Performance Measurement in Corporate Governance: Do Mergers Improve Managerial Performance in the Post‐Merger Period?

Abstract

Corporate finance studies of mergers and acquisitions have relied mostly on stock price reactions to evaluate the impact of these events. In this paper, we analyze the performance of a sample of merged firms over a ten year period using a managerially controlled efficiency measure, data envelopment analysis (DEA). Our individual firm‐level year‐by‐year analyses indicate that the managerial performance of the merged firms generally improved in the post‐merger period as documented in the earlier studies of mergers and acquisitions. However, there were also a significant number of cases where we could not observe improved managerial efficiency using this less aggregated approach. We conclude that DEA based disaggregated approaches are useful tools in the hands of corporate governance boards with an interest in yearly or even quarterly managerial performance at the individual firm level.

Citation

Feroz, E.H., Kim, S. and Raab, R. (2005), "Performance Measurement in Corporate Governance: Do Mergers Improve Managerial Performance in the Post‐Merger Period?", Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 86-100. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb043432