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CRISIS BARGAINING: TRACKING RELATIONAL PARADOX IN HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION

William A. Donohue (Michigan State University)
Closepet Ramesh (Northeast Missouri State University)
Carl Borchgrevink (Michigan State University)

International Journal of Conflict Management

ISSN: 1044-4068

Article publication date: 1 April 1991

Abstract

This paper develops an empirical means of tracking involvement in a relational double‐bind in hostage negotiations as a means of monitoring the extent to which the hostage takers developed more cooperative or competitive relational parameters with police negotiators. Verbal immediacy was used to track the hostage takers double bind problems across nine different hostage negotiations. The results indicated that the purpose for taking hostages greatly influenced the kinds of paradoxes displayed by the hostage takers. Mentally ill hostage takers became cooperative early in the negotiation, but then turned more competitive as the negotiation unfolded. Hostage takers caught in the act of committing a crime became competitive early and then became more cooperative as time elapsed The hostage takers involved in domestic violence remained competitive throughout the interaction.

Citation

Donohue, W.A., Ramesh, C. and Borchgrevink, C. (1991), "CRISIS BARGAINING: TRACKING RELATIONAL PARADOX IN HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION", International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 2 No. 4, pp. 258-274. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb022701

Publisher

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1991, MCB UP Limited