TY  - JOUR
AB  - A simulated price war between two competing gas stations provided the context to assess the effects on de‐escalation of the subject's financial shortage, the competitor's financial shortage, and a message from the competitor conveying a non‐exploitative intent. Subject shortages encouraged gasoline price increases (de‐escalation) and competitor shortages encouraged price decreases (escalation). Subjects who were suffering a financial shortage rated their competitor as less likely to cooperate and more likely to exploit them than those who were not. Results were discussed in terms of a simplification of Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) goal‐expectation hypothesis. One possible explanation for our results is that subjects make a comparison of relative strength before choosing either to de‐escalate or escalate.
VL  - 7
IS  - 1
SN  - 1044-4068
DO  - 10.1108/eb022773
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022773
AU  - Rick Fry William
AU  - Betz Brian
AU  - Pruitt Dean G.
PY  - 1996
Y1  - 1996/01/01
TI  - THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCE SHORTAGE ON DE‐ESCALATION IN A SIMULATED PRICE WAR
T2  - International Journal of Conflict Management
PB  - MCB UP Ltd
SP  - 5
EP  - 20
Y2  - 2024/04/18
ER  -