Does executive compensation mechanism balance performance with risk-taking? Evidence from China's banking system
ISSN: 0368-492X
Article publication date: 27 April 2023
Issue publication date: 30 October 2024
Abstract
Purpose
In this study, the authors demonstrate the inherent connections between bank risk-taking, performance and executive compensation in the banking sector of China by developing a theoretical model and performing empirical tests with simultaneous equation models.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors construct a multi-task principal-agent model to capture agency problems in China, and the model can be extended to various cases. In empirical tests, simultaneous equation models are used to examine the theoretical predictions by eliminating endogenous concerns efficiently compared with the methods in the existing literature.
Findings
The results indicate that the regulator fails to provide bank managers with positive incentives to control risk, whereas the compensation guidance policy (2010) proposed by the CBRC alleviates this problem in China. Additionally, the authors established that shareholders reward bank managers for better and more stable performance. The authors propose the introduction of restricted stock options into the compensation design, as the existing compensation design fails to balance the performance and risk-taking of banks.
Research limitations/implications
First, the executive compensation structure and details in China are not available. In addition, the equity-based incentive compensation is forbidden. Therefore, this paper cannot provide more details about how the compensation structure affects bank manager behaviours. Secondly, the database consists only 25 listed commercial banks. Luckily, the assets of these banks could account for the vast majority of China's banking assets. The authors also expect that new methodologies such as machine learning and deep learning will be adopted in the research on bank risk management.
Practical implications
First, the regulator should optimise the compositions and payment rule of bank executive compensations. Secondly, it is advisable to adopt restricted deferred share reward or stock option compensation in due course. Thirdly, the regulator can require the banks that undertake excessive risks and troubled by moral hazard to increase the independent director proportion on the bank board according to the authors' empirical tests that higher independent proportion prevents the risk accumulations effectively. Fourthly, except for absolute compensation, the gap between executives' salary and average employee's income should be taken account.
Originality/value
This study provides a theoretical framework that incorporates the manager behaviours, executive compensation and bank regulations, and it provides empirical tests by solving endogenous concerns. Additionally, this study examines the effects of China's compensation guidelines issued in 2010. The authors believe that this study adds value to the existing literature by illustrating the compensation mechanism in China.
Keywords
Citation
Jiang, Y., Yuan, C. and Zhang, J. (2024), "Does executive compensation mechanism balance performance with risk-taking? Evidence from China's banking system", Kybernetes, Vol. 53 No. 10, pp. 3041-3060. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-09-2022-1251
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
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