MODELLING ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOUR: A CASE OF FAILURE IN COORDINATION
Abstract
This paper seeks first to build up a game‐theoretic model of the interactions of two agents ‐ a husband and a wife ‐ in a short story about sincere selection of a strategy of self‐sacrifice, and then to find out a solution of the model. This formal model as well as informal analysis is employed to argue that the conventional virtue of everybody's choice of a strategy of sacrifice for others in a group, especially when these strategies are uncoordinated, may ultimately lead to social vice, i.e. irrational behaviour and attempts at rationalization of it by all.
Citation
Jamal Anwar, A. (1999), "MODELLING ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOUR: A CASE OF FAILURE IN COORDINATION", Humanomics, Vol. 15 No. 4, pp. 94-122. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb018841
Publisher
:MCB UP Ltd
Copyright © 1999, MCB UP Limited