INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY AND THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS

Abstract

The idea of what constitutes rationality has always been central to moral philosophy as well as to modern social science and economics; regardless of the fact that its meaning has also greatly changed during the last five hundred years. While for Aristotle and his followers, full rationality implied not only effective deliberation of means towards any given end, but also that such end had to be rationally selected with the guidance of reason or “practical wisdom”, since the age of Thomas Hobbes and David Humes, the concept of rationality has been reduced to one of seeking the best means to any particular end, wise or unwise. In the process, reason was relegated to mere “reckoning”, of adding and subtracting according to arithmetic rules. The good was simply what was desired, motivated by a physiological appetite for survival or otherwise. As could have been expected, such mechanical mode of reasoning readily provided the rudiments of contemporary computational theories of action, in particular game theory (see Cudd, 1993).

Citation

Lutz, M.A. (1994), "INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY AND THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS", Humanomics, Vol. 10 No. 4, pp. 49-75. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb018757