TY  - JOUR
AB  - Analysis of management compensation has focused on the principal — agent problem. We address the problem confronting owners who must choose a manager without knowing the productivity of individual managers. We find performance contingent contracts may result in a separating equilibrium in which high productivity managers accept contracts low productivity managers find unacceptable.
VL  - 18
IS  - 2
SN  - 1086-7376
DO  - 10.1108/eb028744
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/eb028744
AU  - Chopin Marc C.
AU  - Schulman Craig T.
PY  - 1997
Y1  - 1997/01/01
TI  - PERFORMANCE PAY AS A SCREENING DEVICE
T2  - Studies in Economics and Finance
PB  - MCB UP Ltd
SP  - 94
EP  - 108
Y2  - 2024/04/24
ER  -