Precontractual investigation and risk aversion

Abstract

This paper presents an analytical framework for determining efficient levels and durations of precontractual investigation. Economic efficiency in the allocation of investigation tasks between client and tenderer is shown to depend on how closely related the technologies of investigation and construction are. Moreover, risk aversion and the interest rate affect the efficient allocation. The framework is also used as a basis for an investment analysis of the balance between client's investigation efforts and expected claims in the future. Finally, the framework is used to show how the optimal length of the investigation period can be derived from the expected cash flow associated with a project over its total life cycle, from inception to demolition. Results indicate the economic potential of tailoring risk sharing in construction procurement, according to the type of construction project and the attitudes to risk among client and contractors.

Citation

BRÖCHNER, J. (1994), "Precontractual investigation and risk aversion", Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 91-101. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb020994