Further Examination of the Auditing Standards Board's Voting Patterns

Abstract

This study conducted a comprehensive analysis of the ASB's voting activities for 45 SASs issued over a 12‐year period. The results support earlier studies by Kinney and others that members' respective firm characteristics are strongly associated with their voting behavior. However, while Kinney posited that structured firms investment in audit methodology resulted in more support for new standards due to lower opportunity costs to adopt a new SAS, this study identifies such firms' greater propensity to vote against SASs. This study supports Kinney's (1986) “political cost” hypothesis regarding ASB members' reluctancy to vote against an SAS. This study also supports the relationship between firm characteristics such as audit structure and ASB member voting patterns. Overall, the results suggest that the ASB provides a democratic forum for large and small firms to equally participate in the standard‐setting process. The diversified membership of the ASB appears to result in no systematic dominant influence, other than potentially by the chair position.

Citation

Glover, H.D. and Wallace, W.A. (1997), "Further Examination of the Auditing Standards Board's Voting Patterns", Managerial Finance, Vol. 23 No. 12, pp. 3-21. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb018658