveness as a governance mechanism.

Citation

Baixauli-Soler, J.S., Lozano-Reina, G. and Sánchez-Marín, G. (2021), "Managerial discretion, say on pay, and CEO compensation", Management Decision, Vol. 59 No. 6, pp. 1333-1362. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-03-2020-0242