EFFECTS OF ARBITRATION CONDITION AND RISK‐TAKING PROPENSITY UPON BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

Abstract

This study investigated the effects of arbitration condition and risk‐taking propensity upon bargaining behavior. Negotiators anticipating final‐offer arbitration settled more contracts, resolved more contract issues, and conceded more than did negotiators anticipating conventional arbitration. Contrary to our hypothesis, low risk‐taking propensity dyads did not settle significantly more contract issues under final‐offer arbitration than they did under conventional arbitration. Union negotiators made significantly greater concessions during the 30 minute pre‐arbitration bargaining period and conceded a greater total amount than did management negotiators. Possible explanations for these findings are presented.

Citation

Bigoness, W.J. and DuBose, P.B. (1992), "EFFECTS OF ARBITRATION CONDITION AND RISK‐TAKING PROPENSITY UPON BARGAINING BEHAVIOR", International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 133-150. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022709