PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND MONETARY POLICY: IS THERE AN ELECTORAL CYCLE?

Abstract

In the conventional positive neoclassical economics, the underlying behavioral assumptions concerning government activity clearly contrast with those usually admitted for other economic agents. While the latter are assumed to seek their own private interest, although accomplishing in that way a social function, governments are assumed to have as their main objective the maximization of social welfare. Hence, the assumption that economic policies are intended to stabilize economic activity follows as a consequence. The inconsistency of this asymmetry between the treatment of government and other agents was clearly stressed by Downs (1957):

Citation

SANTOS, F.T. (1985), "PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND MONETARY POLICY: IS THERE AN ELECTORAL CYCLE?", Studies in Economics and Finance, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 85-105. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb028659