Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Control

Abstract

The conventional wisdom regarding the rationale for employee stock ownership plans (ESOPS) holds that such plans provide incentives for improved worker productivity. This view minimizes the employees' portfolio problem inherent in ESOP participation — employment risk for ESOP participants is increased by tying their investment/retirement program to the fortunes of the company in which they are employed. We examine the extent of empirical support for the incentive alignment theory of ESOPs, along with two alternative explanations. One alternative holds that firms initiating ESOP plans signal high investment quality, thus reducing the cost of raising equity capital. Another theory is that ESOPs are a form of coalition, or “devil's pact” between managers and workers in which they agree to prolong and share in perquisite consumption. A large sample of ESOP plans is divided into three categories: anti‐takeover plans, wage concession plans, and “pure” ESOPs. Analysis of pre‐ and post ESOP conditions and stock returns is performed. Among the findings is that pure ESOPs appear to have effects consistent with improvements in worker productivity and/or signaling high investment quality. Strong support for the devil's pact theory is found in the anti‐takeover subcategories of ESOPs.

Citation

Clark, R.W., Philippatos, G.C. and Shrieves, R.E. (1997), "Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Corporate Control", Managerial Finance, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 19-38. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb018612