CEO Pay in the American Insurance Industry

Kevin J. Sigler (Associate Professor of Business, Cameron School of Business, University of North Carolina at Wilmington, Wilmington, North Carolina 28403, USA)

Management Research News

ISSN: 0140-9174

Publication date: 1 August 1997

Abstract

Academics believe that shareholder and management interests can be productively aligned by directly linking CEO compensation to firm performance (Abowd [1990], Agrawal & Mankelder [1987], Lewellen, Loderer & Martin [1987], and Haugen & Senbet [1981]). Stockholders prefer CEOs pursuing strategies that maximise risk adjusted stock returns, but CEOs are assumed to be interested in strategies that maximise their personal wealth. If rewarded through their pay packages to increase the size of the firm, CEOs may overgrow the firm at shareholder expense to reach that end.

Citation

Sigler, K. (1997), "CEO Pay in the American Insurance Industry", Management Research News, Vol. 20 No. 8, pp. 18-25. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb045675

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Publisher

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1997, MCB UP Limited

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