Familial Control, Size and Performance in the Largest French Firms
Alexis Jacquemin
(Professor of Economics and Research Assistant at the Université Catholique de Louvain)
Elisabeth de Ghellinck
(Professor of Economics and Research Assistant at the Université Catholique de Louvain)
67
Abstract
Contrasting with the traditional profit‐maximising economic theory of the firm where managerial discretion is unimportant, there is a growing volume of U.S. economic studies suggesting first, that the large corporation is characterised by a wide dispersion of stock ownership implying a separation of ownership and control; secondly, that the shift in control from owners to managers lead to firms' policies and performance conflicting with stockholders' interests.
Citation
Jacquemin, A. and de Ghellinck, E. (1978), "Familial Control, Size and Performance in the Largest French Firms", Management Research News, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 10-10. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb027691
Publisher
:MCB UP Ltd
Copyright © 1978, MCB UP Limited